Chromosome abnormalities of cancer cells have been recognized for a long time, and have generally proven to be a highly specific marker ofmalignancy. The contri- butions collected in this book, "Tumor Aneuploidy", cover several major aspects of present knowledge conceming the occurrence and clinical significance of chromo- some abnormalities as delineated by karyotype analyses or measurements of the cellular DNA content. Certain non-random clonal chromosome losses, deletions and translocations ap- pear to represent primary genetic lesions of malignancies and reflect their clonal origin. Secondary intraneoplastic genetic evolution is suggested by major clonal ab- normalities of chromosome number and cellular DNA content. Both types of ge- netic changes have been reaching great relevance in cancer medicine, today. Although the Philadelphia chromosome was first discovered in chronic myelo- cytic leukemia (CML), by Nowell and Hungerford in 1960, new banding techniques developed in the 1970's were needed to identity this abnormality as a translocation between chromosomes 9 and 22 (t(9; 22)). Soon thereafter, further non-random translocations were detected and attributed to special diseases like t(8; 21) and t(15; 17) to acute myeloid leukemias (AML) and t(9; 22), t(4; 11), t(8; 14) to acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL).

The amount and complexity of software developed during the last few years has increased tremendously. In particular, programs are being used more and more in embedded systems (from car-brakes to plant-control). Many of these applications are safety-relevant, i.e. a malfunction of hardware or software can cause severe damage or loss. Tremendous risks are typically present in the area of aviation, (nuclear) power plants or (chemical) plant control. Here, even small problems can lead to thousands of casualties and huge financial losses. Large financial risks also exist when computer systems are used in the area of telecommunication (telephone, electronic commerce) or space exploration. Computer applications in this area are not only subject to safety considerations, but also security issues are important. All these systems must be designed and developed to guarantee high quality with respect to safety and security. Even in an industrial setting which is (or at least should be) aware of the high requirements in Software Engineering, many incidents occur. For example, the Warshaw Airbus crash, was caused by an incomplete requirements specification. Uncontrolled reuse of an Ariane 4 software module was the reason for the Ariane 5 disaster. Some recent incidents in the telecommunication area, like illegal "cloning" of smart-cards of D2GSM handies, or the extraction of (secret) passwords from German T-online users show that also in this area serious flaws can happen. Due to the inherent complexity of computer systems, most authors claim that only a rigorous application of formal methods in all stages of the software life cycle can ensure high quality of the software and lead to real safe and secure systems. In this paper, we will have a look, in how far automated theorem proving can contribute to a more widespread application of formal methods and their tools, and what automated theorem provers (ATPs) must provide in order to be useful.