Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya. They reveal that it is a misconception that overall strategies radiate solely from political leaders. Instead, military officers at an operational level can achieve change as General McChrystal did for Afghanistan in 2009. The authors conclude that NATO cannot succeed in complex operations without the political support for these bottom-up initiatives.

Formulating a military strategy is a complex interaction between politicians, strategic commanders and generals. Formulating such a strategy within a multinational organization is even more complex. In this book, Edstrom and Gyllensporre explore a range of case studies, based on UN documents, and individually analyse their de facto military strategy in terms of ends, ways, means, and the interaction between the political strategic level (UN Security Council) and the military strategic level (UN Secretary General). Some 100,000 UN soldiers deployed all over the world not only deserve but need to be properly directed. Military strategy is hence a necessity, not an option. Moreover the military strategy should be percieved as a complementary effort to a robust integrated mission concept, including other instruments than the military."

This book comprises of a range of case studies of military strategy, based on UN documents, observing and concluding the effectiveness of each individual case. Edstrom and Gyllensporre analyse the UN's military strategy, its consequences and its potential to fulfil political ambitions.

Formulating a strategy involves complex interactions between politicians, strategic commanders and generals in the field. The authors explore the strategic decisions made during NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Somalia and Libya.