In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a fair number of
Americans thought the idea was crazy. Now everyone, except a few
die-hards, thinks it was. So what was going through the minds of
the talented and experienced men and women who planned and
initiated the war? What were their assumptions? Overreach "aims to
recover those presuppositions.
Michael MacDonald examines the standard hypotheses for the
decision to attack, showing them to be either wrong or of secondary
importance: the personality of President George W. Bush, including
his relationship with his father; Republican electoral
considerations; the oil lobby; the Israeli lobby. He also
undermines the argument that the war failed because of the Bush
administration s incompetence.
The more fundamental reasons for the Iraq War and its failure,
MacDonald argues, are located in basic axioms of American foreign
policy, which equate America s ideals with its interests
(distorting both in the process) and project those ideals as
universally applicable. Believing that democratic principles would
bring order to Iraq naturally and spontaneously, regardless of the
region s history and culture or what Iraqis themselves wanted,
neoconservative thinkers, with support from many on the left,
advocated breaking the back of state power under Saddam Hussein.
They maintained that by bringing about radical regime change, the
United States was promoting liberalism, capitalism, and democracy
in Iraq. But what it did instead was unleash chaos. That these
axioms are not limited to Iraq can be seen in the recent ousting of
Khadafi s regime in Libya."
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!