It seems reasonable to believe that there might have existed
things other than those that in fact exist, or have existed. But
how should we understand such claims? Standard semantic theories
exploit the Leibnizian metaphor of a set of all possible worlds: a
proposition might or must be true if it is true in some or all
possible worlds. The actualist, who believes that nothing exists
except what actually exists, prefers to talk of possible states of
the world, or of ways that a world might be. But even the actualist
still faces the problem of explaining what we are talking about
when we talk about the domains of other possible worlds. In "Mere
Possibilities," Robert Stalnaker develops a framework for
clarifying this problem, and explores a number of actualist
strategies for solving it.
Some philosophers have hypothesized a realm of individual
essences that stand as proxies for all merely possible beings.
Others have argued that we are committed to the necessary existence
of everything that does or might exist. In contrast, "Mere
Possibilities" shows how we can make sense of ordinary beliefs
about what might and must exist without making counterintuitive
metaphysical commitments. The book also sheds new light on the
nature of metaphysical theorizing by exploring the interaction of
semantic and metaphysical issues, the connections between different
metaphysical issues, and the nature of ontological commitment.
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