This first-of-a-kind collection brings together in one volume the strongest available evidence of successful transfer effects from unofficial third-party work to official peacemaking. Using comparative case analysis from several real-world interventions, Paving the Way offers insights into the conditions and qualities of successful programs of interactive conflict resolution from experts in the field. Editor Ronald J. Fisher has assembled a collection of seminal case studies that illustrate interactive approaches to conflict resolution from the Malaysia-Indonesia conflict in the 1960s to the Peru-Equador peace process of the late 1990s. Integrating theory, research, and practice, the cases posit that interactive conflict resolution can make a significant, and sometimes essential, contribution to the resolution of protracted and violent identity conflicts. The methods and solutions offered in Paving the Way will serve as best practices for those in the field and as training tools and resources for scholars and policymakers.

This first-of-a-kind collection brings together in one volume the strongest available evidence of successful transfer effects from unofficial third-party work to official peacemaking. Using comparative case analysis from several real-world interventions, Paving the Way offers insights into the conditions and qualities of successful programs of interactive conflict resolution from experts in the field. Editor Ronald J. Fisher has assembled a collection of seminal case studies that illustrate interactive approaches to conflict resolution from the Malaysia-Indonesia conflict in the 1960s to the Peru-Equador peace process of the late 1990s. Integrating theory, research, and practice, the cases posit that interactive conflict resolution can make a significant, and sometimes essential, contribution to the resolution of protracted and violent identity conflicts. The methods and solutions offered in Paving the Way will serve as best practices for those in the field and as training tools and resources for scholars and policymakers.

The decisions to negotiate in the South African and Israeli/Palestinian conflicts can be understood in terms of changed perceptions of threat among political elites and their constituents. As perceptions of an imminent threat to national survival receded, debate over national security policy became a focus of internal politics on the government sides in each case and prompted changes of leadership. The new leaders, F.W. de Klerk and Yitzhak Rabin, faced emerging threats at the national and international levels that made negotiation seem advantageous. Lieberfeld analyzes the decisions of the opposition ANC and PLO in terms of changing threat perceptions and incentives for compromise.

Lieberfeld also evaluates developments since the breakthrough agreements. He concludes by identifying revised indicators of conflicts' ripeness for negotiated settlement and discussing their applicability to other cases of intense, protracted conflict.