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Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which
Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act
utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his
argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act
utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the
clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a
simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with
only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually
unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose
we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is
obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each
alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to
perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then,
obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform
the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently
could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A,
and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the
other acts are alternatives to A & B)."
Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which
Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act
utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his
argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act
utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the
clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a
simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with
only some trivial assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually
unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose
we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is
obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each
alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to
perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then,
obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform
the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently
could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A,
and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the
other acts are alternatives to A & B)."
Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is
especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death
collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current
philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire
range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics-such as
the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of
persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think
about death-as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is
bad for its victim, what makes it bad to die, what attitude it is
fitting to take towards death, the possibility of posthumous harm,
and the desirability of immortality. The contributors also explore
the views of ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and
Epicurus on topics related to the philosophy of death, and
questions in normative ethics, such as what makes killing wrong
when it is wrong, and whether it is wrong to kill fetuses,
non-human animals, combatants in war, and convicted murderers. With
chapters written by a wide range of experts in metaphysics, ethics,
and conceptual analysis, and designed to give the reader a
comprehensive view of recent developments in the philosophical
study of death, this Handbook will appeal to a broad audience in
philosophy, particularly in ethics and metaphysics.
Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death
bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal?
Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and
Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first
appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to
introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy
has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level
and even introductory courses. While many philosophers in the
"continental tradition"-those known as "existentialists"-have
engaged these issues at length and often with great popular appeal,
English-speaking philosophers have had relatively little to say on
these important questions. Yet, the methodology they bring to
philosophical questions can, and occasionally has, been applied
usefully to "existential" questions. This volume draws together a
representative sample of primarily English-speaking philosophers'
reflections on life's big questions, divided into six sections,
covering (1) the meaning of life, (2) creating people, (3) death,
(4) suicide, (5) immortality, and (6) optimism and pessimism. These
key readings are supplemented with helpful introductions, study
questions, and suggestions for further reading, making the material
accessible and interesting for students. In short, the book
provides a singular introduction to the way that philosophy has
dealt with the big questions of life that we are all tempted to
ask.
Do our lives have meaning? Should we create more people? Is death
bad? Should we commit suicide? Would it be better to be immortal?
Should we be optimistic or pessimistic? Since Life, Death, and
Meaning: Key Philosophical Readings on the Big Questions first
appeared, David Benatar's distinctive anthology designed to
introduce students to the key existential questions of philosophy
has won a devoted following among users in a variety of upper-level
and even introductory courses. While many philosophers in the
"continental tradition"-those known as "existentialists"-have
engaged these issues at length and often with great popular appeal,
English-speaking philosophers have had relatively little to say on
these important questions. Yet, the methodology they bring to
philosophical questions can, and occasionally has, been applied
usefully to "existential" questions. This volume draws together a
representative sample of primarily English-speaking philosophers'
reflections on life's big questions, divided into six sections,
covering (1) the meaning of life, (2) creating people, (3) death,
(4) suicide, (5) immortality, and (6) optimism and pessimism. These
key readings are supplemented with helpful introductions, study
questions, and suggestions for further reading, making the material
accessible and interesting for students. In short, the book
provides a singular introduction to the way that philosophy has
dealt with the big questions of life that we are all tempted to
ask.
Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is
especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death
collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current
philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire
range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics-such as
the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of
persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think
about death-as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is
bad for its victim, what makes it bad to die, what attitude it is
fitting to take towards death, the possibility of posthumous harm,
and the desirability of immortality. The contributors also explore
the views of ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and
Epicurus on topics related to the philosophy of death, and
questions in normative ethics, such as what makes killing wrong
when it is wrong, and whether it is wrong to kill fetuses,
non-human animals, combatants in war, and convicted murderers. With
chapters written by a wide range of experts in metaphysics, ethics,
and conceptual analysis, and designed to give the reader a
comprehensive view of recent developments in the philosophical
study of death, this Handbook will appeal to a broad audience in
philosophy, particularly in ethics and metaphysics.
Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as
a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully
and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield
plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining
what we mean when we ask what the Good Life is. He argues that this
should not be taken to be a question about the morally good life or
about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the
general features of the life that is good in itself for the one who
lives it. Hedonism says (roughly) that the Good Life is the
pleasant life. After showing that the usual formulations of
hedonism are often confused or incoherent, Feldman presents a
simple, clear, coherent form of sensory hedonism that provides a
starting point for discussion. He then considers a catalogue of
classic objections to hedonism, coming from sources as diverse as
Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Ross, Moore, Rawls, Kagan, Nozick,
Brandt, and others. One of Feldman's central themes is that there
is an important distinction between the forms of hedonism that
emphasize sensory pleasure and those that emphasize attitudinal
pleasure. Feldman formulates several kinds of hedonism based on the
idea that attitudinal pleasure is the Good. He claims that
attitudinal forms of hedonism - which have often been ignored in
the literature - are worthy of more careful attention. Another main
theme of the book is the plasticity of hedonism. Hedonism comes in
many forms. Attitudinal hedonism is especially receptive to
variations and modifications. Feldman illustrates this plasticity
by formulating several variants of attitudinal hedonism and showing
how they evade some of the objections. He also shows how it is
possible to develop forms of hedonism that are equivalent to the
allegedly anti-hedonistic theory of G. E. Moore, and the
Aristotelian theory according to which the Good Life is the life of
virtue, or flourishing. He also formulates hedonisms relevantly
like the ones defended by Aristippus and Mill. Feldman argues that
a carefully developed form of attitudinal hedonism is not refuted
by objections concerning 'the shape of a life'. He also defends the
claim that all of the alleged forms of hedonism discussed in the
book genuinely deserve to be called 'hedonism'. Finally, after
dealing with the last of the objections, he gives a sketch of his
hedonistic vision of the Good Life.
Fred Feldman's fascinating new book sets out to defend hedonism as
a theory about the Good Life. He tries to show that, when carefully
and charitably interpreted, certain forms of hedonism yield
plausible evaluations of human lives. Feldman begins by explaining
what we mean when we ask what the Good Life is. He argues that this
should not be taken to be a question about the morally good life or
about the beneficial life. Rather, the question concerns the
general features of the life that is good in itself for the one who
lives it. Hedonism says (roughly) that the Good Life is the
pleasant life. After showing that the usual formulations of
hedonism are often confused or incoherent, Feldman presents a
simple, clear, coherent form of sensory hedonism that provides a
starting point for discussion. He then considers a webalogue of
classic objections to hedonism, coming from sources as diverse as
Plato, Aristotle, Brentano, Ross, Moore, Rawls, Kagan, Nozick,
Brandt, and others. One of Feldman's central themes is that there
is an important distinction between the forms of hedonism that
emphasize sensory pleasure and those that emphasize attitudinal
pleasure. Feldman formulates several kinds of hedonism based on the
idea that attitudinal pleasure is the Good. He claims that
attitudinal forms of hedonism - which have often been ignored in
the literature - are worthy of more careful attention. Another main
theme of the book is the plasticity of hedonism. Hedonism comes in
many forms. Attitudinal hedonism is especially receptive to
variations and modifications. Feldman illustrates this plasticity
by formulating several variants of attitudinal hedonism and showing
how they evade some of the objections. He also shows how it is
possible to develop forms of hedonism that are equivalent to the
allegedly anti-hedonistic theory of G. E. Moore, and the
Aristotelian theory according to which the Good Life is the life of
virtue, or flourishing. He also formulates hedonisms relevantly
like the ones defended by Aristippus and Mill. Feldman argues that
a carefully developed form of attitudinal hedonism is not refuted
by objections concerning 'the shape of a life'. He also defends the
claim that all of the alleged forms of hedonism discussed in the
book genuinely deserve to be called 'hedonism'. Finally, after
dealing with the last of the objections, he gives a sketch of his
hedonistic vision of the Good Life.
Fred Feldman is an important philosopher, who has made a
substantial contribution to utilitarian moral philosophy. This
collection of ten previously published essays plus a new
introductory essay reveal the striking originality and unity of his
views. Feldman's version of utilitarianism differs from traditional
forms in that it evaluates behaviour by appeal to the values of
accessible worlds. These worlds are in turn evaluated in terms of
the amounts of pleasure they contain, but the conception of
pleasure involved is a novel one and the formulation of hedonism
improved. In Feldman's view pleasure is not a feeling but a
propositional attitude. He also deals with problems of justice that
affect standard forms of utilitarianism. The collection is ideally
suited for courses on contemporary utilitarian theory.
According to an ancient and still popular view - sometimes known as
'eudaimonism' - a person's well-being, or quality of life, is
ultimately determined by his or her level of happiness. According
to this view, the happier a person is, the better off he is. The
doctrine is controversial in part because the nature of happiness
is controversial. In What Is This Thing Called Happiness? Fred
Feldman presents a study of the nature and value of happiness. Part
One contains critical discussions of the main philosophical and
psychological theories of happiness. Feldman presents arguments
designed to show that each of these theories is problematic. Part
Two contains his presentation and defense of his own theory of
happiness, which is a form of attitudinal hedonism. On this view, a
person's level of happiness may be identified with the extent to
which he or she takes pleasure in things. Feldman shows that if we
understand happiness as he proposes, it becomes reasonable to
suppose that a person's well-being is determined by his or her
level of happiness. This view has important implications not only
for moral philosophy, but also for the emerging field of hedonic
psychology. Part Three contains discussions of some interactions
between the proposed theory of happiness and empirical research
into happiness.
This book presents and defends a novel theory of distributive
justice, according to which political economic distributive justice
reigns in a state if the government of that state ensures that
citizens receive the benefits and burdens they deserve from it. The
book starts with a more precise characterization of the target of
this inquiry - political economic distributive justice. It then
proceeds to explicate the concept of desert, evaluate proposed ways
of justifying desert claims, formulate a number of desertist
theories of justice, and draw out the special features of the
version defended here. Once the proposed form of desertism has been
stated, its implications are compared to those of egalitarianism,
luck egalitarianism, sufficientism, the difference principle,
libertarianism, and prioritarianism, with the aim of showing that
desertism yields more attractive results in cases that prove
difficult for other theories currently being discussed in the
literature. Arguments - especially arguments deriving from Rawls -
against desertism are explained and shown to be ineffective. There
is discussion of the distinction between comparative and
non-comparative justice. Emphasis is placed on the distinction
between (a) theories about the moral rightness of distributions,
(b) theories about the intrinsic value of distributions, and (c)
theories specifically about the justice of distributions. There is
discussion of the unfortunate results of confusion of these
different sorts of theory. The views of Rawls, Nozick, Parfit,
Frankfurt, Feinberg and others are discussed. A version of the
method of reflective equilibrium is explained and defended. The
book concludes with a series of admissions concerning puzzles that
remain unsolved.
According to an ancient and still popular view -- sometimes known
as 'eudaimonism' -- a person's well-being, or quality of life, is
ultimately determined by his or her level of happiness. According
to this view, the happier a person is, the better off he is. The
doctrine is controversial in part because the nature of happiness
is controversial. In What Is This Thing Called Happiness? Fred
Feldman presents a study of the nature and value of happiness. Part
One contains critical discussions of the main philosophical and
psychological theories of happiness. Feldman presents arguments
designed to show that each of these theories is problematic. Part
Two contains his presentation and defense of his own theory of
happiness, which is a form of attitudinal hedonism. On this view, a
person's level of happiness may be identified with the extent to
which he or she takes pleasure in things. Feldman shows that if we
understand happiness as he proposes, it becomes reasonable to
suppose that a person's well-being is determined by his or her
level of happiness. This view has important implications not only
for moral philosophy, but also for the emerging field of hedonic
psychology. Part Three contains discussions of some interactions
between the proposed theory of happiness and empirical research
into happiness.
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