'Relativism versus absolutism' is one of the fundamental
oppositions that have dominated reflections about science for much
of its (modern) history. Often these reflections have been
inseparable from wider social-political concerns regarding the
position of science in society. Where does this debate stand in the
philosophy and sociology of science today? And how does the
'relativism question' relate to current concerns with 'post truth'
politics? In Relativism in the Philosophy of Science, Martin Kusch
examines some of the most influential relativist proposals of the
last fifty years, and the controversies they have triggered. He
argues that defensible forms of relativism all deny that any sense
can be made of a scientific result being absolutely true or
justified, and that they all reject 'anything goes' - that is the
thought that all scientific results are epistemically on a par.
Kusch concludes by distinguishing between defensible forms of
relativism and post-truth thinking.
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