|
Showing 1 - 25 of
32 matches in All Departments
Full color publication with photographs. A first of its kind, this
book-of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty
officer-is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader
across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces
Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in
2007, as well as the Services' NCO/PO manuals and handbooks.
Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted
leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes
how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the
Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the
officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international
engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, "We know
noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional
competence, professional character, and soldierly grit-they are
exemplars of our Profession of Arms." Aspirational and fulfilling,
this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become
NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates
reflection by those who have retired from or left active service.
It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better
understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why
they are properly known as the "Backbone of the Armed Forces."
From the foreword: "Established during World War II to advise the
President on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the
United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in
existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners,
have played a significant role in the development of national
policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council is
essential to an understanding of the current work of the Chairman
and the Joint Staff. A history of their activities, both in war and
peacetime, also provides important insights into the military
history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff directed that an official history of their activities be
kept for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the
orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and
as a source of information for staff studies is self-apparent.
Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991
follows in the tradition of volumes previously prepared by the
Joint History Office dealing with JCS involvement in national
policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Adopting a broader
view than earlier volumes, it surveys the JCS role and
contributions from the early days of orld War II through the end of
the Cold War. Written from a combination of primary and secondary
sources, it is a fresh work of scholarship, looking at the problems
of this era and their military implications. The main prism is that
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but in laying out the JCS
perspective, it deals also with the wider impact of key decisions
and the ensuing policies."
Orginally published in 1991. From the foreword: "Although the
United States did not enter World War II until the end of 1941, US
citizens fought and died in the war long before the Japanese
attacked Pearl Harbor. Among them were the pilots of the Eagle
Squadrons, three fighter squadrons of Britain's Royal Air Force
manned by young US flyers risking their lives in another nation's
war. In this book, Colonel Philip D. Caine, US Air Force, tells how
the Eagle Squadrons were formed, describes their RAF experiences,
and evaluates their contribution to Britain's defense. Unlike other
accounts, Eagles of the RAF is not simply a paean to the pilots as
special heroes and "aces," though many performed heroically and
some sacrificed their lives. Drawing almost exclusively on
interviews with more than thirty-five surviving Eagles, on their
letters and memoirs, and on official records of the squadrons,
Caine shows who these men were and what drove them to endure the
burdens of joining a foreign air force. We see them adjusting to
life in a new country as they train, fly patrol and escort
missions, and sit on alert in dispersal huts or in airplane
cockpits. We see their routine suddenly shattered by the momentary
chaos and exhilaration of aerial combat. The Eagles' story is a
unique chapter in American military history; it deserves to be told
as it really happened-not as romanticized by Hollywood or nostalgic
recollection. Beyond reliably telling the story, Colonel Caine
reveals much about why people enter the military, how military life
satisfies or disappoints their preconceptions, and how at least
some of them reacted to the realities of combat."
The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) has produced this edited
volume, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the
Age of Globalization, that delves deeply into everything mentioned
above and more. In a time when the threat is growing, this is a
timely effort. CCO has gathered an impressive cadre of authors to
illuminate the important aspects of transnational crime and other
illicit networks. They describe the clear and present danger and
the magnitude of the challenge of converging and connecting illicit
networks; the ways and means used by transnational criminal
networks and how illicit networks actually operate and interact;
how the proliferation, convergence, and horizontal diversification
of illicit networks challenge state sovereignty; and how different
national and international organizations are fighting back. A
deeper understanding of the problem will allow us to then develop a
more comprehensive, more effective, and more enduring solution.
Mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles offer an excellent
case study for investigating the current debate over the Pentagon's
approach to developing and fielding irregular warfare capabilities.
MRAPs first gained prominence for their ability to protect U.S.
forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and because the
Pentagon did not deploy them en masse to Iraq until almost five
years of fighting had passed. More recently, following
extraordinary efforts to field more than 10,000 MRAPs quickly, the
program has been criticized as wasteful and unnecessary. Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates often cites the slow fielding of MRAPs as a
prime example of the Pentagon's institutional resistance to
investments in irregular warfare capabilities. Some irregular
warfare requirements traditionally bedevil the United States-such
as human intelligence-but quickly producing and fielding vehicles
is something the country has done well often in the past. Moreover,
the Pentagon assessed MRAPs as 400 percent more effective at
protecting U.S. troops than other vehicles, and Congress was eager
to pay for them. Thus, the slow fielding of the MRAPs certainly
seems like prima facie evidence for the Secretary's claim that the
Pentagon does not do a good job of providing irregular warfare
capabilities. Yet some analysts now argue that MRAPs are not really
useful for irregular warfare and are prohibitively expensive. By
the time the vehicles finally flowed into the combat zone, the need
for them had diminished because the insurgency and the IED problem
in Iraq were on the decline. Now the Pentagon's planned procurement
of MRAPs is being slashed, Congress is demanding more
accountability for controlling their costs, and the MRAP program is
being accused of sidetracking important future acquisition programs
such as the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and the Future Combat
System. As General Barry McCaffrey, USA (Ret.), asserted, "It is
the wrong vehicle, too late, to fit a threat we were actually
managing." Thus, MRAP proponents, who think their delayed fielding
was unconscionable, and detractors, who consider them a misguided,
emotional response to casualties, both view the MRAP saga as an
acquisition disaster. For incoming senior officials who are vowing
acquisition reform, the MRAP experience seems to strengthen their
cause. The controversial MRAPs raise two questions. First, does the
MRAP experience support Secretary Gates' contention that the
Pentagon is not sufficiently able to field irregular warfare
capabilities? To resolve this issue, we have to determine whether
MRAPs actually are a valid irregular warfare requirement, and if
so, whether the Pentagon should have been better prepared to
provide the kind of force protection armored vehicles like the MRAP
provides. Second, what factors best explain the MRAP failure,
whether that failure is determined to be the delayed fielding of
MRAPs or the fact that they were fielded at all? More specifically,
is the acquisition system to blame, as is commonly supposed? We
conclude that MRAPs are a valid irregular warfare requirement and
that the Pentagon should have been better prepared to field them,
albeit not on the scale demanded by events in Iraq. We also argue
that the proximate cause of the failure to quickly field MRAPs is
not the Pentagon's acquisition system but rather the requirements
process, reinforced by more fundamental organizational factors.
These findings suggest that achieving Secretary Gates' objective of
improving irregular warfare capabilities will require more
extensive reforms than many realize.
The Center for Complex Operations (CCO) has produced this edited
volume, Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the
Age of Globalization, that delves deeply into everything mentioned
above and more. In a time when the threat is growing, this is a
timely effort. CCO has gathered an impressive cadre of authors to
illuminate the important aspects of transnational crime and other
illicit networks. They describe the clear and present danger and
the magnitude of the challenge of converging and connecting illicit
networks; the ways and means used by transnational criminal
networks and how illicit networks actually operate and interact;
how the proliferation, convergence, and horizontal diversification
of illicit networks challenge state sovereignty; and how different
national and international organizations are fighting back. A
deeper understanding of the problem will allow us to then develop a
more comprehensive, more effective, and more enduring solution.
The U.S. Government has recently issued seven major studies that
together put forth a comprehensive blueprint for major global
changes in U.S. national security strategy, defense plans, and
diplomacy. These seven studies are brought together in this
illuminating book, which portrays their individual contents and
complex interrelationships and evaluates their strengths and
shortfalls. It argues that while these studies are well-written,
cogently argued, and articulate many valuable innovations for the
Department of Defense, Department of State, and other government
agencies, all of them leave lingering, controversial issues that
require further thinking and analysis as future U.S. national
security policy evolves in a changing and dangerous world. For all
readers, this book offers a quick, readable way to grasp and
critique the many changes now sweeping over the new U.S. approach
to global security affairs.
The second half of the 20th century featured a strategic
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That
competition avoided World War III in part because during the 1950s,
scholars like Henry Kissinger, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and
Albert Wohlstetter analyzed the fundamental nature of nuclear
deterrence. Decades of arms control negotiations reinforced these
early notions of stability and created a mutual understanding that
allowed U.S.-Soviet competition to proceed without armed conflict.
The first half of the 21st century will be dominated by the
relationship between the United States and China. That relationship
is likely to contain elements of both cooperation and competition.
Territorial disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China
Sea will be an important feature of this competition, but both are
traditional disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves.
A more difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition
and cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can
be inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as
a clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear
deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a
clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains
can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the
United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this
book is about. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the
prospect of U.S.- Chinese competition in these domains and develop
three related analytic findings upon which their recommendations
are built. The first is that in each domain, the offense is
dominant. The second is that each side will be highly vulnerable to
a strike from the other side. And the third is that the retaliating
side will still be able to do unacceptable damage to the initiating
party. Therefore, the authors make an important recommendation:
that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on
mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing
strategic vulnerabilities. Unlike the Cold War, this mutual
restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties. But
patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain
stability. Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University Press.
Full color publication with photographs. A first of its kind, this
book-of, by, and for the noncommissioned officer and petty
officer-is a comprehensive explanation of the enlisted leader
across the U.S. Armed Services. It complements The Armed Forces
Officer, the latest edition of which was published by NDU Press in
2007, as well as the Services' NCO/PO manuals and handbooks.
Written by a team of Active, Reserve, and retired senior enlisted
leaders from all Service branches, this book defines and describes
how NCOs/POs fit into an organization, centers them in the
Profession of Arms, explains their dual roles of complementing the
officer and enabling the force, and exposes their international
engagement. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin
E. Dempsey writes in his foreword to the book, "We know
noncommissioned officers and petty officers to have exceptional
competence, professional character, and soldierly grit-they are
exemplars of our Profession of Arms." Aspirational and fulfilling,
this book helps prepare young men and women who strive to become
NCOs/POs, re-inspires serving enlisted leaders, and stimulates
reflection by those who have retired from or left active service.
It also gives those who have never worn the uniform a better
understanding of who these exceptional men and women are, and why
they are properly known as the "Backbone of the Armed Forces."
Published by the National Defense University, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, Center for the Study of Chinese
Military Affairs. From the foreword by Hans Binnendijk: "The first
half of the 21st century will be dominated by the relationship
between the United States and China. That relationship is likely to
contain elements of both cooperation and competition. Territorial
disputes such as those over Taiwan and the South China Sea will be
an important feature of this competition, but both are traditional
disputes, and traditional solutions suggest themselves. A more
difficult set of issues relates to U.S.-Chinese competition and
cooperation in three domains in which real strategic harm can be
inflicted in the current era: nuclear, space, and cyber. Just as a
clearer understanding of the fundamental principles of nuclear
deterrence maintained adequate stability during the Cold War, a
clearer understanding of the characteristics of these three domains
can provide the underpinnings of strategic stability between the
United States and China in the decades ahead. That is what this
book is about. David Gompert and Phillip Saunders assess the
prospect of U.S.- Chinese competition in these domains and develop
three related analytic findings upon which their recommendations
are built. The first is that in each domain, the offense is
dominant. The second is that each side will be highly vulnerable to
a strike from the other side. And the third is that the retaliating
side will still be able to do unacceptable damage to the initiating
party. Therefore, the authors make an important recommendation:
that the United States propose a comprehensive approach based on
mutual restraint whereby it and China can mitigate their growing
strategic vulnerabilities. Unlike the Cold War, this mutual
restraint regime may not take the form of binding treaties. But
patterns of understanding and restraint may be enough to maintain
stability."
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National
Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes
the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations,
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic
Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The
military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its
subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and
analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy
support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic
studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the
academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S.
Government agencies and the broader national security community.
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National
Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes
the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations,
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic
Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The
military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its
subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and
analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy
support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic
studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the
academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S.
Government agencies and the broader national security community.
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National
Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes
the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations,
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic
Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The
military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its
subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and
analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy
support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic
studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the
academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S.
Government agencies and the broader national security community.
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National
Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes
the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations,
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic
Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The
military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its
subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and
analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy
support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic
studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the
academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S.
Government agencies and the broader national security community.
The Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS) serves as a
national and international focal point and resource center for
multidisciplinary research on issues relating to transatlantic
security. The Center provides recommendations to senior U.S. and
international government and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) officials, publishes its research, and conducts a broad
range of outreach activities to inform the broader U.S. national
and transatlantic security community.
Since its inception in 1994, the Center for the Study of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD Center) has been at the forefront of research
on the implications of weapons of mass destruction for U.S.
security. Originally focusing on threats to the military, the WMD
Center now also applies its expertise and body of research to the
challenges of homeland security. The center's mandate includes
research, education, and outreach. Research focuses on
understanding the security challenges posed by WMD and on
fashioning effective responses thereto.
The contributors to this book emphasize a mix of heritage and
history as the primary leitmotif for contemporary border rivalries
and dynamics. Whether the region's 11 states want it or not, their
bordered identity is falling into ever sharper definition-if only
because of pressure from extraregional states. Chapters are
organized by country to elicit a broad range of thought and
approach as much as for the specific areas or nation-states
examined in each chapter. This book aims to provide new ways of
looking at the reality and illusion of bordered Southeast
Asia.Edited by James Clad, Sean M. McDonald, and Bruce Vaughn, with
contributions from: Zachary Abuza, Richard P. Cronin, David Lee,
Rhoda Margesson, Dick K. Nanto, Patricia O'Brien, David Rosenberg,
Carlyle A. Thayer, Michael Wood.
The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National
Defense University's (NDU's) dedicated research arm. INSS includes
the Center for Strategic Research, Center for Complex Operations,
Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Center for
Technology and National Security Policy, Center for Transatlantic
Security Studies, and Conflict Records Research Center. The
military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its
subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and
analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy
support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic
studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands in support of the
academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S.
Government agencies and the broader national security community.
|
You may like...
Gloria
Sam Smith
CD
R238
R195
Discovery Miles 1 950
Finding Dory
Ellen DeGeneres, Albert Brooks, …
Blu-ray disc
(1)
R40
Discovery Miles 400
24K Magic
Bruno Mars
CD
(1)
R185
Discovery Miles 1 850
|