"In numerous crises after World War II-Berlin, Korea, the Taiwan
Straits, and the Middle East-the United States resorted to vague
threats to use nuclear weapons in order to deter Soviet or Chinese
military action. On a few occasions the Soviet Union also engaged
in nuclear saber-ratling. Using declassified documents and other
sources, this volume examines those crises and compares the
decisionmaking processes of leaders who considered nuclear threats
with the commonly accepted logic of nuclear deterrence and
coercion. Rejecting standard explanations of our leader's logic in
these cases, Betts suggests that U.S. presidents were neither
consciously blufffing when they made nuclear threats, nor prepared
to face the consequences if their threats failed. The author also
challenges the myth that the 1950s was a golden age of low
vulberability for the United Stateas and details how nuclear parity
has, and has not, altered conditions that gave rise to nuclear
blackmail in the past. "
General
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