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This is the first book to explore the connections and interactions
between social epistemology and epistemic relativism. The essays in
the volume are organized around three distinct philosophical
approaches to this topic: 1) foundational questions concerning deep
disagreement, the variability of epistemic norms, and the
relationship between relativism and reliabilism; 2) the role of
relativistic themes in feminist social epistemology; and 3) the
relationship between the sociology of knowledge, philosophy of
science, and social epistemology. Recent trends in social
epistemology seek to rectify earlier work that conceptualized
cognitive achievements primarily on the level of isolated
individuals. Relativism insists that epistemic judgements or
beliefs are justified or unjustified only relative to systems of
standards-there is not neutral way of adjudicating between them. By
bringing together these two strands of epistemology, this volume
offers unique perspectives on a number of central epistemological
questions. Social Epistemology and Relativism will be of interest
to researchers working in epistemology, feminist philosophy, and
the sociology of knowledge.
This is the first book to explore the connections and interactions
between social epistemology and epistemic relativism. The essays in
the volume are organized around three distinct philosophical
approaches to this topic: 1) foundational questions concerning deep
disagreement, the variability of epistemic norms, and the
relationship between relativism and reliabilism; 2) the role of
relativistic themes in feminist social epistemology; and 3) the
relationship between the sociology of knowledge, philosophy of
science, and social epistemology. Recent trends in social
epistemology seek to rectify earlier work that conceptualized
cognitive achievements primarily on the level of isolated
individuals. Relativism insists that epistemic judgements or
beliefs are justified or unjustified only relative to systems of
standards-there is not neutral way of adjudicating between them. By
bringing together these two strands of epistemology, this volume
offers unique perspectives on a number of central epistemological
questions. Social Epistemology and Relativism will be of interest
to researchers working in epistemology, feminist philosophy, and
the sociology of knowledge.
Debates over relativism are as old as philosophy itself. Since the
late nineteenth century, relativism has also been a controversial
topic in many of the social and cultural sciences. And yet,
relativism has not been a central topic of research in the history
of philosophy or the history of the social sciences. This
collection seeks to remedy this situation by studying the emergence
of modern forms of relativism as they unfolded in the German lands
during the "long nineteenth century"-from the Enlightenment to
National Socialism. It focuses on relativist and anti-relativist
ideas and arguments in four contexts: history, science,
epistemology, and politics. The Emergence of Relativism will be of
interest to those studying nineteenth- and twentieth-century
philosophy, German idealism, and history and philosophy of science,
as well as those in related disciplines such as sociology and
anthropology.
Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological
knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind.
Psychological Knowledge challenges these views. It argues that
bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like
money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts
like coins or crowns.
Martin Kusch takes on arguments of alternative proposals, shows
what is wrong with them, and demonstrates how his own
social-philosophical approach constitutes an advance. We see that
exists a substantial natural amount of philosophical theorising, a
body of work that tries to determine the nature and structure of
folk psychology.
Examining the workings of constuctivism, Psychological Knowledge is
an invaluable introduction to the history of psychology and the
recent philosophy of mind.
Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that psychological knowledge is knowledge about, and held by, the individual mind. Psychological Knowledge challenges these views. It argues that bodies of psychological knowledge are social institutions like money or the monarchy, and that mental states are social artefacts like coins or crowns. Martin Kusch takes on arguments of alternative proposals, shows what is wrong with them, and demonstrates how his own social-philosophical approach constitutes an advance. We see that exists a substantial natural amount of philosophical theorising, a body of work that tries to determine the nature and structure of folk psychology. An introduction to the workings of constuctivism, Psychological Knowledge is an insightful introduction to the history of psychology and the recent philosophy of mind.
In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were
just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place.
Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's
claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their
field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto
Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is
held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was
also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until
the two fields eventually matured and grew apart.
Until the publication of Martin Kursch's masterly work
"Psychologism," few philosophers and psychologists have attended to
their originally unhappy, turn-of-the-century engagement. Martin
Kusch explores the origins of psychologism in Germany and "fin de
siecle" Vienna by examining two major figures of twentieth century
philosophy: Frege and Husserl. As one of the few serious works on
Frege, Kusch trenchantly and clearly reconstructs the debate and
the context in which it flourished. "Psychologism" will prove to be
a key work of intellectual history on a subject which has largely
been overlooked and, above all, understudied.
In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were
just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place.
Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's
claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their
field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto
Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is
held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was
also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until
the two fields eventually matured and grew apart.
Until the publication of Martin Kursch's masterly work
"Psychologism," few philosophers and psychologists have attended to
their originally unhappy, turn-of-the-century engagement. Martin
Kusch explores the origins of psychologism in Germany and "fin de
siecle" Vienna by examining two major figures of twentieth century
philosophy: Frege and Husserl. As one of the few serious works on
Frege, Kusch trenchantly and clearly reconstructs the debate and
the context in which it flourished. "Psychologism" will prove to be
a key work of intellectual history on a subject which has largely
been overlooked and, above all, understudied.
No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much
criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's
"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics,
one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is
rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at
least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in
their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to
debates that strike at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of
mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch
defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections
that have been put forward over the past twenty years and argues
that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are
based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks
can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and
that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or
to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace.
Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is
deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument
a new strength.
No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much
criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's
"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics,
one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is
rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at
least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in
their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to
debates that strike at the very heart of contemporary philosophy of
mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch
defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections
that have been put forward over the past twenty years and argues
that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are
based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks
can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and
that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or
to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace.
Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is
deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument
a new strength.
Relativism can be found in all philosophical traditions and
subfields of philosophy. It is also a central idea in the social
sciences, the humanities, religion and politics. This is the first
volume to map relativistic motifs in all areas of philosophy,
synchronically and diachronically. It thereby provides essential
intellectual tools for thinking about contemporary issues like
cultural diversity, the plurality of the sciences, or the scope of
moral values. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism is
an outstanding major reference source on this fundamental topic.
The 57 chapters by a team of international contributors are divided
into nine parts: Relativism in non-Western philosophical traditions
Relativism in Western philosophical traditions Relativism in ethics
Relativism in political and legal philosophy Relativism in
epistemology Relativism in metaphysics Relativism in philosophy of
science Relativism in philosophy of language and mind Relativism in
other areas of philosophy. Essential reading for students and
researchers in all branches of philosophy, this handbook will also
be of interest to those in related subjects such as politics,
religion, sociology, cultural studies and literature.
What can humans do? What can machines do? How do humans delegate
actions to machines? In this book, Harry Collins and Martin Kusch
combine insights from sociology and philosophy to provide a novel
answer to these increasingly important questions.The authors begin
by distinguishing between two basic types of intentional behavior,
which they call polimorphic actions and mimeomorphic actions.
Polimorphic actions (such as writing a love letter) are ones that
community members expect to vary with social context. Mimeomorphic
actions (such a swinging a golf club) do not vary. Although
machines cannot act, they can mimic mimeomorphic actions.
Mimeomorphic actions are thus the crucial link between what humans
can do and what machines can do.Following a presentation of their
detailed categorization of actions, the authors apply their
approach to a broad range of human-machine interactions and to
learning. Key examples include bicycle riding and the many
varieties of writing machines. They also show how their theory can
be used to explain the operation of organizations such as
restaurants and armies. Finally, they look at a historical case-the
technological development of the air pump-applying their
categorization of actions to the processes of mechanization and
automation. Automation, they argue, can occur only where what we
want to bring about can be brought about through mimeomorphic
action.
'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental
oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much
of its (modern) history. Often these reflections have been
inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the
position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the
philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the
'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth'
politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch
examines some of the most influential relativist proposals of the
last fifty years, and the controversies they have triggered. He
argues that defensible forms of relativism all deny that any sense
can be made of a scientific result being absolutely true or
justified, and that they all reject 'anything goes' - that is the
thought that all scientific results are epistemically on a par.
Kusch concludes by distinguishing between defensible forms of
relativism and post-truth thinking.
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