The end of the Cold War brought challenges not only for practitioners of national security policy and strategy but for those involved in the education and development of future strategic leaders and security policy practitioners. One of the primary contributors to this book, Professor James M. Smith of the U.S. Air Force Academy, launched this project in initial conversations in 1996-97 with Brigadier General Daniel J. Kaufman of the U.S. Military Academy, Dr. Robert L. Wendzel of the Air War College, and Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland of the U.S. Army War College. All four shared a concern about the future of security studies generally, but especially about the education and development of military officers as future strategic leaders.

On February 25, 2011, Kennesaw State University (KSU) and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, conducted a symposium entitled "Conflict Management: A Tool for U.S. National Security Strategy." This symposium was the first collaboration between KSU and SSI, and it was conducted in the inaugural year of KSU's new Ph.D. program in International Conflict Management (INCM). In addition to the focus on conflict management, the symposium was designed to examine one of the ongoing research interests in the SSI academic engagement series, the role of "whole of government" (WoG) efforts in addressing contemporary national and international security challenges and opportunities. Three symposium panels addressed the following topics: "Responding to New Foreign Policy and National Security Threats," "WoG Prospects and Challenges," and "WoG Lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan." The symposium discussions ranged from the conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in international interventions. Invited panelists shared their experiences and expertise on the question of WoG and the impact of fragile and failing states on national security concerns. The panelists engaged the audience in a discussion that included viewpoints from academia, the military, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and industry. Despite the broad range of viewpoints, a number of overarching themes and tentative agreements emerged. The reader will find them in the chapters of this edited volume.

The authors examine the utility of the U.S. Government's whole-of-government (WoG) approach for responding to the challenging security demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They specifically discuss the strategic objectives of interagency cooperation particularly in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict management. Discussions range from the conceptual to the practical, with a focus on the challenges and desirability of interagency cooperation in international interventions. Shared were experiences and expertise on the need for and future of an American grand strategy in an era characterized by increasingly complex security challenges and shrinking budgets. All agreed that taking the status quo for granted was a major obstacle to developing a successful grand strategy and that government, the military, international and nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector are all called on to contribute their best talents and efforts to joint global peace and security efforts.

On April 22, 2010, the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, and the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), U.S. Army War College, conducted a colloquium in Washington, DC, on "2010: Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in the Obama Administration." This conference marked the fifth collaboration between the Bush School and SSI. The first, "The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations," was held in 2006. In 2007, a workshop was held in College Station, Texas, on "The Interagency and Counter-insurgency Warfare." The third conference, "Reform and the Next President's Agenda," was held in March 2008, also in College Station, Texas. That conference was also co-sponsored by the nonpartisan Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), which includes re-tired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft as a member of its Guiding Coalition. The PNSR guiding coalition also originally included several key members of the Obama administration. The fourth conference, "Leadership and Government Reform," took place in June 2009. Two major topics were discussed: leader development in professional schools and leadership and "whole of government" reforms. The theme of the 2010 colloquium continued the discussion of "whole of government" reforms, but added three new areas of emphasis. The first identified the critical need for congressional leadership in carrying out transformational national security re-forms. The second addressed improving methods of strategic planning and assessment to meet the current U.S. fiscal constraints. The third discussed the transition from military to civilian leadership in Afghanistan and Iraq. Strategic Studies Institute.

Intended to facilitate dialogue between academic experts, military leaders, policymakers, and civilian practitioners, this edited volume provides a state of the art analysis of current whole of government (WoG) approaches and their effectiveness for coordinating stabilization and peacebuilding efforts. It explores the question: Can "smart power"-using the right tool for each operational context-successfully shift the burden of stability operations to civilian actors and enable the timely scaling-down of military deployments?

Today, America faces security challenges that are exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change. To meet these new challenges more effectively, the Obama administration advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power and enhancing America's whole-of-government (WOG) capabilities. Although the need for comprehensive integration and coordination of civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental, national and international capabilities to improve efficiency and effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts is widely recognized, Washington has been criticized for its attempts at creating WOG responses to international crises and conflicts for overcommitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and personnel, competition between agencies, ambiguous mission objectives, ..

On April 22, 2010, the Bush School of Government and Public Service and the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute cosponsored a colloquium in Washington, DC, on a mid-term assessment of leadership and national security reform in the Obama administration. Panelists included experts from the Project on National Security Reform; the Foreign Policy Research Institute; the Hudson Institute; the Council on Foreign Relations; the Reserve Officers Association; the American Security Project; and Creative Associates International, Inc. The colloquium theme focused on the need for advancing the research and study of national security reform by engaging the invited participants in sharing their expertise on ways to develop a deeper awareness and understanding of the reform issues facing the U.S. Government. Three panels of national security experts discussed: "Assessing National Security Reform;" "Legislative Imperatives;" and "Assessing National Security Reform--The Way Forward."

The authors present a new theory of decision-making that provides modes that can be used to describe such widely diverse political entities as the British cabinet, a Quaker meeting, or a village meeting in the Sudan. By studying the Free Democratic party in Switzerland, the authors produced four decision modes: decision by majority vote, decision by amicable agreement, non-decision, and the mode they develop and describe in the book--decision by interpretation. Originally published 1980. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

One of the most common criticisms of current U.S. security policy is that it lacks an overarching strategy, leading to a tendency to address problems and crises individually and in isolation as they arise. This study provides a broad description of the contemporary global security environment and an examination of U.S. security policy since the end of the Cold War. Traditional threats, such as those associated with major theater war, now coexist with newer nontraditional threats. The authors maintain that a sound strategy must support the ability of a country to hedge and adapt to a highly volatile security landscape. That, in turn, is accomplished through an executive level organizational mechanism to authoritatively integrate and execute a cogent national policy.

Understanding the key concepts of strategy and strategy formation is essential in order to place specific challenges--such as global instability and state failure--in an appropriate strategic context. The contributors outline the conceptual guidance for a relevant strategy to deal with the myriad political, economic, informational, and deterrence threats and challenges generated in today's unstable, chaotic, violent, and ambiguous global security environment. Their conclusions are unequivocal. The United States must come to grips with the fundamentally transformed nature of security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century. To do so requires a significant change in how the country develops its security strategy and how the country is organized to plan and implement that strategy.

This book examines the implications of the Persian Gulf crisis in order to enhance our understanding of the post-Cold War international system. More than just another analysis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent war, the book looks at the more general aspects of the use of force (political, economic, and military) evident in the Gulf crisis and what they can tell us about the emerging post-Cold War system. Contributors were selected on the basis of their ability to address specific questions and policy issues, and to cast their analyses at a broadly theoretical level.

Each chapter looks at a different aspect of conflict in the international system and how that relates to the Persian Gulf crisis. Several aspects of the crisis and the new international system are examined such as the role of the United Nations, the utility of economic sanctions, the historical origin of the crisis itself, the potential sources of conflict and responses to it, and the changing nature of the use of military force. To the extent that the lessons found contradict the common wisdoms that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the war, many of the chapters challenge the trend to find sweeping generalizations in the Gulf crisis that bear directly on international relations in the 1990s and beyond. Civilian and military policymakers, as well as students and teachers of international studies, will find this book of interest.