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Deep Control - Essays on Free Will and Value (Paperback)
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Deep Control - Essays on Free Will and Value (Paperback)
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In this collection of essays - a follow up to My Way and Our
Stories - John Martin Fischer defends the contention that moral
responsibility is associated with "deep control". Fischer defines
deep control as the middle ground between two untenable extreme
positions: "superficial control" and "total control". Our freedom
consists of the power to add to the given past, holding fixed the
laws of nature, and therefore, Fischer contends, we must be able to
interpret our actions as extensions of a line that represents the
actual past. In "connecting the dots", we engage in a distinctive
sort of self-expression. In the first group of essays in this
volume, Fischer argues that we do not need genuine access to
alterative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. Thus,
the line need not branch off at crucial points (where the branches
represent genuine metaphysical possibilities). In the remaining
essays in the collection he demonstrates that deep control is the
freedom condition on moral responsibility. In so arguing, Fischer
contends that total control is too much to ask-it is a form of
"metaphysical megalomania". So we do not need to "trace back" all
the way to the beginning of the line (or even farther) in seeking
the relevant kind of freedom or control. Additionally, he contends
that various kinds of "superficial control"-such as versions of
"conditional freedom" and "judgment-sensitivity" are too shallow;
they don't trace back far enough along the line. In short, Fischer
argues that, in seeking the freedom that grounds moral
responsibility, we need to carve out a middle ground between
superficiality and excessive penetration. Deep Control is the
"middle way". Fischer presents a new argument that deep control is
compatible not just with causal determinism, but also causal
indeterminism. He thus tackles the luck problem and shows that the
solution to this problem is parallel in important ways to the
considerations in favor of the compatibility of causal determinism
and moral responsibility.
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