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Pragmatics (Paperback)
N. Burton-Roberts; Contributions by Jay David Atlas, Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Ira A. Noveck, …
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R1,536
Discovery Miles 15 360
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide
range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory,
in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics
covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics,
indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of
negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of
Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.
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Pragmatics (Hardcover)
N. Burton-Roberts; Contributions by Jay David Atlas, Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Ira A. Noveck, …
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R1,562
Discovery Miles 15 620
|
Ships in 10 - 15 working days
|
This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide
range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory,
in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics
covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics,
indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of
negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of
Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.
Can humans and artificial intelligences share concepts and
communicate? Making AI Intelligible shows that philosophical work
on the metaphysics of meaning can help answer these questions.
Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever use the externalist tradition in
philosophy to create models of how AIs and humans can understand
each other. In doing so, they illustrate ways in which that
philosophical tradition can be improved. The questions addressed in
the book are not only theoretically interesting, but the answers
have pressing practical implications. Many important decisions
about human life are now influenced by AI. In giving that power to
AI, we presuppose that AIs can track features of the world that we
care about (for example, creditworthiness, recidivism, cancer, and
combatants). If AIs can share our concepts, that will go some way
towards justifying this reliance on AI. This ground-breaking study
offers insight into how to take some first steps towards achieving
Interpretable AI.
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively
on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current
meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our
self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area
you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those
areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires
constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those
cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental
philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as
evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any
interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many
philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about
their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and
whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to
them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is
unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that
philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions
as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging
in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this
irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy,
it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged
meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what
philosophy is.
When theorizing about language, we tend to assume that speakers are
cooperative, honest, helpful, and so on. This, of course, isn't
remotely true of a lot of real-world language use. Bad Language is
the first textbook to explore non-idealized language use, the
linguistic behaviour of those who exploit language for malign
purposes. Two eminent philosophers of language present a lively and
accessible introduction to a wide range of topics including lies
and bullshit, slurs and insults, coercion and silencing: Cappelen
and Dever offer theoretical frameworks for thinking about these all
too common linguistic behaviours. As the text does not assume prior
training in philosophy or linguistics, it is ideal for use as part
of a philosophy of language course for philosophy students or for
linguistics students. Bad Language belongs to the series
Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy of Language, in which each
book introduces an important area of the philosophy of language,
suitable for students at any level.
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC
BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read on Oxford
Academic and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected
open access locations. If we don't know what the words 'democracy'
and 'democratic' mean, then we don't know what democracy is. This
book defends a radical view: these words mean nothing and should be
abandoned. The argument for Abolitionism is simple: those terms are
defective and we can easily do better, so let's get rid of them.
According to the abolitionist, the switch to alternative devices
would be a significant communicative, cognitive, and political
advance. The first part of the book presents a general theory of
abandonment: the conditions under which language should be
abandoned. The rest of the book applies this general theory to the
case of 'democracy' and 'democratic'. Cappelen shows that
'democracy' and 'democratic' are semantically, pragmatically, and
communicatively defective. Abolitionism is not all gloom and doom.
It also contains a message of good cheer: we have easy access to
conceptual devices that are more effective than 'democracy'. We can
do better. These alternative linguistic devices will enable us to
ask better questions, provide genuinely fruitful answers, and have
more rational discussions. Moreover, those questions and answers
better articulate the communicative and cognitive aims of those who
use empty terms like 'democracy' and 'democratic'.
It is a fundamental feature of language that words refer to things.
Much attention has been devoted to the nature of reference, both in
philosophy and in linguistics. Puzzles of Reference is the first
book to give a comprehensive accessible survey of the fascinating
work on this topic from the 1970s to the present day. Written by
two eminent philosophers of language, Puzzles of Reference offers
an up-to-date introduction to reference in philosophy and
linguistics, summarizing ideas such as Kripke's revolutionary
theory and presenting the various challenges in a clear and
accessible manner. As the text does not assume prior training in
philosophy or linguistics, it is ideal for use as part of a
philosophy of language course for philosophy students or for
linguistics students. Puzzles of Reference belongs to the series
Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy of Language, in which each
book provides an introduction to an important area of the
philosophy of language, suitable for students at any level.
When theorizing about language, we tend to assume that speakers are
cooperative, honest, helpful, and so on. This, of course, isn't
remotely true of a lot of real-world language use. Bad Language is
the first textbook to explore non-idealized language use, the
linguistic behaviour of those who exploit language for malign
purposes. Two eminent philosophers of language present a lively and
accessible introduction to a wide range of topics including lies
and bullshit, slurs and insults, coercion and silencing: Cappelen
and Dever offer theoretical frameworks for thinking about these all
too common linguistic behaviours. As the text does not assume prior
training in philosophy or linguistics, it is ideal for use as part
of a philosophy of language course for philosophy students or for
linguistics students. Bad Language belongs to the series
Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy of Language, in which each
book introduces an important area of the philosophy of language,
suitable for students at any level.
It is a fundamental feature of language that words refer to things.
Much attention has been devoted to the nature of reference, both in
philosophy and in linguistics. Puzzles of Reference is the first
book to give a comprehensive accessible survey of the fascinating
work on this topic from the 1970s to the present day. Written by
two eminent philosophers of language, Puzzles of Reference offers
an up-to-date introduction to reference in philosophy and
linguistics, summarizing ideas such as Kripke's revolutionary
theory and presenting the various challenges in a clear and
accessible manner. As the text does not assume prior training in
philosophy or linguistics, it is ideal for use as part of a
philosophy of language course for philosophy students or for
linguistics students. Puzzles of Reference belongs to the series
Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy of Language, in which each
book provides an introduction to an important area of the
philosophy of language, suitable for students at any level.
This volume brings together two series of papers: one began with
Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore's 1997 paper 'On an Alleged
Connection Between the Theory of Meaning and Indirect Speech'. The
other series started with their 1997 paper 'Varieties of
Quotation'. The central theme throughout is that only when
communicative content is liberated from semantic content will we
make progress in understanding language, communication, contexts,
and their interconnection. These are the papers in which Cappelen
and Lepore introduced speech act pluralism and semantic minimalism,
and they provide the foundation for one of the most powerful
attacks on contextualism in contemporary philosophy.
Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be
the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the
topic. Philosophers of language and epistemologists join forces to
elucidate what kind of speech act assertion is, particularly in
light of relativist views of truth, and how assertion is governed
by epistemic norms.
Language Turned on Itself examines what happens when language
becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about
language. Those who think, talk, and write about language are
habitual users of various metalinguistic devices, but reliance on
these devices begins early: kids are told, 'That's called a
"rabbit"'. It's not implausible that a primitive capacity for the
meta-linguistic kicks in at the beginning stages of language
acquisition. But no matter when or how frequently these devices are
invoked, one thing is clear: they present theorists of language
with a complex data pattern. Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore show
that the study of these devices and patterns not only represents an
interesting and neglected project in the philosophy of language,
but also carries important consequences for other parts of
philosophy.
Part I is devoted to presenting data about various aspects of our
metalinguistic practices. In Part II, the authors examine and
reject the four leading metalinguistic theories, and offer a new
account of our use of quotation in a variety of different contexts.
But the primary goal of this book is not to promote one theory over
another. Rather, it is to present a deeply puzzling set of problems
and explain their significance
Language Turned on Itself examines what happens when language
becomes self-reflexive; when language is used to talk about
language. Those who think, talk and write about language are
compulsive users of various metalinguistic devices, but reliance on
these devices begins early: kids are told, 'That's called a
"rabbit"'. It's not implausible that a primitive capacity for the
meta-linguistic kicks in at the beginning stages of language
acquisition. But no matter when or how frequently these devices are
invoked, one thing is clear: they present theorists of language
with a complex data pattern. Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore
argue that the study of these devices and patterns is not only
interesting, but also carries important consequences for other
parts of philosophy.
The primary goal of this book is not to promote one theory over
another. Rather, it is to present a deeply puzzling set of problems
and explain their significance for other areas of philosophy.
Cappelen and Lepore introduce an important, but sometimes
neglected, part of the philosophy of language. Part I is devoted to
presenting data about various aspects of our metalinguistic
practices. In part II, the authors examine and reject the four
leading metalinguistic theories, and present a new account of our
use of quotation in a variety of different contexts.
Assertion is a fundamental feature of language. This volume will be
the place to look for anyone interested in current work on the
topic. Philosophers of language and epistemologists join forces to
elucidate what kind of speech act assertion is, particularly in
light of relativist views of truth, and how assertion is governed
by epistemic norms.
The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively
on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current
meta-philosophical debates and it figures prominently in our
self-understanding as analytic philosophers. No matter what area
you happen to work in and what views you happen to hold in those
areas, you are likely to think that philosophizing requires
constructing cases and making intuitive judgments about those
cases. This assumption also underlines the entire experimental
philosophy movement: only if philosophers rely on intuitions as
evidence are data about non-philosophers' intuitions of any
interest to us. Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes many
philosophers who don't work on meta-philosophy concerned about
their own discipline: they are unsure what intuitions are and
whether they can carry the evidential weight we allegedly assign to
them. The goal of this book is to argue that this concern is
unwarranted since the claim is false: it is not true that
philosophers rely extensively (or even a little bit) on intuitions
as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging
in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this
irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy,
it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged
meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what
philosophy is.
Relativism has dominated many intellectual circles, past and
present, but the twentieth century saw it banished to the fringes
of mainstream analytic philosophy. Of late, however, it is making
something of a comeback within that loosely configured tradition, a
comeback that attempts to capitalize on some important ideas in
foundational semantics. Relativism and Monadic Truth aims not
merely to combat analytic relativism but also to combat the
foundational ideas in semantics that led to its revival. Doing so
requires a proper understanding of the significance of possible
worlds semantics, an examination of the relation between truth and
the flow of time, an account of putatively relevant data from
attitude and speech act reporting, and a careful treatment of
various operators. Throughout, Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne
contrast relativism with a view according to which the contents of
thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental
monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter.
Such propositions, they argue, are the semantic values of sentences
(relative to context), the objects of illocutionary acts, and,
unsurprisingly, the objects of propositional attitudes.
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