Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches - managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory - and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, this Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business, and accounting. Contributors: C. Amatucci, R. Bender, S. Bhagat, W. Bratton, S. Chahine, R. Chakrabarti, M.J. Conyon, G. Ferrarini, M. Firth, M. Goergen, B. Haar, L. He, M.T. Henderson, J.G. Hill, K. Kubo, T.Y. Leung, G. Loutzenhiser, M. Lubrano di Scorpaniello, J.A. McCahery, N. Moloney, K.J. Murphy, L. Oxelheim, L. Renneboog, R. Romano, O.M. Rui, Z. Sautner, K. Sheehan, K. Subramanian, R.S. Thomas, S. Thompson, G. Trojanowski, H. Wells, C. Wihlborg, J. Winter, P.K. Yadav, Y. Yadav, J. Zhang

The most pressing challenge in corporate governance today is figuring out how to modulate the power given to public investors. Too little is harmful, but so is too much. Finding the sweet spot is very tricky. This Research Handbook makes the quest a little easier. It collects in one place a set of thoughtful and provocative essays, authored by leading academic experts from around the world, on a range of topics related to corporate governance and the power of shareholders. Very highly recommended.' - Jesse Fried, Harvard Law School, US'The Research Handbook on Shareholder Power offers a state-of-the-art collection of original essays on the most profound development in corporate governance in recent decades: the growth of shareholder power as against managerial dominance. From the 1960s through at least the mid-1980s one would hear only cries bemoaning shareholder vulnerability. Managers were in control. Today it is at least as common to hear complaints by managers that they are being persecuted by activist shareholders. The reader of the Handbook will come away with an acute understanding of how and why this happened, and how all this reverberates in countries.' - Donald C. Langevoort, Georgetown University, US 'Edward Elgar's Research Handbook on Shareholder Power is an excellent collection of essays by leading scholars in the fields of corporate law and corporate governance. Professors Hill and Thomas are to be commended for delivering this valuable and timely volume on a fascinating and crucial topic.' - Brian Cheffins, University of Cambridge, UK Much of the history of corporate law has concerned itself not with shareholder power, but rather with its absence. Recent shifts in capital market structure require a reassessment of the role and power of shareholders. These original, specially commissioned contributions by leading scholars in corporate law and financial economics provide a contemporary analysis of shareholder power and consider the regulatory consequences of changing ownership patterns around the world. The book begins with chapters on shareholder activism by institutional investors, hedge funds, and controlling shareholders. Further chapters explore the relationship between shareholders and the board of directors, shareholder activism around mergers and acquisitions, and turf battles during shareholder litigation. The final section offers a number of international perspectives on shareholder power in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Students and scholars of corporate law will value the Handbook's timely exploration of modern shareholder power as well as its fresh perspective and scope. Contributors: S. Bainbridge, M. Becht, M. Belcredi, M.M. Blair, J.C. Coates, J.D. Cox, P. Davies, P.H. Edelman, T. Eguchi, L. Enriques, G. Ferrarini, F. Ferri, M. Filippelli, J. Franks, G.S. Geis, R.J. Gilson, J.N. Gordon, E. Gorga, J. Grant, L. Guo, G. Heng, J.G. Hill, K.S. Kim, L.L. Lan, R.W. Masulis, C. Mayer, F. Partnoy, P.K.Pham, E. Pikulina, D. Puchniak, L. Renneboog, W.G. Ringe, Z. Shishido, M.M. Siems, R.S. Thomas, R.B. Thompson, U. Varottil, H. Wells, J. Zein

Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches - managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory - and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, this Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business, and accounting. Contributors: C. Amatucci, R. Bender, S. Bhagat, W. Bratton, S. Chahine, R. Chakrabarti, M.J. Conyon, G. Ferrarini, M. Firth, M. Goergen, B. Haar, L. He, M.T. Henderson, J.G. Hill, K. Kubo, T.Y. Leung, G. Loutzenhiser, M. Lubrano di Scorpaniello, J.A. McCahery, N. Moloney, K.J. Murphy, L. Oxelheim, L. Renneboog, R. Romano, O.M. Rui, Z. Sautner, K. Sheehan, K. Subramanian, R.S. Thomas, S. Thompson, G. Trojanowski, H. Wells, C. Wihlborg, J. Winter, P.K. Yadav, Y. Yadav, J. Zhang

The EU and the US responded to the global financial crisis by changing the rules for the functioning of financial services and markets and by establishing new oversight bodies. With the US Dodd-Frank Act and numerous EU regulations and directives now in place, this book provides a timely and thoughtful explanation of the key elements of the new regimes in both regions, of the political processes which shaped their content and of their practical impact. Insights from areas such as economics, political science and financial history elucidate the significance of the reforms. Australia's resilience during the financial crisis, which contrasted sharply with the severe problems that were experienced in the EU and the US, is also examined. The comparison between the performances of these major economies in a period of such extreme stress tells us much about the complex regulatory and economic ecosystems of which financial markets are a part.