Presented in this book is a theory of concept formation and
understanding that does not make use of a notion of an innate
mental language as a means of concept representation. Instead,
experimental concepts are treated semantically as stabilising
structuring of growing sets of data, which are sets of experienced
satisfaction situations for expressions, and theoretical concepts
are based on coherent sets of general sentences held true. There
are two kinds of structures to be established: general concepts by
means of similarity sets under perspectives and historical
concepts. This gives rise to a theory of understanding new
situations and expressions by integrating new data into established
sets of data salva stability, or by extending the conceptual
structure in a metaphorical or metonymical way. The theory provides
a way to understand what identity between propositional attitudes
amounts to, especially how people can have more or less the same
belief.
General
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