From Disability Theory to Practice pays tribute to Professor Jerome Bickenbach's highly influential and immensely important work. Professor Bickenbach is a scholar, policy-maker, and activist, of international stature. This volume brings together ten friends, mentors, and mentees, who have penned eight chapters engaging in topics that range, as the title suggests and as Professor Bickenbach's work has spanned, from theory to practice. This volume begins, much as Professor Bickenbach's career has, by grappling with philosophical and sociological issues related to the definition of disability, its relation to health, and conceptions of justice for people with disabilities. Subsequently, these conceptions are utilized to advance policy suggestions that range from assisted dying legislation, mental health policy, and the implementation of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health.

Using New York City as a research model, this study explores the organizational, tactical, and ethical challenges of providing zealous advocacy for every convicted indigent wishing to appeal. David Wasserman, a former staff attorney with New York's Legal Aid Society, examines the unique form of representation that has emerged since the Supreme Court recognized the right to free appellate counsel, and details the conflict between the role of assigned appellate counsel and the demands of an overcrowded and underfunded criminal justice system. As the first study of indigent criminal appellate representation in the United States, this work brings a neglected form of legal service into the mainstream of criminal justice policy analysis.

The book is divided into three parts. Through the use of existing research and commentary, Part I analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court's Douglas v. California decision on the appellate courts and representation and on the organization of defense services. Part II offers an empirical study of criminal appeals in New York City, addressing such issues as the quality and impact of appellate defenders and the division of the indigent caseload. In Part III, Wasserman discusses the implications of this research in relation to the analysis of indigent defense developed in Part I, and considers measures for improving the quality of assigned appellate counsel. The work concludes with an appendix listing suggestions for further reading. This study, which provides the only available information on criminal appellate dispositions in New York City, will be an important resource for courses in law and social science, criminal justice, and appellate or trial practice. It will also be useful to the criminal justice community, particularly to public defender and legal aid groups, and appellate judges and their staffs.

This study brings together two important literatures together in the one volume. One concerns the role of quality assessments in social policy, especially health policy. The second concerns ethical and social issues raised by prenatal testing for disability. Hitherto, these two literatures have had little contact with each other: few scholars have written about both, or have compared the two domains in a systematic way, while people with disabilities and disability scholars are underrepresented in recent discussion on health policy and quality of assessment. This book turns the perspectives of disability scholars on issues that have largely been the province of health methodology, policy and philosophy, while angling philosophical policy analysis on problems that have largely been the province of disability scholarship. This volume will be sought after by bioethicists, philosophers, and specialists in disability studies and healthcare economics.

This study brings together two important literatures together in the one volume. One concerns the role of quality assessments in social policy, especially health policy. The second concerns ethical and social issues raised by prenatal testing for disability. Hitherto, these two literatures have had little contact with each other: few scholars have written about both, or have compared the two domains in a systematic way, while people with disabilities and disability scholars are underrepresented in recent discussion on health policy and quality of assessment. This book turns the perspectives of disability scholars on issues that have largely been the province of health methodology, policy and philosophy, while angling philosophical policy analysis on problems that have largely been the province of disability scholarship. This volume will be sought after by bioethicists, philosophers, and specialists in disability studies and healthcare economics.

This volume brings together a group of essays by leading philosophers of science, ethicists, and legal scholars, commissioned for an important and controversial conference on genetics and crime. The essays address basic conceptual, methodological, and ethical issues raised by genetic research on criminal behavior but largely ignored in the public debate. They explore the complexities in tracing any genetic influence on criminal, violent, or antisocial behavior, the varieties of interpretation to which evidence of such influences is subject, and the relevance of such influences to the moral and legal appraisal of criminal conduct. The volume provides a critical overview of the assumptions, methods, and findings of recent behavioral genetics.

While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical issues involved in creating children is relatively rare. In Debating Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman take opposing views on this important question. David Benatar argues for the anti-natalist view that it is always wrong to bring new people into existence. He argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. In addition to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances the "misanthropic" one that because humans are so defective and cause vast amounts of harm, it is wrong to create more of them. David Wasserman defends procreation against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see procreation as often permissible but never required. After criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews those pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on procreation are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective parents, considers different views of that role morality, and argues for one that imposes only limited constraints based on the well-being of the future child. He then argues that the expected good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to procreate

While procreation is ubiquitous, attention to the ethical issues involved in creating children is relatively rare. In Debating Procreation, David Benatar and David Wasserman take opposing views on this important question. David Benatar argues for the anti-natalist view that it is always wrong to bring new people into existence. He argues that coming into existence is always a serious harm and that even if it were not always so, the risk of serious harm is sufficiently great to make procreation wrong. In addition to these "philanthropic" arguments, he advances the "misanthropic" one that because humans are so defective and cause vast amounts of harm, it is wrong to create more of them. David Wasserman defends procreation against the anti-natalist challenge. He outlines a variety of moderate pro-natalist positions, which all see procreation as often permissible but never required. After criticizing the main anti-natalist arguments, he reviews those pronatalist positions. He argues that constraints on procreation are best understood in terms of the role morality of prospective parents, considers different views of that role morality, and argues for one that imposes only limited constraints based on the well-being of the future child. He then argues that the expected good of a future child and of the parent-child relationship can provide a strong justification for procreation in the face of expected adversities without giving individuals any moral reason to procreate