The prevailing interpretation of Kant's First Critique in
Anglo-American philosophy views his theory of a priori knowledge as
basically a theory about the possibility of empirical knowledge (or
experience), or the a priori conditions for that possibility (the
representations of space and time and the categories). Instead,
Robert Greenberg argues that Kant is more fundamentally concerned
with the possibility of a priori knowledge--the very possibility of
the possibility of empirical knowledge in the first place.
Greenberg advances four central theses: (1) the Critique is
primarily concerned about the possibility, or relation to objects,
of a priori, not empirical knowledge, and Kant's theory of that
possibility is defensible; (2) Kant's transcendental ontology must
be distinct from the conditions of the possibility of a priori
knowledge; (3) the functions of judgment, in Kant's discussion of
the Table of Judgments, should be seen according to his
transcendental logic as having content, not as being just logical
forms of judgment making; (4) Kant's distinction between and
connection of ordering relations (Verhaltnisse) and reference
relations (Beziehungen) have to be kept in mind to avoid
misunderstanding the Critique.
At every step of the way Greenberg contrasts his view with the
major interpretations of Kant by commentators like Henry Allison,
Jonathan Bennett, Paul Guyer, and Peter Strawson. Not only does
this new approach to Kant present a strong challenge to these
dominant interpretations, but by being more true to Kant's own
intent it holds promise for making better sense out of what have
been seen as the First Critique's discordant themes.
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