Most histories of the U.S. Army in World War II view the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations primarily as a deadly training
ground for very green forces, where lessons learned on the beaches
of Oran, in the hills of the Kasserine Pass area, and at the
collapse of the Tunis bridgehead all contributed to later success
in Western Europe. Steven Barry, however, contends that victory in
the MTO would not have materialized without the leadership of
battalion-level commanders. They operated at a high level, despite
the lack of combat experience for themselves and their troops,
ineffective leadership at higher levels, and deficiencies in
equipment, organization, and mobilization.
Barry portrays these officers as highly trained, adaptable, and
courageous in their first combat experiences in North Africa and
Sicily. Their leadership, he argues, brought discipline, maturity,
experience, and the ability to translate common operational
guidance into tactical reality, and thus contributed significantly
to battlefield success in North Africa and Sicily in 1942-1943. To
explain how this happened, he examines their prewar experiences,
including professional military education and unit training
exercises; personal factors such as calmness and physical
resilience under fire; and the ability to draw upon doctrine,
creatively apply the resources at their disposal, and clearly
define and communicate mission goals and means. He also reveals how
battalion leaders incorporated technological innovations into
combined arms maneuvers by employing tank capabilities and close
air support doctrine.
As Barry's assessment shows, these battalion commanders were not
the sole reason for the Allied triumph in North Africa and Sicily,
but victory would not have been possible without the special brand
of military leadership they exhibited throughout those campaigns.
Under their leadership, even inexperienced units were able to
deliver credible combat performance, and without the regular army
battalion leaders, U.S. units could not have functioned tactically
early in the war.
One of the few studies to focus on tactical adaptation at the
battalion level in conventional warfare, Barry's book attests to
the pivotal value of professional military education-and makes an
important contribution to today's "organizational learning"
debate-while providing an in-depth view of adaptation of U.S.
infantry and armored forces in 1942-1943.
General
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