The Caspian Sea region is rich in oil and natural gas and can potentially become a major energy supplier. Despite the interest of the three Caspian countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, their energy resources have remained mainly undeveloped a decade after their independence. The main factor that has prevented the full development of the Caspian energy resources has been the difficulty of selecting long-term safe, reliable, and economically viable export routes. The three landlocked Caspian countries have no choice but to depend on their neighbors to access international waters for their exports. For many reasons, including internal stability and extensive oil facilities and pipelines, Iran offers the most suitable routes to all three Caspian countries. However, despite the interest of the Caspian energy-exporters, in using this route, the U.S. policy of containment of Iran has prevented them from doing so. For political, economic, and security reasons, the existing in-use Georgian and Russian routes cannot and will not be a long-term solution for energy exports. The insistence of the American government on imposing the expensive and unreliable Turkish route on the reluctant Caspian energy-exporters and its categorical rejection of the Iranian route have created a major obstacle to the development of the Caspian energy industries.

As Peimani suggests, if this policy continues, many oil and gas exporters will opt for the Iranian route without regard to existing U.S. punitive legislation. The results could well be the isolation of the U.S. in the Caspian region and a gradual exclusion of American oil companies from the region. This overview will be of interest to scholars, researchers, and policymakers involved with economic and political issues of the region.

This is the only book since the fall of the Soviet Union to analyze the security of the newly emerged independent states in the strategically vital region of Central Asia and the Caucasus. This insightful work maps out the possibilities and dangers that lie ahead for the nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The book analyzes the current security situation and clarifies its historical context, identifying the factors that have shaped the security of these young nations since their independence. It also examines the parameters—political, economic, ethnic, energy, and military—that will decide the security of the region in the future. The book's author tells the whole story behind the headlines when he discusses, for example, the real reason for the "wine war" of 2006, when Russia banned imports of Georgian wine for "health reasons," or when explaining the impact of the expanding American presence—both political and military—after September 11. Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus is a primer for those who want to know more about this strategic region and essential reading for all students of world affairs.

The Taliban's fall and the massive American military and political presence in South and West Asia have created grounds for a polarization into two camps: India, Iran and Russia, to which China is affiliated, and the United States and Pakistan. In Peimani's analysis, their incompatible interests will push them towards confrontations with regional and international implications. Contrary to expectations, the fall of the Taliban did not bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. The Afghan interim government is simply too weak to act as a central government; this results in the re-emergence of warlords, turf wars, and the expansion of drug trafficking. This unstable situation may well result in the emergence of Taliban-like groups. Added to this, the threat of the spillover of instability from Afghanistan into neighboring regions, on the one hand, and the rapid expansion of American military and political power in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, on the other, have created fear among the regional powers. The stated indefinite stay of American forces well after the end of the anti-terrorist war in Afghanistan has worsened that fear as it reflected the American government's plan to pursue certain strategic interests unrelated to that war. Consequently, as Peimani shows, the regional anti-terrorist coalition has disintegrated in the absence of a common objective to help focus the region. Fear of the long-term American objectives and those of its Pakistani ally in South and West Asia incompatible with those of the regional powers have facilitated the creation of two camps consisting of Iran, India, and Russia, to which China is affiliated, and Pakistan and the United States. Respectively, these implicit and explicit camps are likely to collide over their regional interests especially in the strategically important energy-producing Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea regions.

A variety of political, economic, social, and security factors have created a situation conducive to the gradual formation of a regional grouping in West Asia. The countries of the Persian Gulf, Caucasus, and Central Asia are gradually gathering around Iran, a rising regional power. Regional and international isolation, sanctions, the Iran-Iraq War, and financial difficulties deprived Iran of its suppliers and forced it to develop itself to meet its needs.

Iran has long-term interests in these three neighboring and energy-producing regions where the United States also has strategic interests. Peimani argues that the current unfriendly relations between the two countries are counterproductive for both and damage their interests. They can and must cooperate in these regions as their interests are not opposite and antagonistic, but different and compatible. Their interests require stability in these regions, for which the two should cooperate. As he points out, they must and can normalize their relations, among other factors, to preserve their long-term interests in these regions and elsewhere.

The breakup of the USSR created a Central Asian security complex or sphere of influence consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this security complex has tended to distance itself from a Russian-centered approach to foreign relations, has rejected involvement with a Turkey-oriented sphere of influence, and has shifted toward an Iran-oriented security complex. A major reason for these developments has been the activities of the three rival powers-Iran, Turkey, and Russia. As Peimani explains, these states have strong long-term interests in the region; earlier rivalries, which were dormant under Soviet rule, have reawakened since the breakup of the USSR. While Russia attempts to reincorporate Central Asia into its security complex, Iran and Turkey seek to include it in their spheres of influence. The rivalry among these states will largely determine the future development of the region and the individual states.

Peimani challenges the practical indifference of many Western and non-Western countries with interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus to their plight. Independence in 1991 suddenly worsened all the economic and social problems of the countries of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Their failure to address their numerous economic problems and to develop their economies has created a suitable ground for the rise of social and political popular dissent, including ethnic conflicts, in all these multi-ethnic countries.

Concerned about the stability of their political systems, their ruling elites have all opted for authoritarianism. The prevailing intolerance of dissent and the suppression of opposition, political parties have paved the way for the emergence of anti-government extremist ideologies and political groups. The domestic situation has become ripe for the rise of violent political activities and ethnic conflicts, with a great possibility for their escalation to civil wars. The ethnic structure of both the Caucasus and Central Asia makes their development into inter-state wars a strong possibility. The unsettled ethnic and territorial conflicts within and between countries, which turned into wars in the early 1990s, could easily re-emerge. There is a potential for the further escalation of military conflicts in those regions because of the intentional or unintentional intervention of Iran, China, Turkey, Russia, and the United States, which have long-term interests in the two regions. Given the geographical characteristics of the Caucasus and Central Asia as a link between Asia and Europe, war and instability in those regions could destabilize the two continents hosting six declared nuclear powers. Of particular interest to scholars and other researchers involved with Eurasian, Central Asian, and Caucasian countries.

The main impact of the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan was not on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Peimani asserts, but on the structure of the international system. The tests could not encourage massive nuclear proliferation as many natural factors prevent such a scenario, but they surely contributed to the weakening of the mainly American-dominated international system.

The failure of nuclear India and Pakistan to achieve their objectives has increased their dissatisfaction with a system which they see as discriminating against them on the grounds of their insignificant nuclear arsenals and their severe underdevelopment. Given their limited resources, their attempts to deal with these problems in the near future and, in particular to develop credible arsenals, would be self-exhausting and not feasible. Their failure has turned them into dissatisfied regional powers who are being pushed toward forming alliances with their long-time friends, Russia and China, respectively. Each has strong reasons for dissatisfaction with the American system, which is marginalizing them. Their concerns about common enemies and threats as well as their economic and political needs are pushing these states toward the formation of tacit or official alliances. Decades of friendship and extensive ties make them natural allies and encourage the formation of an alliance between India and Russia on the one side, and China and Pakistan on the other. By creating strong regional poles, these predictably hostile alliances will contribute to the weakening of the international system and the consolidation of a rising multipolarity. Scholars, students, and researchers involved with foreign policy, American-Indian and American-Pakistani relations, and international military-political relations will find this analysis of particular interest.

This book sheds light on how global warming has caused the ongoing environmental disaster in the Arctic, namely its melting. This development, if left unabated, will have a major negative environmental impact, not only on the Arctic itself, but on the entire planet, including the worsening of global warming and rising sea levels. The latter is a major threat to all island countries and all countries having coastlines with open seas with major environmental, social, economic, political and military/security implications. The Arctic melting is bringing about challenges while opening doors for certain opportunities. These are the accessibility of the region's large oil, gas and coal reserves and minerals, including rare earth elements. They are in demand both in the Arctic littoral states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, Russia and USA) and the Greater Arctic countries (Iceland, Finland and Sweden) as well as in other parts of the world. In particular, major oil and gas importers (China, India, Japan and South Korea) are interested in the Arctic energy resources, the main non-regional countries with a capability to engage in the region. The obvious importance of the regional energy and mineral resources makes the division of the region among the regional countries crucial. The melting of the Arctic ice will also lead to the availability for at least a few months a year of a Northern Sea Route and a Northwest Passage connecting Europe to North America and the North-Eastern part of Asia. The importance of these northern routes and the Arctic mineral and energy resources is contributing to a growing military presence of mainly the USA and Russia in this region, which could lead to an arms race. This book offers invaluable insights on the issues that have grave implications for energy security and geopolitics in the arctic.