This volume offers the first detailed statement by a contingent of RAND thinkers on the contours of a redefined Atlantic partnership. In the world emerging since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Europe have strikingly common global security and economic interests. But their ability to advance those interests, together, depends on the willingness of Europe to take on greater responsibilities, the willingness of the United States to share leadership, and the vision of both to form a far more ambitious partnership than the one of today's official policies. This work will interest policy and research audiences in world affairs, global business readers, and others engaged in or thinking about America's international role and relations.

This collection of essays collectively offers detailed statements by a contingent of RAND analysts on the contours of a redefined Atlantic partnership. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the authors point to the viability of shifting particular financial, strategic, political, and other responsibilities from America to Europe without jeopardising either areas defence. Individual chapters explore economic features of the proposed partnership, projected changes in NATO, challenges on Europe's eastern periphery and the greater Middle East, and desireable shifts in institutions and policies from European and American perspectives. The essays represent the culmination of several years of work at RAND on the subject of NATO enlargement and restructuring of the Atlantic Alliance. The work should be of interest to policy and research audiences in international relations, security analysis, political science, and European and American studies.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is investing heavily in information systems to support net-centric military capabilities and joint operations. With such programs as Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE), Transformational Satellite Communications Systems (TSAT), Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), and Net Centric Enterprise Services (NCES), DOD is creating a global information backbone and striving to get useful bandwidth and information services to the warfighter. After declining in the 1990s, spending on communications and intelligence has grown by 50 percent since 2001. Yet, the investment in networks still is not enough to harness the full power of information for national defense.

China's emergence begs a fresh look at power in the world affairs-more precisely, at how the spread of freedom and the integration of the global economy, due to the information revolution, are affecting the nature, concentration, and purpose of power. Perhaps such a luck could improve the odds of responding wisely to China's rise.

The U.S. defense sector is not experiencing economic gains from the use of IT like those of other IT-rich sectors. In the economy at large, remarkable improvements in IT price-performance over the last quarter-century have yielded greater productivity and better IT-based products and services at lower costs. In contrast, increased defense capabilities, despite their growing IT content, have meant increased costs.

The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s, scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict. The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.- Chinese competition in these domains and develop three related analytic findings upon which their recommendations are built. The first is that in each domain, the offense is dominant. The second is that each side will be highly vulnerable to a strike from the other side. And the third is that the retaliating side will still be able to do unacceptable damage to the initiating party. Therefore, the authors make an important recommendation: that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. Unlike the Cold War, this mutual restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties. But patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain stability. Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press.

Published by the National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. From the foreword by Hans Binnendijk: "The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this book is about. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the prospect of U.S.- Chinese competition in these domains and develop three related analytic findings upon which their recommendations are built. The first is that in each domain, the offense is dominant. The second is that each side will be highly vulnerable to a strike from the other side. And the third is that the retaliating side will still be able to do unacceptable damage to the initiating party. Therefore, the authors make an important recommendation: that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing strategic vulnerabilities. Unlike the Cold War, this mutual restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties. But patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain stability."

The probability of conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan has diminished in recent years. The chief potential flashpoint for war, a Taiwanese declaration of independence, has become less likely as Taiwan's independence movement has waned and economic ties with the mainland have strengthened. Should the independence movement in Taiwan regain political momentum, however, the potential for U.S. military intervention in the Taiwan Strait would increase. Further, the perception of U.S. vulnerability in the region could invite assertiveness. So, despite the fact that armed conflict between the United States and China is in no one's interest, China's burgeoning power requires that critical factor sin U.S. plans for the defense of Taiwan be examined. This collection of essays offers just such an examination. It looks at China's growing strength, the strategies underlying U.S. plans for military intervention in the Strait, U.S. vulnerabilities, and options for how these vulnerabilities might be overcome through the development of new technologies and strategies. The U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan, thought tacit and conditional, has been a long-standing strategic constant. America's ability to prevent the invasion or coercion of Taiwan, however, is more variable. As the Defense Department's most recent report to Congress on Chinese military power indicates, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has embarked on a concerted effort to modernize, with the goal of being able to conduct (and counter) the sort of rapid, precise, information-intensive operations of which the U.S. military is now capable. Of particular concern in a Taiwan scenario is China's growing ability to track, target, and destroy U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs), which are the fulcrum of American military strategy in the region. The Defense Department reports that the PLA is focused on targeting surface ships at long ranges, perhaps as far as the "second island chain," east of Japan and as far south as Guam. China is amassing the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (SR) and strike assets needed to conduct long-range precision attacks. These growing capabilities are coupled with PLA doctrine that emphasizes preemption and surprise attack; the potential significance of this turn of thought was underscored by China's January 2007 demonstration of antisatellite weapon. China's growing capabilities demand that the United States carefully review the evolving military balance in the western Pacific and consider the implications for further strategy. Each essay addresses a key part of the Taiwan intervention puzzle. The compilation moves from an overview of U.S. strength and China's growing military abilities (Gompert); to two pieces on China's present and future military technology (Cheung) and personnel (Lo) resources; to an examination of a particular threat to U.S. regional power, China's improving ISR capabilities (Mulvenon); to a review of U.S. maritime (McDevitt) and aerial (Shlapak) strengths and vulnerabilities; to a piece on how some aerial vulnerabilities could be allayed with UAVs (Libicki); to an analysis of U.S. options to better deter Chinese aggression (Gompert and Long); to a forward-looking article on how a new U.S. fleet architecture could change the balance of power in a Taiwan Strait conflict (Johnson).

Considers potential Chinese responses to U.S. transformation efforts and offers possible U.S. counterresponses. For the past decade, Chinese military strategists have keenly observed the changes in U.S. national strategy and military transformation. This report examines the constraints, facilitators, and potential options for Chinese responses to U.S. transformation efforts and offers possible U.S. counterresponses (particularly in light of whether Taiwan moves toward or away from formal independence).

This volume offers the first detailed statement by a contingent of RAND thinkers on the contours of a redefined Atlantic partnership. In the world emerging since the end of the Cold War, the United States and Europe have strikingly common global security and economic interests. But their ability to advance those interests, together, depends on the willingness of Europe to take on greater responsibilities, the willingness of the United States to share leadership, and the vision of both to form a far more ambitious partnership than the one of today's official policies. This work will interest policy and research audiences in world affairs, global business readers, and others engaged in or thinking about America's international role and relations.