Federal regulatory agencies are often assumed to be excessively
responsive to and influenced by the corporate interests they are
supposed to regulate. On the basis of direct empirical examination,
Paul Quirk challenges this assumption as it relates to four United
States federal regulatory agencies. Through a series of interviews
with high-level officials of the Federal Trade Commission, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, the Food and Drug Administration, and the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, he determines
whether and what kinds of incentives exist to adopt policies
favorable to industry. Originally published in 1981. The Princeton
Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again
make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished
backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the
original texts of these important books while presenting them in
durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton
Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly
heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton
University Press since its founding in 1905.
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