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In July 2002 the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was reconstituted
and given a new charter by the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) commander, General John Abrams. One of the three
missions outlined in that charter is to conduct original,
interpretive research on historical topics pertinent to the current
doctrinal concerns of the US Army. Having published some 10 works
in the intervening two years, CSI is now poised to initiate a new
series addressing important facets of the Global War on Terrorism.
Lieutenant Colonel Louis DiMarco's Traditions, Changes, and
Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City is the
first in that series called Occasional Papers. The Middle East is
one of the most urbanized regions of the world, and growth
continues at an unprecedented rate. With operations ongoing in the
Middle East today, it is fitting that this inaugural study should
focus on military aspects of the urban areas of that region. There
is an undoubted need for US military planners to possess a solid
foundation of military history, cultural awareness, and an
understanding of the intricacies of city design and function in
this critical region. Each conflict brings its own challenges and
dynamics. The challenges of a Middle Eastern fight require decisive
involvement in that region's cities. The enemy is adaptive-we must
be adaptive as well. This call to study and understand history and
culture is the first step along that road to critical thinking and
adaptability. The purpose of this work is to examine the major
features of the Middle Eastern city and evaluate the military
significance of those features. It intends to serve as a starting
point for military professionals, particularly commanders and key
staff officers at the Army battalion through corps level, planning
or conducting operations in the region. This study should provide
the context within which more detailed study, evaluation, and
observation can be conducted. Although this study is mindful of the
ongoing Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) fight, it was initiated
before OIF began and does not specifically reflect its area of
operations or lessons learned. This study emphasizes the
traditional aspects of the Middle Eastern city because those
features are most unique and distinct from western European and
North American city design with which military professionals are
familiar. In addition, the old city core is often the center of
religious activity and thus is disproportionately politically and
socially influential. The physical aspects of the traditional
Middle Eastern city are examined here in detail-mosques, suqs,
residences, and quarters. Also examined in some depth is the less
obvious relationship between the Islamic religion and the Middle
Eastern urban environment. How the modern Middle Eastern city has
changed from its traditional form and the challenges associated
with that rapid change are also covered in this study. These facets
of the old Middle Eastern city are examined by reference to
contemporary travel guides; academic works in the fields of Middle
East history, urban geography, history, architecture, and city
design; appropriate military manuals and publications; and
contemporary travel narratives. This work connects the description
of Middle Eastern city design to the conduct of full-spectrum
military urban operations. It does this through referencing
American and Israeli urban warfare experts, current Army and Joint
doctrine described in US Army Field Manual 3-06, Urban Operations
and Joint Publication 3-06, Joint Urban Operations, other relevant
official publications, and historical experiences. Although the
author did conduct limited travel in some of the region's urban
centers, circumstances require that this paper primarily rely on
open-source research. Finally, the reader should understand that
this work is a survey of general regional characteristics.
The US Army's experience with detainee operations spans the period
from the Revolutionary War to the present. More to the point, over
the past 60 years a body of international law and military
regulations, the joint and Army doctrine derived from it, and two
centuries of practical experience have emerged that inform current
detainee operations in the Global War on Terrorism. The 2004
revelations of detainee maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison
outside of Baghdad, Iraq have led to an exhaustive overhaul of Army
doctrine and training with respect to this topic. The Army has
identified disconnects in its individual, leader, and collective
training programs, and has also identified the absence of a
deliberate, focused doctrinal crosswalk between the two principal
branches concerned with detainees, Military Intelligence (MI) and
Military Police (MP). These problems and their consequences are
real and immediate. The perceptions of just treatment held by
citizens of our nation and, to a great extent the world at large,
have been and are being shaped by the actions of the US Army, both
in the commission of detainee maltreatment but also, and more
importantly, in the way the Army addresses its institutional
shortcomings. James Gebhardt's study, The Road to Abu Ghraib: US
Army Detainee Doctrine and Experience, captures the salient
doctrinal issues of this critical aspect of the Army's battlespace.
Indeed, this work, in DRAFT form, has already informed the
evolution of detainee doctrine in the MP and MI schoolhouses, as
well as Combat Training Center practical exercises. A solid
understanding of our past experiences will aid those soldiers
charged with executing this important mission today and in the
future, and this study represents a valuable contribution to the
effort. When the Global War on Terrorism began in late 2001, few
Americans had ever heard of the Geneva Conventions. Now type
"Geneva Convention" into any Internet search engine and you can
easily find all four Geneva Conventions and read them in the
comfort of your home in three languages. Our armed forces, though,
have a long history of dealing with Geneva Conventions that began
with implementing the Convention of 1929 during World War II and
then led to the Conventions of 1949 a year before the beginning of
the Korean War. The US Army, in particular, has a long history of
dealing with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
Geneva-based non-governmental organization that is the "promoter
and enforcer," if one can use that phrase, of the Geneva
Conventions. This study examines the relationship over time between
doctrine in two branches of the Army-Military Police (MP) and
Military Intelligence (MI)-and the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). Specifically, it analyzes
the MP detention field manual series and the MI interrogation field
manual series to evaluate their GPW content. It also further
examines the relationship of military police and military
intelligence to each other in the enemy prisoner-of-war (EPW) and
detainee operations environment, as expressed in their doctrinal
manuals. Finally, the study looks at the Army's experience in
detainee operations through the prism of six conflicts or
contingency operations: the Korean War, Vietnam, Operation URGENT
FURY (Grenada, 1983), Operation JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989),
Operation DESERT STORM (Iraq, 1991), and Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
(Haiti, 1994).
Eyes Behind the Lines: US Army Long-Range Reconnaissance and
Surveillance Units is the 10th study in the Combat Studies
Institute (CSI) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper
series. This work is an out-growth of concerns identified by the
authors of On Point: The United States Army in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM. Specifically, these authors called into question the use
of long-range surveillance (LRD) assets by commanders during that
campaign and suggested an assessment ought to be made about their
continuing utility and means of employment. Major (Retired) James
Gebhardt, of CSI, researched and wrote this Occasional Paper with
that end in view. IN this study, Gebhardt surveys the US Army's
historical experience with LRRP and LRS units from the 1960s Cold
War and Vietnam War, through their resurgence in the 1980s and use
in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STROM, to the advent of the
GWOT. The paper's analytical framework examines each era of LRS
units in terms of doctrine, organization, training, material,
leadership, and personnel. In doing so, the author makes a strong
case for continuing the LRS capability in the Army's force
structure. The variety of environments and enemies likely to be
faced by the military in the GWOT continues to demand the unique
human intelligence abilities of trained and organized LRS units. As
the Army leads the Armed Forces of the United States in combating
terrorists where they live, the lessons found in this survey remain
timely and relevant.
Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat
Operations and Stability Operations is another in the Combat
Studies Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional
Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics
relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding
General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant
General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would
benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq
today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One
of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III)
operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current
phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David
Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI
historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors
that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution.
Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of
Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the
case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
through the lens of the critical planning factors. This study
serves as a bridge between the tactics, techniques, and procedures
(TTP) found in stability operations how-to manuals and the broader
military operations other than war (MOOTW) concepts found in joint
doctrine. Its purpose was to identify key themes that merit
consideration when planning or conducting transitions between
combat operations and stability operations. These themes were
identified by combining a review of joint and US Army stability
operations doctrine with a specific case study analysis of the US
occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 and then extrapolated those
themes to current stability operations to assess their
applicability. The Japanese occupation is useful as a case study
because it required that occupation forces address several
challenges similar to those facing current stability operations in
the Middle East, such as a fundamental change in governance
philosophy, a long-term democratization program, a critical
regional security challenge, and a complex economic reconstruction
challenge. This analysis is not designed to serve as a one answer
fits all challenges solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle
for informing time-constrained professionals operating at the
tactical and operational levels. One can easily identify several
instances where the US Army has faced stability operations
challenges; Cuba, Germany, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic,
Panama, and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Each case involved
stability operations challenges unique to its environment, but only
one time during the 20th century did the United States take the
lead in stabilizing the entire infrastructure-political, economic,
industrial, military, educational, and even societal-of a former
enemy. During this complex stability operation, the US Army
implemented a number of planning themes related to transitioning
between the full spectrum operations components of offense/defense
and stability/support. These themes were applied, depending on the
US Army's ability to manipulate each, with varying degrees of
success. A RAND Corporation study published in 2003, titled
America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, developed
six such themes, traced each through seven case studies, and
concluded by drawing implications for future US military
operations.
"Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the
Campaign" was the title of a recent US Army Training and Doctrine
Command/Combat Studies Institute military symposium at Fort
Leavenworth. The presenters looked at the imperative of linking
battlefield success to political objectives across both tactical
and strategic spectrums. One of the symposium's salient points was
that overwhelming military accomplishment does not automatically
translate to overall success. Major Tim Karcher's Understanding the
"Victory Disease," From the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond
presents further evidence supporting the above premise. With
Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM in the foreground today, it
is fitting that this study should focus on military operations
undertaken in the immediate aftermath of extraordinary military
victory. US military planners must possess a solid foundation of
military history and cultural awareness to ensure battlefield and
strategic success today and in the future. Future conflicts are not
likely to resemble those of the past, whether they are conflicts
from dim memory, the previous decade, or last year. Each brings its
own challenges and dynamics. One thing is certain, however, as
Major Karcher points out: The US military cannot rest on the
laurels of previous campaigns. Major Karcher's study makes an
important contribution to military history as a warfighter's tool
to refine critical thinking and adaptability. As a result of
America's national strength and its demonstrated military prowess,
US forces are quite susceptible to falling prey to the effects of
the "victory disease." The disease, by definition, brings defeat to
a previously victorious nation or military due to three basic
symptoms: arrogance, complacency, and the habit of using
established patterns to solve military problems. The growth of the
victory disease can best be analyzed through the study of
historical examples where the symptoms become quite clear. This
work uses the 1876 Battle of the Little Bighorn and the 1993
actions of Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia to highlight the
disease's effects. Studying the victory disease can help one avoid
succumbing to its effects and ultimately find an effective
vaccination. As this work will argue, the only real vaccine for the
disease is found in increased study of military history in the
Officer Education System, particularly through focusing on
campaigns and battles where defeat may be attributed to the
sickness. Simple awareness of the problem prevents one from falling
prey to the disease, thereby creating immunity.
The Law of War: Can 20th-Century Standards Apply to the Global War
on Terrorism? is the ninth offering in the Combat Studies
Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers
series. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and
CSI historian, has produced a study that examines the evolution and
continued applicability of the corpus, both conventional and
customary, that constitutes the law of war. As background, Mr.
Cavaleri provides a theoretical framework and the development of
the law within Western and, specifically, US Army doctrine and
regulation. He then presents a case study of the British
suppression of the Mau Mau insurgency in 1950s Kenya, a conflict
with particular resonance today. Some of the more relevant
characteristics of the "emergency," as it was called, include the
clash between Western and non-Western cultures and an initially
asymmetric fight between conventional security forces and loosely
organized, poorly equipped insurgents. The genesis of this study is
the public discourse, both explicit and implicit, asserting the
possibility that the GWOT may require new rules and new law-of-war
prescripts. This important discussion is fraught with complexities
and long-term implications; the moral force in warfare is
incredibly significant and any changes to the legal framework in
place must be very carefully considered. Do we follow the law of
war to the letter, do we remain "consistent with the principles of
Geneva," or do we approach the conflict as a new challenge
requiring fundamental revisions to the law? These are the options
Mr. Cavaleri addresses, and we are pleased to contribute this
Occasional Paper to the debate. In 1630 the first governor of
Massachusetts, John Winthrop, wrote a sermon titled "A Model of
Christian Charity" in which he enjoined his fellow colonists to
make Boston a "city set on a hill." Subsequent political leaders,
President Ronald Reagan for one, have periodically employed that
image to portray the United States as a beacon of moral fortitude
and Western character. This perception of the United States as a
"shining city" creates a dilemma caused by the friction between the
regulatory principles of the law of war as codified in the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the military necessity of responding to
non-Western tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) now
encountered during the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This study
is intended to generate discussion about the application of the law
of war during 21st-century military campaigns conducted in the
contemporary operational environment (COE). It combines a review of
the documentary evolution of the law of war with a historical case
study of the British experience in Kenya between 1952 and 1960
against the Mau Mau insurgents. It makes no claim that every lesson
learned by the British during that counterinsurgency operation can
be directly applied by the United States to the challenges of the
GWOT, but this analysis does offer some insight about applying the
law of war to an unfamiliar, non-Western environment. The debate
concerning the law of war's applicability will grow more vocal as
non-state enemies of the United States adapt TTP to exploit
perceived centers of gravity like public opinion. In anticipation
of that escalating debate, this analysis offers the following as
its overarching question: Is the current version of the law of war
suited to the COE in general and the GWOT in particular?
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