What drives politics in dictatorships? Milan W. Svolik argues
authoritarian regimes must resolve two fundamental conflicts.
Dictators face threats from the masses over which they rule - the
problem of authoritarian control. Secondly from the elites with
whom dictators rule - the problem of authoritarian power-sharing.
Using the tools of game theory, Svolik explains why some dictators
establish personal autocracy and stay in power for decades; why
elsewhere leadership changes are regular and institutionalized, as
in contemporary China; why some dictatorships are ruled by
soldiers, as Uganda was under Idi Amin; why many authoritarian
regimes, such as PRI-era Mexico, maintain regime-sanctioned
political parties; and why a country's authoritarian past casts a
long shadow over its prospects for democracy, as the unfolding
events of the Arab Spring reveal. Svolik complements these and
other historical case studies with the statistical analysis on
institutions, leaders and ruling coalitions across dictatorships
from 1946 to 2008.
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