Dynamic oligopolistic competition has implications both for the
strategic management of firms and for the design of an effective
competition policy. Consequently, the present book considers the
issue from a private and social perspective. It discusses the
potential pro- and anticollusive effects of long-term business
strategies, especially for cooperation and reinvestment in
production, financing and management compensation, in markets with
fluctuating demand. The method of supergame theory is applied to
integrate long-run decisions and different types of demand into the
analysis. Aside from its contributions to the theoretical
literature, the book provides valuable insights into the design of
competition policy. The observed development of prices is an
indicator of the extent of collusion in the market and can thereby
be used to assess antitrust regulation in certain business areas,
and to focus the resources of competition authorities on markets
where conditions are conducive to collusion.
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