In this provocative study, Robert Cummins takes on philosophers,
both old and new, who pursue the question of mental representation
as an abstraction, apart from the constraints of any particular
theory or framework. Cummins asserts that mental representation is,
in fact, a problem in the philosophy of science, a theoretical
assumption that serves different explanatory roles within the
different contexts of commonsense or "folk" psychology, orthodox
computation, connectionism, or neuroscience.
Cummins looks at existing and traditional accounts by Locke,
Fodor, Dretske, Millikan, and others of the nature of mental
representation and evaluates these accounts within the context of
orthodox computational theories of cognition. He proposes that
popular accounts of mental representation are inconsistent with the
empirical assumptions of these models, which require an account of
representation like that involved in mathematical modeling. In the
final chapter he considers how mental representation might look in
a connectionist context.
"A Bradford Book."
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