This book integrates elements from agency theory and signaling theory and draws upon recent changes in the Australia payout policy and incentives pay for risk-averse employees, to provide theoretical and empirical analyses that explain the paradox of the popularity of on-market stock buyback activities in a market environment characterized by reasonably high share prices. The authors utilize a dynamic model that rationalizes this paradox, which is divided into three components. The first predicts that executives may be conducting on-market stock buyback programs to adjust equity-based remuneration for risk-averse employees, thereby motivating their performance without granting them additional costly equity incentive plans; the second predicts that companies are likely to invest in stock buyback programs to increase the ownership stakes of employees in the firm, thereby inducing risk-averse employees to increase their productivity which increases firm value; while the third predicts that shareholders would benefit from incentives-induced buybacks if a firm’s opportunity cost of funds spent on buybacks is less than its inverse price-earnings ratio. The authors’ findings highlight differences in the market responses toward announced repurchase motives, implying that not all incentives-induced buybacks are value-destructive buybacks. Specifically, the widespread assumption that stock buyback programs stifle investments in human and capital stock may be subjective as the findings show that incentives-induced buybacks may be value-creative or value-destructive depending on share repurchase motives of stock buyback programs. The book will be a useful guide for scholars and researchers of finance, corporate finance, financial economics, and financial accounting.