WARNING: Peter warned that multitudes could be lead to their own destruction by misinterpreting some of Paul's letters. Speaking of Paul... "his letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort (untrained in the knowledge of the Torah) as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction. Therefore, dear friends, since you have been forewarned, be on your guard so that you may not be carried away by the error of the lawless... those who do not walk in the way of the Torah-Law]" (2 Peter 3:16, 17; commentary added). Why is Peter warning us of Paul's letters? Peter understood Paul's style of teaching, which was from an intellectual and philosophical Greek mindset. Peter knew that unschooled people and those unlearned in the ways of Torah would misunderstand them and would be misled by teachers who manipulate the letters to elevate and profit from them, ultimately leading many to their own destruction. ITZHAK BEN AARON LEVY was born and raised in Israel and comes to us from the priestly tribe of Levy. Rabbi Levy uses history and the Bible in the making of this book; his teachings fall in the middle between Judaism and Christianity, bridging the divide. Levy has chosen Paul's letters since they have been a pivotal point of controversy when compared to the other writers of the New Testament. Knowing that Paul was schooled in the Hebrew language, Levy has used Paul's translated letters from Greek to Hebrew in order to help the reader better understand Paul's Hebrew thinking. By doing this, Levy delivers the true intent of Paul's letters while removing the controversial shadow that was cast on Paul for 2,000 years, allowing the real Paul to come forth. "Thought provoking... enlightening... once I started reading, I couldn't put it down." -MSK "This book sheds much clarity on Paul the person." - B. Jensen "A truly enlightened deliverance of Paul." R. Welsh

This volume presents a series of essays which investigate the nature of intellectual inquiry: what its aims are and how it operates. The starting-point is the work of the American Pragmatists C. S. Peirce and John Dewey. Inquiry according to Peirce is a struggle to replace doubt by true belief. Dewey insisted that the transformation was from an indeterminate situation to a determinate or non-problematic one. So Isaac Levi's subject is changes in doxastic commitments, which may involve changes in attitudes or changes in situations in which attitudes are entangled. The question what justifies modification of doxastic commitments is a normative one, and so may not be understandable in purely naturalistic terms.

Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists.

This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction, and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made "for the sake of the argument" sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such hypothetical belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonicity are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief-contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked. In arguing that the distinction between belief contravening and inductive nonmonotonicity plays a far greater role in deliberation and decision than it is given credit for, this major study will be required reading for all philosophers and logicians concerned with conditionals, decision theory, and inductive inference. It will also interest those in artificial intelligence who work on expert systems, default reasoning, and nonmonotonic reasoning.

This is a collection of Isaac Levi's philosophical papers. Over the period represented by the work here, Professor Levi has developed an interrelated set of views, in the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, on epistemology and the philosophy of science and social science. This focus has been on the problem of induction and the growth of knowledge, the foundations of probability and the theory of rational decision-making. His most important essays in these areas are assembled here, with an introduction setting out their main themes and connections. As a whole the volume presents a coherent, elaborated position which will be of great interest to a range of philosophers, decision theorists, welfare and social choice theorists and cognitive scientists.

Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coherence of our beliefs and values with our rational choices. The norms impose minimal constraints on deliberation and inquiry, but they also impose demands well beyond the capacities of deliberating agents. This major collection will be eagerly sought out by a wide range of philosophers in epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science, as well as economists, decision theorists, and statisticians.

This book by one of the world's foremost philosophers in the fields of epistemology and logic offers an account of suppositional reasoning relevant to practical deliberation, explanation, prediction, and hypothesis testing. Suppositions made "for the sake of the argument" sometimes conflict with our beliefs, and when they do, some beliefs are rejected and others retained. Thanks to such hypothetical belief contravention, adding content to a supposition can undermine conclusions reached without it. Subversion can also arise because suppositional reasoning is ampliative. These two types of nonmonotonicity are the focus of this book. A detailed comparison of nonmonotonicity appropriate to both belief-contravening and ampliative suppositional reasoning reveals important differences that have been overlooked. In arguing that the distinction between belief contravening and inductive nonmonotonicity plays a far greater role in deliberation and decision than it is given credit for, this major study will be required reading for all philosophers and logicians concerned with conditionals, decision theory, and inductive inference. It will also interest those in artificial intelligence who work on expert systems, default reasoning, and nonmonotonic reasoning.

It is a commonplace that in making decisions agents often have to juggle competing values, and that no choice will maximise satisfaction of them all. However, the prevailing account of these cases assumes that there is always a single ranking of the agent's values, and therefore no unresolvable conflict between them. Isaac Levi denies this assumption, arguing that agents often must choose without having balanced their different values and that to be rational, an act does not have to be optimal, only what Levi terms 'admissible'. This book explores the consequences of denying the assumption and develops a general approach to decision-making under unresolved conflict. Professor Levi discusses conflicts of value in several domains - those arising in moral dilemmas, the drawing of scientific inferences, decisions taken under uncertainty, and in social choice. In each of these he adapts his theoretical framework, showing how conflict may often be reduced though not always altogether eliminated.

Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays presents his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of opinions. This major collection will be of interest to a wide range of philosophers in epistemology, logic, and philosophy of science, as well as economists, decision theorists, and statisticians.

Isaac Levi's new book develops further his pioneering work in formal epistemology, focusing on the problem of belief contraction, or how rationally to relinquish old beliefs. Levi offers the most penetrating analysis to date of this key question in epistemology, offering a completely new solution and explaining its relation to his earlier proposals. He mounts an argument in favour of the thesis that contracting a state of belief by giving up specific beliefs is to be evaluated in terms of the value of the information lost by doing so. The rationale aims to be thoroughly decision theoretic. Levi spells out his goals and shows that certain types of recommendations are obtained if one seeks to promote these goals. He compares his approach to his earlier account of inductive expansion. The recommendations are for 'mild contractions'. These are formally the same as the 'severe withdrawals' considered by Pagnucco and Rott. The rationale, however, is different. A critical part of the book concerns the elaboration of these differences. The results are relevant to accounts of the conditions under which it is legitimate to cease believing and to accounts of conditionals. Mild Contraction will be of great interest to all specialists in belief revision theory and to many students of formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and pragmatism.

WARNING: Peter warned that multitudes could be lead to their own destruction by misinterpreting some of Paul's letters. Speaking of Paul... "his letters contain some things that are hard to understand, which ignorant and unstable people distort (untrained in the knowledge of the Torah) as they do the other Scriptures, to their own destruction. Therefore, dear friends, since you have been forewarned, be on your guard so that you may not be carried away by the error of the lawless... those who do not walk in the way of the Torah-Law]" (2 Peter 3:16, 17; commentary added). Why is Peter warning us of Paul's letters? Peter understood Paul's style of teaching, which was from an intellectual and philosophical Greek mindset. Peter knew that unschooled people and those unlearned in the ways of Torah would misunderstand them and would be misled by teachers who manipulate the letters to elevate and profit from them, ultimately leading many to their own destruction. ITZHAK BEN AARON LEVY was born and raised in Israel and comes to us from the priestly tribe of Levy. Rabbi Levy uses history and the Bible in the making of this book; his teachings fall in the middle between Judaism and Christianity, bridging the divide. Levy has chosen Paul's letters since they have been a pivotal point of controversy when compared to the other writers of the New Testament. Knowing that Paul was schooled in the Hebrew language, Levy has used Paul's translated letters from Greek to Hebrew in order to help the reader better understand Paul's Hebrew thinking. By doing this, Levy delivers the true intent of Paul's letters while removing the controversial shadow that was cast on Paul for 2,000 years, allowing the real Paul to come forth. "Thought provoking... enlightening... once I started reading, I couldn't put it down." -MSK "This book sheds much clarity on Paul the person." - B. Jensen "A truly enlightened deliverance of Paul." R. Welsh

Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an agent and either a linguistic entity or some other intentional object such as a proposition or set of possible worlds. The last two chapters offer an account of change in states of full belief understood as changes in commitments rather than changes in performance; one chapter deals with adding new information to a belief state, the other with giving up information. The book builds upon topics discussed in some of Levi's earlier work. It will be of particular interest to discussion theorists, epistemologists, philosophers of science, computer scientists, and cognitive psychologists.

This is a collection of Isaac Levi's philosophical papers. Over the period represented by the work here, Professor Levi has developed an interrelated set of views, in the tradition of Peirce and Dewey, on epistemology and the philosophy of science and social science. This focus has been on the problem of induction and the growth of knowledge, the foundations of probability and the theory of rational decision making. His most important essays in these areas are assembled here, with an introduction setting out their main themes and connections. Part I considers how the aims of scientific inquiry should constrain its practice, employing the crucial notion of 'epistemic utility'. The essays in Part II explain Professor Levi's conception of human knowledge; those in Part III consider objective or statistical probability and evaluate the notion of potential surprise; while Part IV extends his views to central questions of individual and collective decision making. As a whole the volume presents a coherent, elaborated position which will be of great interest to a range of philosophers, decision theorists, welfare and social choice theorists and cognitive scientists.