Orginally published in 1991. From the foreword: "Although the United States did not enter World War II until the end of 1941, US citizens fought and died in the war long before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Among them were the pilots of the Eagle Squadrons, three fighter squadrons of Britain's Royal Air Force manned by young US flyers risking their lives in another nation's war. In this book, Colonel Philip D. Caine, US Air Force, tells how the Eagle Squadrons were formed, describes their RAF experiences, and evaluates their contribution to Britain's defense. Unlike other accounts, Eagles of the RAF is not simply a paean to the pilots as special heroes and "aces," though many performed heroically and some sacrificed their lives. Drawing almost exclusively on interviews with more than thirty-five surviving Eagles, on their letters and memoirs, and on official records of the squadrons, Caine shows who these men were and what drove them to endure the burdens of joining a foreign air force. We see them adjusting to life in a new country as they train, fly patrol and escort missions, and sit on alert in dispersal huts or in airplane cockpits. We see their routine suddenly shattered by the momentary chaos and exhilaration of aerial combat. The Eagles' story is a unique chapter in American military history; it deserves to be told as it really happened-not as romanticized by Hollywood or nostalgic recollection. Beyond reliably telling the story, Colonel Caine reveals much about why people enter the military, how military life satisfies or disappoints their preconceptions, and how at least some of them reacted to the realities of combat."

From the foreword: "Established during World War II to advise the President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and peacetime, also provides important insights into the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history of their activities be kept for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies is self-apparent. Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991 follows in the tradition of volumes previously prepared by the Joint History Office dealing with JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Adopting a broader view than earlier volumes, it surveys the JCS role and contributions from the early days of orld War II through the end of the Cold War. Written from a combination of primary and secondary sources, it is a fresh work of scholarship, looking at the problems of this era and their military implications. The main prism is that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in laying out the JCS perspective, it deals also with the wider impact of key decisions and the ensuing policies."

The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) has produced this edited volume, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization, that delves deeply into everything mentioned above and more. In a time when the threat is growing, this is a timely effort. CCO has gathered an impressive cadre of authors to illuminate the important aspects of transnational crime and other illicit networks. They describe the clear and present danger and the magnitude of the challenge of converging and connecting illicit networks; the ways and means used by transnational criminal networks and how illicit networks actually operate and interact; how the proliferation, convergence, and horizontal diversification of illicit networks challenge state sovereignty; and how different national and international organizations are fighting back. A deeper understanding of the problem will allow us to then develop a more comprehensive, more effective, and more enduring solution.

Full color publication with photographs. A first of its kind, this book-of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty officer-is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in 2007, as well as the Services' NCO/PO manuals and handbooks. Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, "We know noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional competence, professional character, and soldierly grit-they are exemplars of our Profession of Arms." Aspirational and fulfilling, this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates reflection by those who have retired from or left active service. It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why they are properly known as the "Backbone of the Armed Forces."

In 2016, economic globalization suffered a severe crisis after over half a century of smooth development, and deglobalization was running mountains high. Not only did it trigger domestic political discord in major countries like the United States, Britain, France and Germany, but also led to international economic and political disputes among Western countries, intensifying strategic competition between major powers. With the arrival of 2017, through the perilous waves of deglobalization and the consequent international political upheavals, we find that the post Cold War era that we were familiarized with, is coming to a rapid end, ushering in a new international political era, full of uncertainties. This annual book presents Chinese scholars' views, opinions and predictions on global political and security issues, as well as China's strategic choice. It covers a wide range of important issues concerning international security, ranging from the assessment of Sino-US relations, Russian-American relations, the counter terrorism situation in the Middle East, the political situation in Taiwan and cross-Strait relations, Brexit and the refugee problem, and the strategic situation in the South China Sea, to the judgment of the strategic posture in countries and regions like Japan, the Korean Peninsula, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. Also covered are the analysis of the strategic posture in cyber space, outer space (as well as their governance), and discussion on China's international strategic choice in the wave of deglobalization.

The world was standing at the crossroads in 2015 as globalization propelled human beings into an increasingly integrated community of common destiny. In the meantime, the world witnessed the strategic competition among major powers. This annual publication offers views, opinions and predictions on global political and security issues, and China's strategic choices by Chinese scholars. It covers almost all the significant issues that took place in the international security arena in 2015. Besides the relations among major powers, it studies the international community's fight against Islamic State (IS), the strategic situation in the Korean Peninsula, political situation in Myanmar, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue, free navigation in the South China Sea, China's Belt and Road Initiative and its grand diplomacy.This book argues that the strategic competition among major powers is heightening, and smaller countries as well as extremist forces like the IS are seeking strategic space by taking advantage of the conflicts among major powers. The book concludes that to address this major historic challenge in international politics, it is essential that some major powers drop the hostile stance towards each other and enhance partnership to foster international cooperation.

The world was standing at the crossroads in 2015 as globalization propelled human beings into an increasingly integrated community of common destiny. In the meantime, the world witnessed the strategic competition among major powers. This annual publication offers views, opinions and predictions on global political and security issues, and China's strategic choices by Chinese scholars. It covers almost all the significant issues that took place in the international security arena in 2015. Besides the relations among major powers, it studies the international community's fight against Islamic State (IS), the strategic situation in the Korean Peninsula, political situation in Myanmar, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear issue, free navigation in the South China Sea, China's Belt and Road Initiative and its grand diplomacy.This book argues that the strategic competition among major powers is heightening, and smaller countries as well as extremist forces like the IS are seeking strategic space by taking advantage of the conflicts among major powers. The book concludes that to address this major historic challenge in international politics, it is essential that some major powers drop the hostile stance towards each other and enhance partnership to foster international cooperation.

The international strategic relations have been undergoing great turbulence, readjustment and reformation since the financial crisis in 2008. This round of transition is mainly driven by economic competition instead of wars. International competition, crises and collisions will ebb and flow and happen frequently in the foreseeable future, but will not break through the international political framework based on cooperation. However, these crises, collisions and even wars will have disturbing effects on the political framework for international cooperation, and will change and distort the patterns of international cooperation. This annual publication provides Chinese scholars' views, opinions and predictions on global political and security issues, and China's strategic choices. It covers almost all the significant issues in the international security arena. It evaluates the strategic influence of regional issues such as the Ukraine crisis, the crisis in the Middle East, the South China Sea disputes and the US-Asia-Europe strategic balance. It analyzes strategic trends of international organizations like the BRICS, the SCO, and the ASEAN. It studies strategic development of countries and regions like Japan, India, the Korean Peninsula, Africa, Taiwan and cross-Strait relations. It researches the strategic situations in the cyber space and the outer space, and sums up the reform and development of China's national security system.

From fighting terrorists to stabilizing a war-torn country to waging all-out combat, military campaigns are increasingly shaped by networks that enable dispersed and disparate forces to collaborate by sharing data. Along with the high-precision sensors and weapons they connect, networks are turning information power into military power. Defense investment priorities are shifting from mechanized platforms and weapons to the information collectors, processors, links and services that compose these networks. With its unmatched defense resources and technological talents, the United States has pioneered networked warfare. But the United States will have company-not all of it friendly. For example, China and Al Qaeda, using very different doctrines, are showing interest in tapping the power of information. Indeed, Al Qaeda and its franchised affiliates are displaying cunning and resourcefulness in putting this power to work with virtually no investment. As adversaries exploit networks, the United States must seek new leverage by improving its fighters' ability to use information in war's confusing, critical, and violent conditions. Blessed with more, better, and timelier information, yet vexed by increasingly murky circumstances, the cognitive faculties of military decision makers-lieutenants no less than lieutenant generals-are more crucial than ever. In a forthcoming National Defense University book, the authors suggest why and how U.S. and allied forces should improve these faculties to attain new operational and strategic advantages, or at least to avoid the loss of the advantages they now enjoy. Although military combat is unique, the authors draw lessons from non-military sectors, including some in which urgent life-and-death decisions must be made. This paper summarizes their thinking. While this is neither the first nor the last word on why and how to gain cognitive advantage, it aims to take an integrated view, provide a geo-strategic context, broaden and heighten awareness, frame policy issues, offer preliminary advice, and indicate where research and analysis is needed.

The U.S. government continues to improve its plans for protecting civilians and soldiers from attacks with biological weapons. Part of this effort focuses on developing strategies that recognize the difficult choices to be made in using and deploying resources. This paper presents a risk- and decision-based framework-derived from the field of Bayesian statistics-for developing strategies that facilitate managing the risks of biological agents. The framework recognizes the significantly different attributes of potential biological weapons and offers a strategy for improving communication to effectively coordinate national biopreparedness efforts. The framework identifies generic decisions related to routine immunization, response planning, stockpiling vaccines and therapeutic agents, surveillance choices, containment, emergency response training, research, media and communications preparations, information management, and policy development. This paper provides a straw man to be used in wargames, exercises, practices, etc., at all levels of government. Given the attention on anthrax following the 2001 attacks, this paper applies the framework to managing the risks of anthrax to provide an illustrative example. The example demonstrates that by organizing information at this level, decision makers can quickly understand the critical connections between different options (e.g., vaccinating with a new vaccine requires an investment in research; research might increase the opportunities for breaches of containment). With respect to managing the risks of an attack with anthrax, this analysis suggests the need for creation of a comprehensive national management plan that includes quantitative evaluation of resource investments. The authors conclude that the government should adopt a process-based on decision science and using the power of decision trees as an analytical tool-to develop a strategy for managing the risks of bioterrorism. Using this type of approach, the government can better characterize the costs, risks and benefits of different policy options and ensure the integration of policy development. Additionally, confirmed use and refinement of decision trees during exercises will provide analysis of the long-term consequences of decisions made during an event and give policymakers insights to improve initial decisions.

The "hurry up and wait" phenomenon in many military operations is aptly called "hours of boredom," whereas the transition to meet sudden task demands when combat breaks out is sometimes deemed to consist of "moments of terror." Increasingly, other national security and paramilitary force personnel (e.g., police forces, border patrol, operational intelligence agents) also experience long periods of boredom interspersed with all-out response efforts when the going "gets hot." The authors examine resultant psychological and behavioral implications for combatant and security personnel performance as viewed through application of a traditional human psychological stress model. Inadequate recognition of the implications resulting from long lull periods, combat pulses, and the need to recover from stress can lead to dysfunctional soldiering as well as poor individual and small unit performance. Accounting for such time-based transitions in the psychological state of military combatants and security force operators is important in configuring resilience training for small group leaders, their personnel, and their organizational units. As we seek to come to terms with the rapidly emerging challenges of military and other national security operations in the new millennium it is crucial to take a careful look at the fundamental characteristics of some of the tasks our deployed personnel are now being asked to perform. This assessment embraces a wide spectrum of requirements, since many former military job elements are now subject to outsourcing. Contemporary national security policies witness deployments of large number of State Department, international development agencies, and even Justice Department employees, many of whom carry out a myriad of activities with some of the same military characteristics and accompanying psychological and physiological stressors. Our comments may pertain to other national security forces as well, but here we exemplify our points by referring mostly to the tasks and stresses of military personnel. While not unique to the military, the ore security tasks that remain for our professional military have evolved under the driving force of a changing environment, including a broad expansion of defense missions; for example, providing humanitarian assistance, stability and security operations, implementation of new technologies, and emerging forms of conflict such as engaging in asymmetric warfare and counterinsurgency operations. Whereas Krueger recently outlined an extensive listing of soldier stresses that impact performance of military personnel on contemporary and future battlefields, our central thesis here is that identifiable constants remain in the missions that military and other security force personnel are tasked to accomplish, especially in the temporal rhythm of these assignments. Often characterized as "hurry up and wait operations," we term these requirements as "hours of boredom and moments of terror." It is these forms of demand and their effect upon performance and health which form our primary concern. These temporal rhythms are normal and expected in military operations, and are becoming so in other security operations as well. Understood in this light, this article asserts that leaders should, in training, prepare their troops for high levels of cognitive and physiological readiness; they need to anticipate executing operational plans that often require patience and apparent, sometime boring inactivity that will eventually be followed by sustained maximum performance. This is, in turn, followed by anticipation of the next activity cycle as pulses in the normal sequence of boredom-terror-boredom - which is the military way of things. Advances in anticipatory strategy can help a variety of professional occupations (e.g., police, emergency response, and other security force workers) whose central temporal characteristics are highly similar to this military challenge.

In the second half of the 20th century, the United States enjoyed stature and prosperity at levels seldom achieved in recorded history. The country's status included predominance in most fields of science and technology (S&T), as well as a phenomenal breadth and pace of innovation. We are now experiencing a global shift to a more level playing field among nations; demographics, economics, and political forces are the driving forces behind this shift. The impact of this shift on U.S. S&T will be significant. By the middle of the 21st century, it is likely that a number of nations will be similarly prosperous and technologically productive. No single nation or group will dominate as the United States did in the latter half of the 1900s. The U.S. share of the global S&T enterprise will decrease, and only a small fraction of U.S. scientists and engineers (S&E) will work on national security problems. This change poses challenges to the roles and conduct of Department of Defense (DOD) S&T. In particular, DOD's ability to maintain an authoritative awareness of S&T developments around the world will become increasingly problematic. Most attempts to quantify these challenges utilize simple linear or exponential extrapolations. Although such approaches are helpful for short-term predictions, they tend to produce unrealistically pessimistic predictions for the timescales considered in this paper. The present work establishes an empirical relationship between an economy's gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and its ability to gene rate S&T knowledge. This paper then employs the results of a full economic analysis for the period 2005-2050 to estimate the S&T knowledge production for each of the world's 17 largest economies. The estimate indicates that U.S. share of S&T productivity will decline from about 26 percent in 2005 to 18 percent in 2050. This decline, while problematic, is not unmanageable. At least through 2050, the United States will remain one of the world's most significant contributors to scientific knowledge. As a result, the U.S. S&T workforce should be large enough, relative to the world S&T workforce, to remain cognizant of S&T developments around the world-although the means of doing so may change. This ability to remain cognizant is important because by 2050, countries other than the United States will produce most scientific knowledge. Maintaining an authoritative awareness of S&T around the world will be essential if the United States is to remain economically and militarily competitive. This awareness includes the ability of the U.S. S&T workforce to authoritatively interpret trends in global S&T. The required awareness can be maintained only if the U.S. S&T workforce is a participant in the global S&T community. This is true for the DOD S&T workforce as well. For DOD to succeed, it will be necessary to find a means to tap the knowledge of the larger U.S. S&T community regarding global S&T. It is only at this level that the United States will have a sufficient number of S&T "brain cells" to actually know what is occurring in the world of global S&T, what is important, and what is not important. Tapping this knowledge will be very challenging for DOD. Nevertheless, we must ensure the global S&T knowledge held by the larger U.S. S&T community is available to the military and that DOD has the internal capability to comprehend and exploit this knowledge through the DOD S&T workforce. The term "DOD S&T workforce" refers to those S&Es who are funded by DOD S&T dollars that fall into the categories of Basic Research (6.1) and Exploratory Development (6.2). This workforce is larger than the DOD federal S&T workforce (often called the in-house workforce), which, of course, has a special role. Some members of the DOD S&T workforce will be employees of DOD; others will be involved through vehicles such as contracts, advisory committees, and cooperative programs with other government agencies.

The Army team at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy has been doing technology studies for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology since 2003. In 2007 we published Enhancing Army S&T: Lessons Learned From Project Hindsight Revisited, which we refer to here as Vo l. I. That publication was a summary of critical technology contributions to the development of four successful Army warfighting systems. Since then, we have completed a number of studies of important aspects of the Army science and technology (S&T) program with an emphasis on the Army laboratories. In the present paper, Vol. II, we integrate the findings of these studies and make recommendations after each chapter, as well as in a separate final chapter. Chapter I of this volume is an introduction, and Chapter II offers an updated view of the work discussed in Vol. I with an emphasis on the relative roles played by the Army laboratories and the contractors that manufactured the systems. The close collaboration between the two groups was judged by us to be the key to the successful outcomes. Both the Army laboratories and the technical personnel at the contractors were essential-without either group the work would have cost more, taken more time, and might well have failed. We believe the collaboration was the result of the efforts of the mid-level managers who pressed technologists to work together. In Chapter III, we discuss the impact of the lack of publicity given to the Army laboratories' work. This lack of publicity has caused some observers to conclude that the laboratories are not significant contributors to the warfighters. This belief in turn has produced recommendations from outside the military to close the laboratories and assign the research to the private sector. We do not agree with the criticism or the recommendation. We discuss two aspects of addressing this problem: the need to maintain high-quality work and the need to provide detailed information about the contributions of the laboratories to all parties concerned-namely, Army senior leadership, officials in the Department of Defense (DOD), the Administration, the Congress, and the general public. Chapter IV explores the laboratory quality question. We begin by asserting that the most important asset of a laboratory is its technical staff members and that, therefore, ensuring staff quality should be a top priority of management. We discuss a number of methods for locating and bringing new employees onboard, including use of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), post-doctoral appointments, and visiting scientists and engineers. Chapter V discusses two reports we issued on the role of technology in stabilization and reconstruction. We surveyed the experiences of recently returned soldiers from Iraq. More recently we have conducted Gedanken Experiments at Fort Bennning to explore, with experienced soldiers, various challenges facing the laboratory programs. These experiments brought together a number of officers and senior non-commissioned officers in combination with Army scientists and engineers and observers from ASAALT and other Army organizations. The participants have been enthusiastic about the experience and are urging that more such experiments be carried out. In Chapter VI we recommend that the Army laboratories be managed as the important component of developing new capabilities for warfighters that they are. The Army should emphasize reporting relationships and the role of ASAALT in developing policy affecting the laboratories.

The Pre-Conflict Management Tools (PCMT) Program was developed to transform how intelligence analysts, policy analysts, operational planners, and decision makers interact when confronting highly complex strategic problems. The PCMT Program capitalizes on technologies and methods that help users collect, process, perform analyses with large quantities of data, and employ computational modeling and simulation methods to determine the probability and likelihood of state failure. The Program's computational decision aids and planning methodology help policymakers and military planners devise activities that can mitigate the consequences of civil war, or prevent state failure altogether. State failure has become an increasingly important national and international security issue since the end of the Cold War. Weak and failed states establish a nexus of interests between global terrorism, embattled leaders or insurgents, and large populations easily mobilized by a combination of violent ideology and economic opportunity. Civil war, the most common form of armed conflict around the world, undermines regional and international stability and catalyzes larger national security problems, such as weapons proliferation, organized crime, and terrorism. The PCMT Program builds on social science research on state failure and conflict, by turning government users into consumers of social science models employed by academic researchers and validated through peer review processes and implementation by practitioners. By constructing an analytic suite out of existing models, the Program avoids the controversies of 1960's social science research programs, such as Project Camelot, by rejecting the notion of a single, government-sponsored theory of conflict or placing policymakers in the position of determining what is or is not valid social science. PCMT architecture and methodology capitalize on changes in the landscape of information made possible by the ever-increasing quantity and diversity of information available electronically, by modeling, simulation, and analysis for identifying social vulnerabilities, and by a collaborative analytic and planning process at interagency and international levels. Each component of the PCMT architecture incorporates or extends established tools and practices that have improved performance in a variety of endeavors in other domains. The PCMT data collection capability helps the user organize and exploit all information available in electronic form, whether collected from open sources or the user's private databases. This enables analysts to filter data, rather than sample from small populations of sources whose ability to represent the character of the available universe of data is in doubt. Moreover, automated document coding enables analysts to work from datasets that would be too costly to construct, maintain, and manipulate manually. As a result, PCMT data collection and management technologies enable users to perform new kinds of analysis. The PCMT modeling and simulation suite contains multiple models of social vulnerabilities that assess the probability of state failure. Each model instantiates a different social science theory as to why states fail and civil war occurs. The suite gives policymakers diverse perspectives on each country or region. The application of multiple, competing models in analytic processes also assists users in confronting uncertainty by preventing decision makers from developing plans based on the outputs of a single model or theory. Instead, the PCMT suite assists users in crafting robust, adaptive policies that satisfice across landscapes of potential futures or scenarios generated through simulation Finally, PCMT is constructed to facilitate communication and analysis at interagency and international levels. By giving users warning of state failure months in advance, coalitions, partnerships, and plans can be formed to head off a crisis.

The urge to remain militarily strong has long been a driver of technological advancement. This interplay between strength and technology, so evident in America's global military reach, has for decades prompted U.S. defense planners to engage in technology forecasting. Analysis of emerging technologies was, and is, vital to making wise defense investments. Among the preeminent examples of such analysis are the studies undertaken by Theodore von Karman just after the Second World War. The von Karman reports represent an exhaustive review of science and technology related to the military services. His analysis projected the importance of unmanned aircraft, advanced jet propulsion, allweather sensors, and target seeking missiles. While it is important to assess the needs and challenges of the future, understanding past military technological successes can be equally important to defense science and technology (S&T) investment and management. To complement the above efforts and the many other technology forecasts too numerous to mention, this study is the first in a series that will examine some of the key factors that have led to meaningful technology generation and ultimate incorporation into the U.S. weapons systems we see in the field today. Included here are such factors as where the technical work was performed, funding source(s) for the effort, collaboration between government and non-government laboratories, and management style. This series of studies will focus only on Army weapons systems, beginning with the mainstay of the Army's armor force, the Abrams tank. Analysis of other Army systems, such as the Apache helicopter and the Javelin and Stinger missiles, will follow. The results of all studies will be compiled in a wrap-up report that will focus on the implications of the findings for today's S&T environment. We begin the paper by briefly reviewing a project that served as a source of inspiration for this study: Project Hindsight, a 1969 Defense Department (DOD) report. Hindsight was an in-depth study sponsored by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) that provided some insights into the development of approximately 20 weapons systems across the DOD spectrum. Following the review of Hindsight, we present a short history of U.S. battle tanks as well as a summary of events leading up to the Army decision to replace the M60 Patton tank with the Abrams tank. This is followed by a description of the methodology used to gather key data on the development of the Abrams. The information is broken out by topic area (armament related subjects; armor and other survivability related subjects; engine and drive system; vetronics, C4ISR and fire control) and presented in terms of critical technology events (CTEs). CTEs are ideas, concepts, models, and analyses, including key technical and managerial decisions that have had a major impact on the development of a specific weapons system. CTEs can occur at any point in the system's life cycle, from basic research, to advanced development, to testing and evaluation, to product improvements. The final portion of the paper presents the concluding remarks and findings based on the CTEs that characterize the Abrams tank's development. The CTEs are noted in the left margin throughout the report. They are summarized in Appendix B. CTEs are numbered only for ease of reference; there is no hierarchical or chronological significance to their order. While the link between high-tech weapons systems and battlefield success is often readily apparent, the geneses of and processes associated with CTEs often are not. CTEs depend on several important factors, including effective management, adequate funding, establishment of clear priorities, fostering of proper technical competencies, and leveraging of the resources of the private sector and academia.