Pascal Engel investigates how outside directors are incentivized in
family firms that are publicly listed but still partly owned by
members of the founding family. Owning families significantly
influence their firms' corporate conduct with their own set of
goals, sometimes in conflict with economically driven goals of the
capital markets. The author analyzes how family shareholders exert
their influence on compensation schemes of outside directors who
have the difficult task to protect the interests of family and
non-family shareholders. This book provides insights on current
approaches of defining a compensation scheme that attracts
qualified outside directors but concurrently reflects respective
shareholders' preferences.
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