This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial manoeuvres designed to alter voting outcomes, elections with experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with more than two candidates under different election rules, and bureaucratic efforts to manipulate referendum voting. Recognized scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and others' work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.

It has long been recognized that an improved standard of living results from advances in technology, not from the accumulation of capital. It has also become clear that what truly separates developed from less-developed countries is not just a gap in resources or output but a gap in knowledge. In fact, the pace at which developing countries grow is largely a function of the pace at which they close that gap. Thus, to understand how countries grow and develop, it is essential to know how they learn and become more productive and what government can do to promote learning. In Creating a Learning Society, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Bruce C. Greenwald cast light on the significance of this insight for economic theory and policy. Taking as a starting point Kenneth J. Arrow's 1962 paper "Learning by Doing," they explain why the production of knowledge differs from that of other goods and why market economies alone typically do not produce and transmit knowledge efficiently. Closing knowledge gaps and helping laggards learn are central to growth and development. But creating a learning society is equally crucial if we are to sustain improved living standards in advanced countries. Combining accessible prose with technical economic analysis, Stiglitz and Greenwald provide new models of "endogenous growth," up-ending thowhe thinking about both domestic and global policy and trade regimes. They show well-designed government trade and industrial policies can help create a learning society, and how poorly designed intellectual property regimes can retard learning. They also explain how virtually every government policy has effects, both positive and negative, on learning, a fact that policymakers must recognize. They demonstrate why many standard policy prescriptions, especially those associated with "neoliberal" doctrines focusing on static resource allocations, have impeded learning. Among the provocative implications are that free trade may lead to stagnation whereas broad-based industrial protection and exchange rate interventions may bring benefits-not just to the industrial sector, but to the entire economy. The volume concludes with brief commentaries from Philippe Aghion and Michael Woodford, as well as from Nobel Laureates Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert M. Solow.

Nobel Prize winner the late William Vickrey was one of the truly important figures in contemporary economics. Over the past fifty-five years he has published several books and some 140 papers scattered over many journals. This book offers a thoughtful selection from these papers, organised so as to bring out the scope and yet the unity of the work. Vickrey has the unique distinction of having contributed, often seminally and always operationally, to all major branches of public economics. The papers collected here cover social choice and allocation mechanisms, taxation, pricing in public utilities and in urban transportation, urban economics, and macroeconomic policies. Each topic is introduced by one of the four editors, and the book is completed with a full annotated bibliography of Vickrey's work. For the first time, we have convenient access to a set of important, creative and stimulating contributions, which have helped shape the modern field of public economics. This is a fascinating overview of the field and of the life-time work of a great economist.

In this short and accessible book, Amy Finkelstein -- winner of the 2012 John Bates Clark award -- tackles the tricky question of moral hazard, which is the tendency to take risks when the cost will be borne by others. Kenneth J. Arrow's seminal 1963 paper, "Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care" -- included in the volume -- was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for healthcare, and in this book, Finkelstein examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy.

Showcasing research from a 1972 RAND experiment and her own findings from an ongoing Medicaid study in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction from Joseph Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow.

This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial manoeuvres designed to alter voting outcomes, elections with experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with more than two candidates under different election rules, and bureaucratic efforts to manipulate referendum voting. Recognized scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and others' work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.

Most Americans strongly favor equality of opportunity if not outcome, but many are weary of poverty's seeming immunity to public policy. This helps to explain the recent attention paid to cultural and genetic explanations of persistent poverty, including claims that economic inequality is a function of intellectual ability, as well as more subtle depictions of the United States as a meritocracy where barriers to achievement are personal--either voluntary or inherited--rather than systemic. This volume of original essays by luminaries in the economic, social, and biological sciences, however, confirms mounting evidence that the connection between intelligence and inequality is surprisingly weak and demonstrates that targeted educational and economic reforms can reduce the income gap and improve the country's aggregate productivity and economic well-being. It also offers a novel agenda of equal access to valuable associations.

Amartya Sen, John Roemer, Robert M. Hauser, Glenn Loury, Orley Ashenfelter, and others sift and analyze the latest arguments and quantitative findings on equality in order to explain how merit is and should be defined, how economic rewards are distributed, and how patterns of economic success persist across generations. Moving well beyond exploration, they draw specific conclusions that are bold yet empirically grounded, finding that schooling improves occupational success in ways unrelated to cognitive ability, that IQ is not a strong independent predictor of economic success, and that people's associations--their neighborhoods, working groups, and other social ties--significantly explain many of the poverty traps we observe.

The optimistic message of this beautifully edited book is that important violations of equality of opportunity do exist but can be attenuated by policies that will serve the general economy. Policy makers will read with interest concrete suggestions for crafting economically beneficial anti-discrimination measures, enhancing educational and associational opportunity, and centering economic reforms in community-based institutions. Here is an example of some of our most brilliant social thinkers using the most advanced techniques that their disciplines have to offer to tackle an issue of great social importance.

Kenneth J. Arrow's pathbreaking "impossibility theorem" was a watershed innovation in the history of welfare economics, voting theory, and collective choice, demonstrating that there is no voting rule that satisfies the four desirable axioms of decisiveness, consensus, nondictatorship, and independence. In this book Eric Maskin and Amartya Sen explore the implications of Arrow's theorem. Sen considers its ongoing utility, exploring the theorem's value and limitations in relation to recent research on social reasoning, and Maskin discusses how to design a voting rule that gets us closer to the ideal-given the impossibility of achieving the ideal. The volume also contains a contextual introduction by social choice scholar Prasanta K. Pattanaik and commentaries from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow himself, as well as essays by Maskin, Dasgupta, and Sen outlining the mathematical proof and framework behind their assertions.