Why do some authoritarian regimes topple during financial crises,
while others steer through financial crises relatively unscathed?
In this book, Thomas B. Pepinsky uses the experiences of Indonesia
and Malaysia and the analytical tools of open economy
macroeconomics to answer this question. Focusing on the economic
interests of authoritarian regimes' supporters, Pepinsky shows that
differences in cross-border asset specificity produce dramatically
different outcomes in regimes facing financial crises. When asset
specificity divides supporters, as in Indonesia, they desire
mutually incompatible adjustment policies, yielding incoherent
adjustment policy followed by regime collapse. When coalitions are
not divided by asset specificity, as in Malaysia, regimes adopt
radical adjustment measures that enable them to survive financial
crises. Combining rich qualitative evidence from Southeast Asia
with cross-national time-series data and comparative case studies
of Latin American autocracies, Pepinsky reveals the power of
coalitions and capital mobility to explain how financial crises
produce regime change.
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