Does foreign denial and deception threaten the interests of contemporary democracies? Strategic denial and deception (D&D) has emerged as a little understood challenge to security in general, and the intelligence community in particular. To gain advantages, adversaries seek to deny critical information about their own activities and capabilities, and to decieve foreign governments. In recent years, Iraq, India, Somalia, Colombian criminal groups, and terrorists, for example, have all used D&D successfully against the United States. Denial and deception is a low cost, potentially high impact to level political, military, and economic playing fields, particularly against strong opponents.Concerns about the threat of denial and deception have waxed and waned since the end of World War II. Sometimes it shaped assessments about the former Soviet Union, for example. At other times, such as the end of the Cold War, such threats appear to fade into insignificance. This volume considers whether globalization, proliferating communication technologies, and the dissemination of vast amounts of information make effective foreign denial and deception more or less likely. Contributors also examine whether more information and data sources make policymakers better informed or simply create confusion.Drawing on lessons learned from historical experiences, the authors propose ways to minimize future challenges. Chapters include "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," by Abram Shulsky; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by Barton Whaley; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by M.R.D. Foot; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by J. Bowyer Bell; "Arms Control," by Lynn M. Hansen; and "Prescription: Detecting Deception-Practice, Practitioners, and Theory," by Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby.While there are previous books about celebrated D&D cases, from Troy to Pearl Harbor and D-Day, no work attempts to assess how these instruments of denial and deception can be used in the early twenty-first century. This book will be of interest to students, security planners, and general readers interested in political science, security, and foreign and military policy.

This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

This collection, comprising key works by James J. Wirtz, explains how different threat perceptions can lead to strategic surprise attack, intelligence failure and the failure of deterrence. This volume adopts a strategist's view of the issue of surprise and intelligence failure by placing these phenomena in the context of conflict between strong and weak actors in world affairs. A two-level theory explains the incentives and perceptions of both parties when significant imbalances of military power exist between potential combatants, and how this situation sets the stage for strategic surprise and intelligence failure to occur. The volume illustrates this theory by applying it to the Kargil Crisis, attacks launched by non-state actors, and by offering a comparison of Pearl Harbor and the September 11, 2001 attacks. It explores the phenomenon of deterrence failure; specifically, how weaker parties in an enduring or nascent conflict come to believe that deterrent threats posed by militarily stronger antagonists will be undermined by various constraints, increasing the attractiveness of utilising surprise attack to achieve their objectives. This work also offers strategies that could mitigate the occurrence of intelligence failure, strategic surprise and the failure of deterrence. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

Does foreign denial and deception threaten the interests of contemporary democracies? Strategic denial and deception (D&D) has emerged as a little understood challenge to security in general, and the intelligence community in particular. To gain advantages, adversaries seek to deny critical information about their own activities and capabilities, and to decieve foreign governments. In recent years, Iraq, India, Somalia, Colombian criminal groups, and terrorists, for example, have all used D&D successfully against the United States. Denial and deception is a low cost, potentially high impact to level political, military, and economic playing fields, particularly against strong opponents.

Concerns about the threat of denial and deception have waxed and waned since the end of World War II. Sometimes it shaped assessments about the former Soviet Union, for example. At other times, such as the end of the Cold War, such threats appear to fade into insignificance. This volume considers whether globalization, proliferating communication technologies, and the dissemination of vast amounts of information make effective foreign denial and deception more or less likely. Contributors also examine whether more information and data sources make policymakers better informed or simply create confusion.

Drawing on lessons learned from historical experiences, the authors propose ways to minimize future challenges. Chapters include "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," by Abram Shulsky; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by Barton Whaley; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by M.R.D. Foot; "Conditions Making for Success and Failure of D&D," by J. Bowyer Bell; "Arms Control," by Lynn M. Hansen; and "Prescription: Detecting Deception-Practice, Practitioners, and Theory," by Barton Whaley and Jeffrey Busby.

While there are previous books about celebrated D&D cases, from Troy to Pearl Harbor and D-Day, no work attempts to assess how these instruments of denial and deception can be used in the early twenty-first century. This book will be of interest to students, security planners, and general readers interested in political science, security, and foreign and military policy.