The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.

How autocracy flourished even as the economy failed in VenezuelaAn alarming number of countries that once were seemingly stable democracies have veered in recent years toward authoritarianism a trend known as "democratic backsliding." One of those countries in Venezuela, which enjoyed periods of democratically elected governments in the latter half of the twentieth century but in the past two decades has increasingly descended into autocratic rule, coupled with economic collapse. Venezuela's Transition to Authoritarianism, written by a veteran scholar of Venezuela and Latin American politics generally explores how and why this happened. Corrales argues that Venezuela's slide began with the policies of former president Hugo Chavez policies that were based on government control of the economy and in turn generated a lingering economic crisis. After he succeeded Chavez in 2013, Nicolas Maduro not only entrenched the failed economic policies but also responded to various crises by establishing institutions that further undermined democracy. Each of Maduro's responses may have solved a short-term problem but collectively they destroyed both any pretense of democracy in Venezuela and prospects for his own long-term success. Corrales analyzes the lingering crisis in Venezuela by comparing it to twenty cases in Latin America where presidents were forced out of office. Regardless of how the current situation ends in Venezuela, His book illuminates the depressing cycle in which semi-authoritarian regimes become increasingly autocratic in response to crises, only to cause new crises that led to even greater authoritarianism.

An alarming number of countries that once were seemingly stable democracies have veered in recent years toward authoritarianism-a trend known as "democratic backsliding." One of those countries in Venezuela, which enjoyed periods of democratically elected governments in the latter half of the twentieth century but in the past two decades has increasingly descended into autocratic rule, coupled with economic collapse. Autocracy Rising, written by a veteran scholar of Venezuela and Latin American politics generally explores how and why this happened. Corrales argues that Venezuela's slide began with the policies of former president Hugo Chavez-policies that were based on government control of the economy and in turn generated a lingering economic crisis. After he succeeded Chavez in 2013, Nicolas Maduro not only entrenched the failed economic policies but also responded to various crises by establishing institutions that further undermined democracy. Each of Maduro's responses may have solved a short-term problem but collectively they destroyed both any pretense of democracy in Venezuela and prospects for his own long-term success. Corrales analyzes the lingering crisis in Venezuela by comparing it to twenty cases in Latin America where presidents were forced out of office. Regardless of how the current situation ends in Venezuela, his book illuminates the depressing cycle in which semi-authoritarian regimes become increasingly autocratic in response to crises, only to cause new crises that led to even greater authoritarianism.

With the death of Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez, demand has developed for an update to the 2010 title, Dragon in the Tropics - the widely-hailed comprehensive account of how Chavez and his regime revamped Venezuela. Authors Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold have revised and updated their original work. Two new chapters have been added: "Succession Crises and Hybrid Regimes" examines the electoral decline of Chavismo after the passing of its namesake, and a new concluding chapter argues that Chavez's successor, Nicolas Maduro, has turned far more autocratic than anything seen in Venezuela since 1958. Finally, the authors apply lessons from the Arab Spring to show why Venezuela's succession produced neither regime collapse nor heightened political violence.

Oil makes up one-third of Venezuela's entire GDP, and the United States is far and away Venezuela's largest trading partner. Relations between Venezuela and the United States, traditionally close for most of the last two centuries, began to fray as the end of the Cold War altered the international environment.

Current Issues in U.S.-Venezuelan Relations explores relations between these two countries since 1999, when Hugo Chavez came to office and proceeded to change Venezuela's historical relation with the United States and other democracies. The authors analyze the reasons for rising bilateral conflict, the decision-making process in Venezuela, the role played by public and private actors in shaping foreign policy, the role of other powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in shaping U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the role of Venezuela in Cuba and Colombia, and the impact of broader international dynamics in the bi-lateral relations.

Oil makes up one-third of Venezuela's entire GDP, and the United States is far and away Venezuela's largest trading partner. Relations between Venezuela and the United States, traditionally close for most of the last two centuries, began to fray as the end of the Cold War altered the international environment.

U.S.-Venezuela Relations since the 1990s explores relations between these two countries since 1999, when Hugo Chavez came to office and proceeded to change Venezuela's historical relation with the United States and other democracies. The authors analyze the reasons for rising bilateral conflict, the decision-making process in Venezuela, the role played by public and private actors in shaping foreign policy, the role of other powers such as China, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in shaping U.S.-Venezuelan relations, the role of Venezuela in Cuba and Colombia, and the impact of broader international dynamics in the bi-lateral relations.

The first section of this Element reviews the history of LGBTQ rights in the region since the 1960s. The second section reviews explanations for the expansion of rights and setbacks, especially since the mid 2000s. Explanations are organized according to three themes: (1) the (re-)emergence of a religious cleavage; (2) the role of political institutions such as presidential leadership, political parties, federalism, courts, and transnational forces; and (3) the role of social movement strategies, and especially, unity. The last section compares the progress on LGBTQ rights (significant) with reproductive rights (insignificant). This Element concludes with an overview of the causes and possible future direction of the current backlash against LGBTQ rights.

The study of institutions, a core concept in comparative politics, has produced many rich and influential theories on the economic and political effects of institutions, yet it has been less successful at theorizing their origins. In Fixing Democracy, Javier Corrales develops a theory of institutional origins that concentrates on constitutions and levels of power within them. He reviews numerous Latin American constituent assemblies and constitutional amendments to explore why some democracies expand rather than restrict presidential powers and why this heightened presidentialism discourages democracy. His signal theoretical contribution is his elaboration on power asymmetries. Corrales determines that conditions of reduced power asymmetry make constituent assemblies more likely to curtail presidential powers, while weaker opposition and heightened power asymmetry is an indicator that presidential powers will expand. The bargain-based theory that he uses focuses on power distribution and provides a more accurate variable in predicting actual constitutional outcomes than other approaches based on functionalism or ideology. While the empirical focus is Latin America, Fixing Democracy contributes a broadly applicable theory to the scholarship both institutions and democracy.

Is Venezuela's Bolivarian revolution under Hugo Chavez truly revolutionary? Most books and articles tend to view the Chavez government in an either-or fashion. Some see the president as the shining knight of twenty-first-century socialism, while others see him as an avenging Stalinist strongman. Despite passion on both sides, the Chavez government does not fall easily into a seamless fable of emancipatory or authoritarian history, as these essays make clear. A range of distinguished authors consider the nature of social change in contemporary Venezuela and explore a number of themes that help elucidate the sources of the nation's political polarization. The chapters range from Fernando Coronil's "Bolivarian Revolution," which examines the relationship between the state's social body (its population) and its natural body (its oil reserves), to an insightful look at women's rights by Cathy A. Rakowski and Gioconda Espina. This volume shows that, while the future of the national process is unclear, the principles elaborated by the Chavez government are helping articulate a new Latin American left.

Most studies about the politics of economic reform focus on the struggles between the state and interest groups or opposition political parties. In this book Javier Corrales argues instead that the key struggle is between the executive and the ruling party. Deep economic transformations require cooperation from the ruling party. This support allows the state to sustain societal support and simultaneously ward off the potentially paralyzing influence of interest groups. Without such cooperation, the executive loses credibility and the political fortitude necessary to neutralize the opposition from skeptical as well as cost-bearing sectors of society. Presidents Without Parties puts this argument to the test by examining closely what happened in Argentina and Venezuela during the 1990s.

Similarly situated when they embarked on economic reform in 1989, Argentina experienced success, with the reformers reelected in 1995, whereas Venezuela saw its reformers' efforts fail, leading to a prolonged crisis. Corrales shows precisely how the executive's relationship with the ruling party shaped the different outcomes in the two countries. He then applies this argument to eight other cases of market reform in Latin American countries in the 1990s.

This book resuscitates and refines the ancient but often forgotten argument that political parties are indispensable for governability. In an era in which it is trendy to discount the usefulness of parties and to celebrate extrapartisan institutions, Corrales offers a reconsideration of the costs of trying to govern in the absence of competitive parties.