Wittgenstein's philosophy is a puzzling subject mainly because Wittgenstein himself does not appear to have given a full, explicit account of what he means by his phenomenology', phenomenological language' or phenomenological problems'. This book examines the idea of phenomenology throughout the different stages of Wittgenstein's philosophical development. The author argues that Wittgenstein's entire philosophical life was mainly concerned with what is immediately given in one's experience. Early interpretations of the phenomenological elements in Wittgenstein's philosophy usually emphasized the unique nature of his later work. However, the author here convincingly makes the case that Wittgenstein's concern with immediate experience and the way we describe it guided his philosophical journey through the phenomenological problems that pervade his work. The author offers many intriguing ideas and philosophical insights for Wittgenstein scholars and students, and philosophers interested in phenomenology who wish to study one of the most distinguished but least understood philosophers of the twentieth century. Audience: Philosophers, philosophers interested in phenomenology, Wittgenstein scholars.