0
Your cart

Your cart is empty

Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Economic theory & philosophy

Buy Now

Game Equilibrium Models I - Evolution and Game Dynamics (Paperback, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1991) Loot Price: R1,587
Discovery Miles 15 870
Game Equilibrium Models I - Evolution and Game Dynamics (Paperback, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1991): Reinhard....

Game Equilibrium Models I - Evolution and Game Dynamics (Paperback, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1991)

Reinhard. Selten; Contributions by I. Eshel, J.W. Friedman, R. Gardner, P. Hammerstein, P.F. Hoekstra, Y. Iwasa, D. Messick, M. Morris, H.J. Poethke

 (sign in to rate)
Loot Price R1,587 Discovery Miles 15 870 | Repayment Terms: R149 pm x 12*

Bookmark and Share

Expected to ship within 10 - 15 working days

There are two main approaches towards the phenotypic analysis of frequency dependent natural selection. First, there is the approach of evolutionary game theory, which was introduced in 1973 by John Maynard Smith and George R. Price. In this theory, the dynamical process of natural selection is not modeled explicitly. Instead, the selective forces acting within a population are represented by a fitness function, which is then analysed according to the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy or ESS. Later on, the static approach of evolutionary game theory has been complemented by a dynamic stability analysis of the replicator equations. Introduced by Peter D. Taylor and Leo B. Jonker in 1978, these equations specify a class of dynamical systems, which provide a simple dynamic description of a selection process. Usually, the investigation of the replicator dynamics centers around a stability analysis of their stationary solutions. Although evolutionary stability and dynamic stability both intend to characterize the long-term outcome of frequency dependent selection, these concepts differ considerably in the 'philosophies' on which they are based. It is therefore not too surprising that they often lead to quite different evolutionary predictions (see, e. g. , Weissing 1983). The present paper intends to illustrate the incongruities between the two approaches towards a phenotypic theory of natural selection. A detailed game theoretical and dynamical analysis is given for a generic class of evolutionary normal form games.

General

Imprint: Springer-Verlag
Country of origin: Germany
Release date: December 2010
First published: 1991
Editors: Reinhard. Selten
Contributors: I. Eshel • J.W. Friedman • R. Gardner • P. Hammerstein • P.F. Hoekstra • Y. Iwasa • D. Messick • M. Morris • H.J. Poethke
Dimensions: 244 x 170 x 18mm (L x W x T)
Format: Paperback
Pages: 330
Edition: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1991
ISBN-13: 978-3-642-08108-8
Categories: Books > Business & Economics > Economics > Economic theory & philosophy
Books > Science & Mathematics > Mathematics > Probability & statistics
Books > Science & Mathematics > Mathematics > Applied mathematics > Mathematics for scientists & engineers
Books > Science & Mathematics > Biology, life sciences > Life sciences: general issues > Evolution
LSN: 3-642-08108-8
Barcode: 9783642081088

Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate? Let us know about it.

Does this product have an incorrect or missing image? Send us a new image.

Is this product missing categories? Add more categories.

Review This Product

No reviews yet - be the first to create one!

Partners