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This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional
deterrence theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the
Middle East.
The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the
development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was
developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to
address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of
nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of
stability over credibility; however, because the logic of
conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension
between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to
credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly
signaling.
This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and evidence. It
explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a process that
culminates in the internalization of deterrence within enduring
rivalries is better suited to account for its final success: a
finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long.
This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students
of deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security,
Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.
This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state
terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that
current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence
success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not
capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus
of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state's
counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor's grand
strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the
Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan
Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see
that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of
terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition - which is the
non-state organization's strategy for victory. To escape the
attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of
terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become
critical educational moments. The case studies presented here
uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic
deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the
use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational
goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings
should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy
that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war
in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence.
This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence
theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security
studies.
This book offers a reconceptualisation of conventional deterrence
theory, and applies it to enduring rivalries in the Middle East.
The work argues that many of the problems encountered in the
development of deterrence theory lay in the fact that it was
developed during the Cold War, when the immediate problem it had to
address was how to prevent catastrophic nuclear wars. The logic of
nuclear deterrence compelled a preoccupation with the problem of
stability over credibility; however, because the logic of
conventional deterrence is different, the solution of the tension
between credibility and stability is achieved by deference to
credibility, due to the requirements of reputation and costly
signaling. This book aims to narrow the gap between theory and
evidence. It explores how a reconceptualization of the theory as a
process that culminates in the internalization of deterrence within
enduring rivalries is better suited to account for its final
success: a finding that has eluded deterrence theorists for long.
This interdisciplinary book will be of much interest to students of
deterrence theory, strategic studies, international security,
Middle Eastern studies and IR in general.
This book examines the question of how to deter a non-state
terrorist actor. Can terrorism be deterred? This book argues that
current research is unable to find strong cases of deterrence
success, because it uses a flawed research design which does not
capture the longitudinal dynamics of the process. So far, the focus
of inquiry has been on the tactical elements of a state's
counterterrorism strategy, instead of the non-state actor's grand
strategies. By studying the campaigns of Hezbollah, the
Palestinians, the Irish Republican Army, Chechens, the Kurdistan
Workers' Party, and Al-Qaeda/Taliban and ISIS over time, we can see
that deterrence strategies that target the cost-benefit calculus of
terrorist organizations lead to wars of attrition - which is the
non-state organization's strategy for victory. To escape the
attrition trap, the state must undermine the attrition strategy of
terrorist organizations by using offensive campaigns that become
critical educational moments. The case studies presented here
uncover an evolutionary process of learning, leading to strategic
deterrence successes. Some terrorist organizations abandoned the
use of force altogether, while others abandoned their aspirational
goals or resorted to lower levels of violence. These findings
should enable policymakers to transition from the failed policy
that sought to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the unending war
in Afghanistan to a policy that successfully applies deterrence.
This book will be of much interest to students of deterrence
theory, terrorism studies, war and conflict studies, and security
studies.
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Be (Paperback)
Ellie Lieberman
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R427
Discovery Miles 4 270
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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Ms. Hairry (Paperback)
Ellie Lieberman; Evangeline Duran Fuentes
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R256
Discovery Miles 2 560
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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Waggles (Paperback)
Ellie Lieberman; Evangeline Duran Fuentes
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R256
Discovery Miles 2 560
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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Rational deterrence theory provides scholars with an explanatory
framework which specifies the requirements for the success and
failure of deterrence. In this book the success or failure of the
deterrence theory in the Arab-Israeli wars.
CONTENTS Introduction "Designing Around" I: The "War of Attrition,"
Success or Failure? Balance of Interests Competing Hypotheses
Egypt's and Israel's Interests During the War of Attrition Egypt's
and Israel's Strategies and Secondary Interests Egypt's Perception
of Israel's Strategic and Reputational Interests The Balance of
Capability Competing Hypotheses Stein's Critique of Egypt's
Strategy The Balance of Capability in the War of Attrition Israel's
Use of Its Air Force The Relationship Between Strategy and
Objectives in Egypt's Strategy The Role of Opportunity in Egypt's
Decisions to Challenge Reputations Why did Egypt Challenge Despite
Israel's Reputation for Brinkmanship? Did Egypt Miscalculate
Israel's Capacity for Endurance? Recreating
Reputation-for-Capability in the War of Attrition The Competition
of General Reputations with Other Interests Crisis Bargaining
Behavior Competing Hypotheses Why Were Costly Signals
Uninformative? The Failure of Reassurance to Produce Deterrence
Stability Conclusion: "Designing Around," Success or Failure?
"Designing Around" II: The Yom Kippur War, Success or Failure?
Egypt's Goals and Strategy Stein's Critique The Balance of
Capability Crisis Bargaining Behavior Success or Failure Conclusion
Notes About the Author
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