The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese
Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency
campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources,
choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The
Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to
match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so,
followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French
experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict
was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national
strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the
burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It
describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem
in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it
developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and
how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The
uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic
military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with
the experiences of other governments fighting similar
contemporaneous wars.
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