Concern has grown in Congress and elsewhere about China's military
modernisation. The topic is an increasing factor in discussions
over future required U.S. Navy capabilities. The issue for Congress
addressed in this book is: How should China's military
modernisation be factored into decisions about U.S. Navy programs?
Several laments of China's military modernisation have potential
implications for future required U.S. Navy capabilities. These
include theatre-range ballistic missiles (TBMs), land-attack cruise
missiles (LACMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs), land-based aircraft, submarines, surface
combatants, amphibious ships, naval mines, nuclear weapons, and
possibly high-power microwave HPM) devices. China's naval
limitations or weaknesses include capabilities for operating in
waters more distant from China, joint operations, C4ISR (command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance), long-range surveillance and targeting systems,
anti-air warfare (AAW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), mine
countermeasures (MCM), and logistics. Observers believe a near-term
focus of China's military modernisation is to field a force that
can succeed in a short-duration conflict with Taiwan and act as an
anti-access force to deter U.S. intervention or delay the arrival
of U.S. forces, particularly naval and air forces, in such a
conflict. Some analysts speculate that China may attain (or believe
that it has attained) a capable maritime anti-access force, or
elements of it, by about 2010. Other observers believe this will
happen later. Potential broader or longer-term goals of China's
naval modernisation include asserting China's regional military
leadership and protecting China's maritime territorial, economic,
and energy interests. China's naval modernisation has potential
implications for required U.S. Navy capabilities in terms of
preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area, maintaining
U.S. Navy presence and military influence in the Western Pacific,
and countering Chinese ballistic missile submarines. Preparing for
a conflict in the Taiwan Strait area could place a premium on the
following: on-station or early-arriving Navy forces, capabilities
for defeating China's maritime anti-access forces, and capabilities
for operating in an environment that could be characterised by
information warfare and possibly electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and
the use of nuclear weapons. Certain options are available for
improving U.S. Navy capabilities by 2010; additional options,
particularly in shipbuilding, can improve U.S. Navy capabilities in
subsequent years. China's naval modernisation raises potential
issues for Congress concerning the role of China in Department of
Defense (DOD) and Navy planning; the size of the Navy; the Pacific
Fleet's share of the Navy; forward homeporting of Navy ships in the
Western Pacific; the number of aircraft carriers, submarines, and
ASW-capable platforms; Navy missile defence, air-warfare, AAW, ASW,
and mine warfare programs; Navy computer network security; and EMP
hardening of Navy systems.
General
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