During the early 1990s the Department of Justice used its Voting
Rights Act power to object to racially unfair redistricting laws to
force states to maximize minority congressional districts. The
results were dramatic: Congressional Black Caucus membership
swelled from 25 to 38 and nine new Hispanic congresspersons were
sworn in. Only three years later, the maximization strategy lay in
ruins. The courts forced many of the new minority districts to be
redrawn and the judiciary reserved especially harsh criticism for
the Department.
Cunningham examines and analyzes how the Department came to
adopt the maximization strategy. He explores the bureaucratic
culture of the Division's Voting Section, its history, and the
interaction of its progressive career staff with more conservative
political appointees. The Division works amidst a vibrant interest
group environment, with civil rights advocates, the state, and
political parties eager for influence. Cunningham shows how that
influence contest was won by the civil rights groups, how their
preferred interpretations of fair redistricting and discriminatory
purpose were adopted by the Division, and how their chosen
districting models were forced upon states by the Division. He
examines the effect the Department has had on federalism,
representation, and its own impaired credibility with the
judiciary. Finally, he suggests how the Division might resurrect
its damaged reputation for balanced enforcement. An important study
for scholars, students, and public policy makers involved with
civil rights, public administration, and public law.
General
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