The decision to fortify northeastern France has usually been
considered a tragic mistake, an example of bad planning and missed
opportunities. Not so, says Judith M. Hughes, who provides a
convincing view of how France's military and political leaders
tried to safeguard their nation and why they failed.
"�A� stimulating and excellently documented book...Individual
personalities are particularly well handled. Foch and Ptain,
Poincar and Blum--all emerge with veritable life in them. The
trends of French interwar history are deftly carried through onto
these pages with an unobtrusive lucidity and persuasiveness."
--Michael Hurst, American Historical Review
"Admirable...Instead of working backward from 1940, seeking
causes and culprits of collapse in the 1930s, Ms. Hughes has wisely
chosen to begin in 1918 and to focus upon the 1920s. This
chronology has given her a fresher perspective and a wider scope
for sympathy than other commentators of the period. It is the great
merit of this book that it passes judgments with compassion and
restraint. Indeed, Professor Hughes insists upon viewing French
military policy in the broadest possible context of international
developments, domestic politics, economic problems, and
intellectual moods; from these elements, she weaves a dilemma of
tragic dimensions in which the confusions and mistakes of
individuals are reviewed with kindness and realism." --Charles C.
Bright, Political Science Quarterly
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