Information acquisition and information asymmetry are important
issues in decision-making as they may have a vital influence on the
decision makers' payoffs in the market or other economic
situations. The value of information is the main interest in this
book. In the first part of this book, the value of information in
single-player decision-making games is studied with the proof of
Blackwell's Theorem. In the second part, it is extended to a
dynamic game of incomplete information involving two players to
investigate the conditions for the value of information being
positive to the receiver by comparing his expected utility before
and after acquiring the information. A signaling game is selected
as an example.
General
Imprint: |
Lap Lambert Academic Publishing
|
Country of origin: |
United States |
Release date: |
February 2013 |
First published: |
February 2013 |
Authors: |
Zhe Wang
|
Dimensions: |
229 x 152 x 3mm (L x W x T) |
Format: |
Paperback - Trade
|
Pages: |
52 |
ISBN-13: |
978-3-659-32900-5 |
Categories: |
Books >
Business & Economics >
Business & management >
General
|
LSN: |
3-659-32900-2 |
Barcode: |
9783659329005 |
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