How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and
economic development? This question cannot be answered from a
purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider
perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole
political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book,
we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional
equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the
distribution of political power among four different kinds of
agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and
"grabbers," which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many
underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a
rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in
a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria,
the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of
networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic
model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an
uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the
characteristics of the communication network that connects the
citizens.
General
Imprint: |
Lap Lambert Academic Publishing
|
Country of origin: |
Germany |
Release date: |
April 2012 |
First published: |
April 2012 |
Authors: |
Wilson Perez-Oviedo
|
Dimensions: |
229 x 152 x 6mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
92 |
ISBN-13: |
978-3-8473-0608-5 |
Categories: |
Books >
Business & Economics >
Business & management >
General
|
LSN: |
3-8473-0608-1 |
Barcode: |
9783847306085 |
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