This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel
Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth
principally in the "Critique of Pure Reason." It is widely
recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer
skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the
controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He
distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception"
skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism,
which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a
priori knowledge; and Pyrrhonian skepticism, which concerns the
equal balance of opposing arguments. Forster overturns conventional
views by showing how the first of these types was of little
importance for Kant, but how the second and third held very special
importance for him, namely because of their bearing on the fate of
metaphysics. He argues that Kant undertook his reform of
metaphysics primarily in order to render it defensible against
these types of skepticism. Finally, in a critical appraisal of
Kant's project, Forster argues that, despite its strengths, it
ultimately fails, for reasons that carry interesting broader
philosophical lessons. These reasons include inadequate
self-reflection and an underestimation of the resources of
Pyrrhonian skepticism.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!