Naval War College Historical Monograph Series, 18. Examines in detail, making extensive use of the Naval War College archives, each of the U.S. Navy's twenty-one "fleet problems" conducted between World Wars I and II, elucidating the patterns that emerged, finding a range of enduring lessons, and suggesting their applicability for future naval warfare.

International Law Studies, Volume 88. Edited by Kenneth Watkin and Andrew J. Norris. Contains papers from the conference: "Non-International Armed Conflict in the 21st Century" hosted by the Naval War College on June 21-23, 2011. Examines the legal issues surrounding non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in the modern era.

International Law Studies Volume 87. Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Daria P. Wollschlaeger, editors. Contains a compilation of scholarly papers and remarks derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War College on June 22-24, 2010 entitled "International Law and the Changing Character of War." The objectives of the conference were to catalogue the extent to whichh existing international law governs these changing aspects of warfare and to assess whether these developments warrant revision of existing international law.

From June 25 to 27, 2008, the Naval War College had the honor to convene an International Law Expert's Workshop, "The War in Afghanistan - A Legal Analysis." This volume captures the legal lessons of the war in Afghanistan as reported, studied and debated by a rare gathering of eminent scholars and practitioners of international law. The workshop's mission was to provide a comprehensive legal examination of the Afghan conflict-from the decision to use force, to the manner with which force was employed, to the legal construct for the evolution of military operations transitioning away from the use of force. Renowned international academics and legal advisers, both military and civilian, representing military, diplomatic, nongovernmental and academic institutions from throughout the world contributed to the workshop and this volume.

Excerpt from the introduction: "In the late nineteenth century, the French Jeune Ecole, or "new school," of naval thinking promoted a commerce-raiding strategy for the weaker naval power to defeat the dominant naval power. France provided the vocabulary for the discussion-Jeune Ecole and guerre de course (war of the chase)-and embodied the geopolitical predicament addressed: France had been a dominant land power, known for its large and proficient army and resentful of British imperial dominance and commercial preeminence. But its navy had rarely matched the Royal Navy in either quantity or quality, and its economy could not support both a preeminent army and navy. So its naval thinkers thought of an economical way out of its predicament. They argued that a guerre de course allowed weaker maritime power, such as France, to impose disproportionate costs on the stronger sea power in order to achieve its objectives. Sadly for France, the strategy did not work as anticipated, and British naval dominance and imperial primacy endured. The case studies in this book reveal why this was so, and they shed light on the dynamic of rivalries between maritime and continental powers. This issue is an important one in that from the heyday of the British Empire to the present, maritime powers have set the global order, and continental powers have contested it. So the dynamic is still with us, and it is of vital national import to all countries that benefit from the present international order of freedom of navigation, free trade, and the rule of international law."

Excerpt from the introduction: "In the late nineteenth century, the French Jeune Ecole, or "new school," of naval thinking promoted a commerce-raiding strategy for the weaker naval power to defeat the dominant naval power. France provided the vocabulary for the discussion-Jeune Ecole and guerre de course (war of the chase)-and embodied the geopolitical predicament addressed: France had been a dominant land power, known for its large and proficient army and resentful of British imperial dominance and commercial preeminence. But its navy had rarely matched the Royal Navy in either quantity or quality, and its economy could not support both a preeminent army and navy. So its naval thinkers thought of an economical way out of its predicament. They argued that a guerre de course allowed weaker maritime power, such as France, to impose disproportionate costs on the stronger sea power in order to achieve its objectives. Sadly for France, the strategy did not work as anticipated, and British naval dominance and imperial primacy endured. The case studies in this book reveal why this was so, and they shed light on the dynamic of rivalries between maritime and continental powers. This issue is an important one in that from the heyday of the British Empire to the present, maritime powers have set the global order, and continental powers have contested it. So the dynamic is still with us, and it is of vital national import to all countries that benefit from the present international order of freedom of navigation, free trade, and the rule of international law."

Newport Paper No. 29, Shaping the Security Environment, edited by Derek S. Reveron, makes an important contribution to an unfolding debate on the global role of U.S. military forces in an era of transnational terrorism, failed or failing states, and globalization. Reveron, professor of national security decision making at the Naval War College, looks beyond the current conflicts in which the United States is involved to raise fundamental questions concerning the regional diplomatic roles of America's combatant commanders (COCOMs) and, more generally, the entire array of nonwarfighting functions that have become an increasingly important part of the day-to-day life of the American military as it engages a variety of partners or potential partners around the world. These functions are increasingly being given doctrinal definition and a larger role in U.S. military planning under the novel concept of "shaping." This volume is intended to explore the notion of shaping in its various aspects, both generally and in several regional contexts. The changing role of the regional COCOMs (formerly CINCs) over the last dozen years or so is the focus of a paper by General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), who provides a characteristically frank and illuminating account of his own tenure as commander of the U.S. Central Command, with responsibilities for the Persian Gulf and the greater Middle East. Papers by Commander Alan Lee Boyer, USN (Ret.), and Stephen A. Emerson examine maritime and regional security cooperation from the perspective of the U.S. European Command on the one hand and, on the other, the Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa, a joint organization headquartered in Djibouti that has played a critical role in recent years in strengthening the capabilities of countries throughout the region to improve their own security and counter terrorism. Two further chapters examine aspects of shaping from a global perspective. Ronald E. Ratcliffe provides a searching analysis of the "thousand-ship navy" initiative proposed several years ago by outgoing Chief of Naval Operations Michael Mullen, including the difficulties the U.S. Navy has had in operationalizing this concept-and the difficulties some of our allies and partners continue to have in coming to terms with it. Ratcliffe makes a number of useful recommendations as to how the Navy can make headway in the area of maritime security cooperation in the coming years, which is likely to figure prominently in the new maritime strategy the Navy is currently developing. Finally, Dennis Lynn looks at "strategic communication," also a relatively new concept that is intended to bring greater coherence to the way the U.S. military thinks about the overall impact of its words and actions abroad and how it can better craft messages to shape the environment-friendly as well as adversarial-in which it finds itself today.

The powerful underwater earthquake that occurred off the coast of Sumatra on 26 December 2004 generated the most destructive tsunami ever recorded, drowning more than 150,000 people without warning in exposed littoral areas from Indonesia to South Africa. The destruction was particularly severe in the Aceh Province of Indonesia, at the northwestern tip of the island of Sumatra. There entire villages were destroyed within minutes as waves of thirty feet or more advanced far inland, while destruction of the main coastal highway made the entire region virtually inaccessible to Indonesian authorities ashore. In these extraordinary circumstances of human suffering, the U.S. Navy was able to play a key role in organizing what was to become a massive, multinational humanitarian relief operation, one based and executed virtually entirely "from the sea." Working closely with the Indonesian government and military, the Navy delivered, beginning within days of the disaster, vast quantities of emergency food and other supplies and provided on-the-spot emergency medical treatment to thousands of injured and displaced persons along the Aceh coast. Humanitarian relief has long been recognized as a mission of the American armed forces and of the U.S. Navy in particular. The scale and complexity of the tsunami's impact, however, posed particular and in some respects novel challenges to the Joint Task Force 536 (JTF 536) that was created to deal with the situation, not least of them the requirement imposed on it to operate exclusively from an improvised "sea base," to use a term that has gained some currency in recent discussions of naval missions and capabilities. In Newport Paper 28, Waves of Hope: The U.S. Navy's Response to the Tsunami in Northern Indonesia, historian Bruce A. Elleman provides the first comprehensive history and analysis of what would become known as Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. Elleman, a research professor in the Department of Maritime History at the Naval War College, has produced a valuable and indeed unique study, one that makes use of a variety of internal Navy documents, oral histories, and interviews with a number of senior naval officers, including the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark. It is to be hoped that it will prove of immediate benefit to planners in the naval and joint worlds of the U.S. military, as well as to those of other nations potentially interested in exploiting its lessons to improve their own capabilities in this frequently neglected yet vital-indeed, life-saving-military mission.

This Naval War College Newport paper, Sailing New Seas, presents the ideas of one of the Navy's most senior leaders. Admiral Reason's topic is the course the United States Navy should steer in the "typhoon of change" characterizing today's and tomorrow's world. He begins by describing what the technological, managerial, and social hurricane of the Information Age means for warriors who go to sea. He then addresses, in general terms and in specifics, the response such an upheaval requires. While acknowledging the traditions that made the Navy great, Admiral Reason proposes a new way to think about the fleet as a whole, one that discards the "industrial age model" in favor of the "flight deck paradigm" of a high-performance organization operating at the edge of chaos. He concludes by stressing the importance of rapid adaptability to the Navy's paramount measure of performance-warfighting. This is an insightful blending of the implications of the "trans-industrial age" to future warfare, the criticality of data, the relevance of an extraordinary naval model of leadership, and the requirement for a new mind-set in the United States Navy. It is a brief essay, because the author recognizes that quickness and individual initiative are far more important than "top-down direction" and "the voice of experience" in readying today's Navy for tomorrow's challenges. "The task at hand," he writes, "is to lever the Navy from the Industrial Age to the trans-industrial age, using data-based arguments to increase the efficiency and quickness with which it accomplishes its missions."

The cornerstone of modern International Environmental Law is the prohibition of transfrontier pollution: states have the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond national jurisdiction. In addition, there is now a substantial body of international treaties laying down detailed regimes for various environmental sectors. Relatedly, recent international conflicts have raised fundamental questions about the relationship between international law and armed conflict. The notion that the rules of general international environmental law continue to apply during armed conflict is now well accepted, but the principles that are usually cited remain at a very high level of abstraction. Dr. Sonja Ann JozefBoelaert-Suominen, legal adviser in the Office of the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the Hague, the Netherlands, examines the extent to which international law has developed more detailed rules to protect the environment in international armed conflict. After a discussion of the main legal issues, the author focuses on the marine environment, examining the relationship between naval warfare, on one hand, and multilateral environmental treaties on marine safety and the prevention of marine pollution, on the other. Dr. Boelaert-Suominen argues that the majority of these treaties do not apply during armed conflict, either because war damage is expressly excluded or because the treaties do not apply to warships. As for the treaties that are in principle applicable during armed conflict, her analysis shows that, under international law, belligerent and neutral states have the legal right to suspend those treaties, wholly or in part. The author concludes that very few of the treaties considered take the new law of armed conflict into account and that there remains a need for more detailed rules on environmental standards for military operations. In 1996, the Naval War College International Law Studies published volume 69 in its "Blue Book" series-Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict. This compilation of papers was written for and presented at the Law of Naval Warfare Symposium on the Protection of the Environment during Armed Conflict and other Military Operations, held at the Naval War College in 1995. Contributors to this conference suggested the necessity for a thorough study of the relationship between environmental treaties and the laws of war.

The Naval War College has expanded its expertise in the Asia-Pacific Rim region in recent years largely in response to the growing significance of the region to U.S. national security. The College has actively hired prominent scholars and hosted a number of conferences, workshops, and guest speakers focusing on the problems and possibilities facing the Pacific Rim. South and Northeast Asia, after all, are home to some of the world's fastest-growing economies and close American allies, as well as several potential political and diplomatic flashpoints. Even more to the point, China is an ascending economic and military power both in the region and on the world stage. The U.S. Navy plays a leading role in maintaining stability in the region with its strong presence and ability to guard the freedom of navigation in vital sea lines of communication. The efforts of the Asia-Pacific Rim specialists at the Naval War College in some ways represent a case of "back to the future." One of the proudest episodes in the College's history came in the 1930s when Newport played a central role in developing the military plans necessary to cope with the ascendance of another Asian economic and military power-Japan. Although we expect that wise diplomacy and national self-interest will prevent a reoccurrence of similar difficulties in the coming decades, there is no substitute for military preparedness and well-thought-out international and regional strategies for dealing with the important region. The Naval War College Press has done its part in providing its readers with many excellent articles on regional security in Asia in the Naval War College Review; an important book-Jonathan Pollack, editor, Strategic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century (released March 2004); and now Newport Paper 22. Professor Lyle Goldstein of the Strategic Research Department of the College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies has been at the forefront of recent research into China's future. In this project he has guided a handful of naval officers through the puzzle of China's ongoing nuclear modernization programs. With the able assistance of Andrew Erickson, these sailor-scholars have examined various aspects of nuclear modernization from ballistic missile defense to nuclear command and control. In general the chapter tells a cautionary tale; the progress of China's nuclear modernization documented here should give pause to those inclined to dismiss China's military modernization. Steadily and with relatively little attention the People's Republic continues to improve its technologies and weapons systems. As the authors emphasize, no "Rubicon" has been crossed, but potentials are already apparent that, if realized, the U.S. Navy as now constituted would find challenging indeed.

Sometimes lost in the deluge of attention devoted to national security challenges in the Middle East and Asia is the importance of America's own backyard, the countries and waters of Latin America and the Caribbean. Even as the United States combats terrorists and their state supporters in the greater Middle East, and even as long-range planners cast wary eyes on the growing power of China, American strategists cannot and should not neglect the threats or challenges closer to home. After all, as this volume and others point out, Latin America is a key economic partner, both a market for American products and a source of many of the goods North Americans have come to take for granted. Moreover, the distance between the two regions is not great; inevitably crises and festering problems in Latin America lead to such problems in the United States as illegal immigration. Conversely, the American struggles against al-Qa'ida and other transnational threats may bring unwanted attention to places like the tri-border region as terrorists transit or seek refuge. Newport Paper 21, Latin American Security Challenges: A Collaborative Inquiry from North and South, helps reopen the door to serious analyses of the relationship between Latin American national security issues and American strategic interests. The monograph consists of an introduction and conclusion and three substantive essays analyzing specific issues facing Latin America. The first builds upon the concepts of failed states and borderless regions to suggest how criminals and perhaps terrorists can find refuge and perhaps support in localities outside the control of states. The second essay provides a solid introduction to the interconnection of economic behavior and the national security threats facing both Latin American governments and the United States. The final essay speculates on the interest of China in the region, with particular attention to the potential roles played by immigration and Chinese ownership of firms charged with operation of both access ports to the Panama Canal. It is our hope that this work will help reinvigorate sound thinking about U.S. policies toward Latin America and encourage closer cooperation between strategists and scholars in both regions. Such cooperation would provide real benefits to the national security communities and military establishments in the United States and many critical Latin American countries.

Though still adjusting to the end of the Cold War, the defense industry is now confronted with the prospect of military transformation. Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, many firms have seen business improve in response to the subsequent large increase in the defense budget. But in the longer run, the defense sector's military customers intend to reinvent themselves for a future that may require the acquisition of unfamiliar weapons and support systems. Joint and service visions of the military after next raise serious questions that require the attention of the Defense Department's civilian and uniformed leadership and industry executives alike: What are the defense industrial implications of military transformation? Will military transformation lead to major changes in the composition of the defense industrial base? This study employs network-centric warfare, a Navy transformation vision that is being adopted increasingly in the joint world as a vehicle for exploring the defense industrial implications of military transformation. We focus on three defense industrial sectors: shipbuilding, unmanned vehicles, and systems integration. The transformation to NCW will require both sustaining and disruptive innovation-that is, innovation that improves performance measured by existing standards and innovation that defines new quality metrics for defense systems. The dominant type of innovation needed to support transformation varies across industrial sectors; some sectors face more sustaining than disruptive innovation, while some sectors will need more disruptive than sustaining innovation as they supply systems for the "Navy after Next." Military transformation does not entail wholesale defense industrial transformation. In the systems integrations sector, much of the innovation required to effect networkcentric warfare is likely to be sustaining rather than disruptive. In the parts of the defense industrial base that build platforms, on the other hand, the standards by which proposals are evaluated for the Navy after Next will be somewhat different than the standards used in the past. As a result, transformation could significantly change the industrial landscape of shipbuilding. The unmanned-vehicle sector falls somewhere in between; because unmanned vehicles have not been acquired in quantity in the past, their performance metrics are not well established. Existing suppliers of unmanned vehicles will have a role in the future industry, but some innovative concepts and technologies may come from nontraditional suppliers, such as start-up firms. The U.S. Navy bears the responsibility of transforming itself. Internally, it must find ways to deconflict the needs of the current Navy and the "Next Navy" from the needs of the Navy after Next if industry is to support its long-term transformation requirements. Externally, pervasive organizational and political obstacles to transformation require that the Navy carefully manage its relationships with Congress and industry. Recognition that military transformation need not drive existing defense firms out of business will facilitate that task.

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John Hattendorf, is the thirtieth in the Newport Paper monograph series and the second in a projected four volume set of authoritative documents on U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning. The first volume in this series, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27, also edited by Professor Hattendorf, appeared in September 2006. The current volume was originally intended to include documents relating to the development of the Navy's "Maritime Strategy" during the 1980s, but the bulk of relevant material has made it advisable to dedicate a separate volume to that period; this is due to appear shortly. A final volume will then cover documents from the 1950s and 1960s.When combined with Professor Hattendorf 's authoritative narrative of the genesis and development of the "Maritime Strategy," The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19, these volumes will provide for the first time a comprehensive picture of the evolution of high-level U.S. Navy (and to some extent U.S. Marine Corps) strategic thinking over the half-century following the end of World War II. Many of the documents reprinted here were-and were intended to be-public statements. In all cases, however, these documents remain little known and mostly inaccessible, certainly outside the Navy itself. It is important to emphasize that they need to be read with careful attention to their historical and institutional contexts. They are in any case not always easy to interpret, and they differ substantially in the weight they carried at the time or later. For these reasons, we have felt it essential to present the documents accompanied by a general introductory essay that locates them in their appropriate contexts, as well as by brief commentaries on each providing additional pertinent information and attempting to assess their wider significances. This project, it is hoped, will contribute importantly not just to our understanding of our recent naval history but also to the serious study of military institutions, strategy, and planning more generally. Also, it is worth noting that this material is of more than merely historical interest. The U.S. Navy (with its sister sea services, the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard) is currently on the verge of completing a major review of its naval and maritime strategy in a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growing global economic interdependence. This exercise, whatever the immediate result may prove to be, has unquestionably served the valuable purpose of stimulating serious thought about fundamental strategic issues at many levels throughout the Navy. These volumes can be expected to be an important resource in a continuing process of strategic assessment and education as the Navy continues to adjust to a rapidly evolving security environment.

The present volume, Reposturing the Force: U.S. Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, is the twenty-sixth in the Newport Papers monograph series, published since 1991 by the Naval War College Press. Its primary aim is to provide a snapshot of a process-the ongoing reconfiguration of America's foreign military "footprint" abroad-that is likely to prove of the most fundamental importance for the long-term security of the United States, yet has so far received little if any systematic attention from national security specialists and still less from the wider public. As such, it serves well the broad mission of the Newport Papers series-to provide rigorous and authoritative analysis, of a sort not readily available in the world of academic or commercial publishing, of issues of strategic salience to the U.S. Navy and the national security community generally. Reposturing the Force is, however, unusual in the manner in which it combines rigor and authoritativeness, for several of its authors are or recently were senior U.S. government officials. Ryan Henry and Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., have been central figures in the Global Defense Posture Review (initiated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in 2002 as the key mechanism for forcing transformation of the U.S. overseas presence) while serving as, respectively, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. As such, they are uniquely positioned to comment on the unfolding of this vast, complex, and extremely sensitive undertaking, many of the details of which are still in flux or are (and likely will remain) classified. For additional perspective on the subject, however, we have felt it important to include also papers by several independent scholars and policy analysts. Robert Harkavy's opening essay helps to place current developments in the American global posture in a larger historical and strategic framework. Andrew Erickson and Justin Mikolay provide an in-depth analysis of the role of Guam in recent thinking and decisions about the posture of the U.S. military in the western Pacific. Finally, Robert Work examines the emerging concept of "sea basing" in Navy and Marine Corps doctrine and force planning, an integral yet so far largely neglected dimension of the American military presence abroad.

The principal findings of this study are that Great Britain's search for an independent nuclear deterrent was waged with a purposeful dedication that wedded highly effective statecraft and brilliant, innovative nuclear engineering to produce a strategic nuclear deterrent that remained under her sovereign control. Because Britain's efforts in this area were so often achieved in the face of United States' opposition, Britain's subsequent utilization of her deterrent capability as an instrument to secure American support, notwithstanding that opposition, ought to be considered an example of successful policy management. The product of this effort has been the Anglo-American "special relationship" in nuclear weapons. The demonstrable success of British policy management to nurture and secure the special relationship in nuclear weapons is confirmed by its endurance in the face of American indifference, if not overt hostility, to its continuation. A major contention of this inquiry, therefore, is that the independent nature of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent has been the primary prerequisite for the evolution of an interdependent, hence "special," relationship with the United States. This relationship will endure, for it must; the physics and metaphysics of strategic relationships in the thermonuclear age will secure this constancy. In the meantime, Britain will play a far greater role internationally than heretofore, just as the special relationship binds her ever closer to the United States. And this, after all, has always been a principal objective of British policy.

This collection of documents reflecting the evolution of official thinking within the United States Navy and Marine Corps during the post-Cold War era concerning the fundamental missions and strategy of the sea services is part of a larger project designed to bring greater transparency to an important dimension of our recent naval history. This project was initiated by Professor John Hattendorf with his authoritative study in Newport Paper 19, which utilized much previously classified material, of the so-called Maritime Strategy developed and promulgated by the Navy during the 1980s. In the present volume, Newport Paper 27, covering the decade of the 1990s, Professor Hattendorf assembles for the first time in a single publication all the major naval strategy and policy statements of this period. Though all are public documents, most of these statements remain very little known and relatively inaccessible, at any rate outside the Navy itself. They are also not always easy to interpret, reflecting as they often do subtle shifts in emphasis or the nuances of internal bureaucratic argument rather than broadly understandable major changes in strategic thought or practice. Accordingly, the documents are accompanied by an introductory essay that attempts to put them in the proper historical and institutional perspective, as well as by a brief commentary for each that provides additional pertinent information and attempts to assess wider significance. A second Newport Paper dealing with comparable naval strategy statements of the 1970s and 1980s, in the same format and also edited by Professor Hattendorf. It is important to bear in mind that this material is not merely of historical interest. In his address to the annual Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in June 2006, the Chief of Naval Operations. Adm. Michael Mullen, announced his intention to craft what he called a new "maritime strategy" geared to the contemporary and emerging global security environment. The complex and not altogether happy story of earlier efforts within the Navy along similar lines can contribute in vital ways to preparing essential groundwork for such an undertaking.

In September 2005, fifty-five chiefs of navies and coast guards, along with twenty-seven war college presidents from around the world gathered in Newport for the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium. We shared perspectives on a broad range of issues important to the global maritime community and individual countries through the mechanism of regionally oriented seminars. As the symposium drew to a close, a consensus was articulated that maritime security was fundamental to address these concerns, that the scope of security challenges reached beyond the waters of individual nations, and most importantly, that the responsibilities in the maritime domain-the great "commons" of the world-were shared. Moreover, the need was expressed for regional and global mechanisms that allowed maritime nations to more routinely and effectively bring their particular capabilities together to ensure a free and secure maritime domain. The host of the ISS, Admiral Mike Mullen, summarized the key proposition of the symposium: "Because today's challenges are global in nature, we must be collective in our response. We are bound together in our dependence on the seas and in our need for security of the vast commons. This is a requisite for national security, global stability, and economic prosperity." Acknowledging that "the United States Navy could not, by itself, preserve the freedom and security of the entire maritime domain," Admiral Mullen said that "it must count on assistance from like-minded nations interested in using the sea for lawful purposes and precluding its use by others that threaten national, regional, or global security." So too must each nation count on assistance from other nations. Over the past two years the Naval War College has found itself in a position of prominence in helping the leadership of our maritime forces, and the leaderships of our global partners, think through the implications of a new set of global security challenges and opportunities. It has been a very productive period since the College-against the fundamental notions of the Seventeenth International Seapower Symposium-was tasked to work on a new strategy "of and for its time." Critical to our effort to rethink maritime strategy has been an extensive scenario analysis and war-gaming effort and a series of high-level conferences, symposia, and other professional exchanges with maritime partners here in Newport and at other venues around the world. This collaborative effort has produced great insight and brought into focus the diverse perspectives necessary to make this strategy robust across multiple arguments and useful for both naval leadership and national policy makers in understanding the key role maritime forces must play in the evolving international system. We see some interesting new ideas in this strategy: the preeminent value of maritime forces to underwrite stability for the global system and an emphasis on unique capabilities inherent in maritime forces to prevent global shocks and to limit and localize regional conflict. While this enhances the long-standing naval commitment to provide high-end capability, there are clear new demands related to sustaining the global system-unique in the maritime domain. The new maritime strategy also recognizes that capacity must rely increasingly, across the range of military operations, on an expanded set of more robust, global maritime relationships-in effect, partnerships that engender trust, enable prevention, and yield more effective maritime security. The present volume contributes clearly and significantly to building just this sort of maritime partnerships. In subsequent guidance to the Naval War College, Admiral Mullen emphasized that any new strategy must be one viewed through the eyes of our partners. The essays from the Americas that follow are a compendium of "perspectives on maritime strategy."

To understand a series of events in the past, one needs to do more than just know a set of detailed and isolated facts. Historical understanding is a process to work out the best way to generalize accurately about something that has happened. It is an ongoing and never-ending discussion about what events mean, why they took place the way they did, and how and to what extent that past experience affects our present or provides a useful example for our general appreciation of our development over time. Historical understanding is an examination that involves attaching specifics to wide trends and broad ideas. In this, individual actors in history can be surprised to find that their actions involve trends and issues that they were not thinking about at the time they were involved in a past action as well as those that they do recognize and were thinking about at the time. It is the historian's job to look beyond specifics to see context and to make connections with trends that are not otherwise obvious. The process of moving from recorded facts to a general understanding can be a long one. For events that take place within a government agency, such as the U.S. Navy, the process cannot even begin until the information and key documents become public knowledge and can be disseminated widely enough to bring different viewpoints and wider perspectives to bear upon them. This volume is published to help begin that process of wider historical understanding and generalization for the subject of strategic thinking in the U.S. Navy during the last phases of the Cold War. To facilitate this beginning, we offer here the now-declassified, full and original version of the official study that I undertook in 1986-1989, supplemented by three appendices. The study attempted to record the trends and ideas that we could see at the time, written on the basis of interviews with a range of the key individuals involved and on the working documents that were then still located in their original office locations, some of which have not survived or were not permanently retained in archival files. We publish it here as a document, as it was written, without attempting to bring it up to date. To supplement this original study, we have appended the declassified version of the Central Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Estimate of March 1982, which was a key analysis in understanding the Soviet Navy, provided a generally accepted consensus of American understanding at the time, and provided a basis around which to develop the U.S Navy's maritime strategy in this period. A second appendix is by Captain Peter Swartz, U.S. Navy (Ret.), and consists of his annotated bibliography of the public debate surrounding the formulation of the strategy in the 1980s, updated to include materials published through the end of 2003. And finally, Yuri M. Zhukov has created especially for this volume a timeline that lays out a chronology of events to better understand the sequence of events involved. The study and the three appendices are materials that contribute toward a future historical understanding and do not, in themselves, constitute a definitive history, although they are published as valuable tools toward reaching that goal. To reach closer to a definitive understanding, there are a variety of new perceptions that need to be added over time. With the opening of archives on both sides of the world, and as scholarly discourse between Russians and Americans develop, one will be able to begin to compare and contrast perceptions with factual realities. As more time passes and we gain further distance and perspective in seeing the emerging broad trends, new approaches to the subject may become apparent. Simultaneously, new materials may be released from government archives that will enhance our understanding.

In The Third Battle, by Owen Cote, a manuscript developed under the editorial leadership of Dr. Thomas B. Grassey, then Press editor, Dr. Cote argues that the U.S. Navy's innovative response to the Soviet submarine fleet during the Cold War represents the third great battle for control of the seas in the 20th century. Technology was always the key factor in the continuing seesaw peacetime race between the two superpowers. Dr. Cote, Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, provides a critical groundbreaking perspective on this battle-quite different from the two that preceded it. During the two world wars, the then new and revolutionary submarine threatened the ability of the major naval powers to gain decisive control of the sea. In peacetime, the Allied powers were unable, or perhaps ultimately basically reluctant, to prepare innovative and effective measures to counter submarine use. In war, they then faced unrestricted submarine warfare and the attending significant losses. Those antisubmarine measures that were eventually developed were short-lived because of the close technological arms race between the combatants. It was only with the development in the mid-1980s of truly quiet Soviet nuclear submarines that the U.S. Navy decisively confronted the antisubmarine warfare challenge. Cote details the events leading to that point and presents a critical study of technological innovation with clear implications for challenges in the 21st century.

From the foreword. "In Defeating the U-boat: Inventing Antisubmarine Warfare, Newport Paper 36, Jan S. Breemer tells the story of the British response to the German submarine threat. His account of Germany's "asymmetric" challenge (to use the contemporary term) to Britain's naval mastery holds important lessons for the United States today, the U.S. Navy in particular. The Royal Navy's obstinate refusal to consider seriously the option of convoying merchant vessels, which turned out to be the key to the solution of the Uboat problem, demonstrates the extent to which professional military cultures can thwart technical and operational innovation even in circumstances of existential threat. Although historical controversy continues to cloud this issue, Breemer concludes thatthe convoying option was embraced by the Royal Navy only under the pressure of civilian authority. Breemer ends his lively and informative study with some general reflections on military innovation and the requirements for fostering it."

Newport Paper 39. The monograph is an empirical analysis of crisis haracteristics, actors, U.S. involvement, and outcomes, exploring the political use of naval forces during foreign-policy crises short of full-scale warfare. Dr. Forster, of the University of Zurich, uses a statistical model to analyze naval crisis data in ways useful to policy makers and strategists-outlining the unique characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of naval forces and summarizing theoretical literature on naval diplomacy and coercion, as well as earlier quantitative research.

Dr. Nordquist's study and Newport Papers 13, What Color Helmet?, reviews past peacekeeping operations and the aspects of the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use of force. He proposes that, given the end of the Cold War, distinctions in the UN Charter framework between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions can and ought to be reflected in future Security Council peacekeeping mandates. He also offers realistic peace-enforcement scenarios illustrating how updated mandates might operate. This overview of the Charter and the challenges of modern peace operations provides a better understanding of the legal and institutional nature of the Security Council, of why existing peacekeeping mandates now lack consistency, and of the importance of dealing with these issues. This study is divided into five chapters. The first focuses on the legal framework for peacekeeping and enforcement operations under the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. The general approach here is an article-by-article review of the pertinent texts, without delving into nuances of meaning or legislative history. Chapter II is a brief summary of the forty peacekeeping operations in which the United Nations engaged from June 1948 through the end of 1995. Again, to foster a reform-minded policy outlook, only a skeletal description of the mandate for each UN peacekeeping operation is given. Marshaling such an outline of peacekeeping operations is instructive in that even the bare recitation of this fifty years of practice reveals a remarkable range of experiences. It is easy to discern why Security Council mandates on peacekeeping lack consistency. Chapter III of this study contains an analysis of UN peacekeeping practice and of key points that ought to be dealt with in reformulating traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions under Security Council mandates. In Chapter IV, several scenarios are presented to illustrate how properly mandated peacekeeping and enforcement operations might work in the post-Cold War era. To emphasize the critical distinctions between different use of force mandates and the corresponding legal status of the individuals involved, the illustrations refer to white, blue, and green helmet participants. Chapter V of this study proposes a few suggestions to improve Security Council mandates for "mixed" traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions. A threshold comment is needed for clarification about the use of the term "peacekeeping" in this study. When the term appears alone, it refers to the great variety of activities that have been mandated and therefore formally designated as "peacekeeping" operations. As will be explained, peacekeeping is a generic label that, inter alia, obscures an important legal distinction between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions. From a legal perspective, it is important to know what is meant by the term "peacekeeping." However, efforts to use more precise words with better defined meanings may also pose problems. For instance, the term "peace enforcement" is now heard and often seen in the literature. While this is an understandable effort to distinguish operations based on consent from those that are not, the term is not taken from the Charter, is ill-defined in actual practice, and is logically inconsistent as a phrase. The approach preferred in this study is to use words taken from the text of the Charter or with an agreed meaning in State practice. However, bowing to overwhelming usage, an exception to this preference for precise language is made in the case of the term "peacekeeping." Accordingly, the term is used in this study generically to cover the entire spectrum of activities ranging from traditional peacekeeping to enforcement actions.

In a widely noted speech to the Navy League Sea-Air-Space Expo in May 2010, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates warned that "the Navy and Marine Corps must be willing to reexamine and question basic assumptions in light of evolving technologies, new threats, and budget realities.We simply cannot afford to perpetuate a status quo that heaps more and more expensive technologies onto fewer and fewer platforms-thereby risking a situation where some of our greatest capital expenditures go toward weapons and ships that could potentially become wasting assets." Secretary Gates specifically questioned whether the Navy's commitment to a force of eleven carrier strike groups through 2040 makes sense, given the extent of the anticipated superiority of the United States over potential adversaries at sea as well as the growing threat of antiship missiles. Though later disclaiming any immediate intention to seek a reduction in the current carrier force, Gates nevertheless laid down a clear marker that all who are concerned over the future of the U.S. Navy would be well advised to take with the utmost seriousness. We may stand, then, at an important watershed in the evolution of carrier aviation, one reflecting not only the nation's current financial crisis but the changing nature of the threats to, or constraints on, American sea power, as well as-something the secretary did not mention-the advent of a new era of unmanned air and sea platforms of all types. Taken together, these developments argue for resolutely innovative thinking about the future of the nation's carrier fleet and our surface navy more generally. In Innovation in Carrier Aviation, number thirty-seven in our Newport Papers monograph series, Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D.Mandeles examine the watershed period in carrier development that occurred immediately following World War II, when design advances were made that would be crucial to the centrality in national-security policy making that carriers and naval aviation have today. In those years several major technological breakthroughs-notably the jet engine and nuclear weapons-raised large questions about the future and led to an array of innovations in the design and operational utilization of aircraft carriers. Central to this story is the collaboration between the aviation communities in the navies of the United States and Great Britain during these years, building on the intimate relationship they had developed during the war itself. Strikingly, the most important of these innovations, notably the angled flight deck and steam catapult, originated with the British, not the Americans. This study thereby also provides interesting lessons for the U.S. Navy today with respect to its commitment to maritime security cooperation in the context of its new "maritime strategy." It is a welcome and important addition to the historiography of the Navy in the seminal years of the Cold War.

The U.S. Navy has had a long tradition of operating in East Asian waters. The first American warship to appear in those waters was the thirty-six-gun frigate USS Congress in late 1819, which called at Canton while providing protection to American merchant ships. In 1830, USS Vincennes, the first American warship to circumnavigate the globe, passed through the China seas and called at Macao. Two years later, in November 1832, the arrival of the sloop of war USS Peacock marked the beginning of a nearly constant presence of American warships in the Far East and the early beginnings of an American naval squadron cruising regularly to protect American shipping and business interests in the region. A dozen years later, in 1844, USS Brandywine brought the American envoy Caleb Cushing to Macao to negotiate the first treaty of peace, amity, and commerce between China and the United States, signed at the nearby village of Wanghai. Commodore James Biddle returned to China in the ship of the line USS Columbus in January 1846 to return America's formal ratification of that treaty. Among the officers in Columbus during this voyage was Midshipman Stephen B. Luce, who thus became the first in the long line of officers and faculty members at the Naval War College-the institution Luce founded nearly forty years later-to have had some direct experience of China. From that beginning, the College's body of expertise in and understanding of China, and of American experience in China, has grown exponentially. For over a century and a quarter, Naval War College students and faculty have had an interest in the subject. In the first part of the twentieth century, officers associated with the Naval War College served in-and even commanded-the Asiatic Fleet, the Yangtze Patrol, the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, and U.S. Naval Group China. Evidence of some of the College's past interests and connections in these areas may still be found and used in its archives and in its historical document and museum collections. Between 1950 and 1979, during the Cold War, much of the U.S. Navy's relationship with China centered around the Taiwan Patrol Force, whose duties included patrolling the international waters off mainland China's Fujian Province, which separates the mainland from the island of Taiwan. Based on Taiwan at Keelung in the north and at Kaohsiung in the south, U.S. Seventh Fleet sailors who were assigned to those patrol duties-mainly in destroyers and destroyer escorts-found on the island the only direct relationship available to them to interact with China and Chinese culture. Mainland China remained distant and obscure, sensed only by the distinctive smell of the land that many a sailor commented on in approaching the Chinese coast, even before it became distantly visible from the deck. American sailors in those years could get closer only during the occasional port visit to the British crown colony of Hong Kong, where they could take an opportunity to go to the far side of Hong Kong's New Territories to peer across the closed border into the People's Republic of China and to try to imagine what the mainland was really like. In this volume, Bruce Elleman, research professor in the Maritime History Department at the Naval War College, applies his expertise as one of the College's specialists in Chinese language and history to provide a pioneering history of American naval experience in the Taiwan Patrol. His focus reflects the Naval War College's interests in the policy, strategy, and operational levels and is designed to provide a historical complement to other work on current issues being done at the Naval War College-in the China Maritime Studies Institute and in other departments.