This is the first book to analyze how the technology to alter images and rapidly distribute them can be used for propaganda and to support deception operations.

In the past, propagandists and those seeking to conduct deception operations used crude methods to alter images of real people, events and objects, which could usually be detected relatively easily. Today, however, computers allow propagandists to create any imaginable image, still or moving, with appropriate accompanying audio. Furthermore, it is becoming extremely difficult to detect that an image has been manipulated, and the Internet, television and global media make it possible to disseminate altered images around the world almost instantaneously. Given that the United States is the sole superpower, few, if any, adversaries will attempt to fight the US military conventionally on the battlefield. Therefore, adversaries will use propaganda and deception, especially altered images, in an attempt to level the battlefield or to win a war against the United States without even having to fight militarily.

Propaganda and Information Warfare in the 21st Century will be of great interest to students of information war, propaganda, public diplomacy and security studies in general.

This is the first book to analyze how the technology to alter images and rapidly distribute them can be used for propaganda and to support deception operations. In the past, propagandists and those seeking to conduct deception operations used crude methods to alter images of real people, events and objects, which could usually be detected relatively easily. Today, however, computers allow propagandists to create any imaginable image, still or moving, with appropriate accompanying audio. Furthermore, it is becoming extremely difficult to detect that an image has been manipulated, and the Internet, television and global media make it possible to disseminate altered images around the world almost instantaneously. Given that the United States is the sole superpower, few, if any, adversaries will attempt to fight the US military conventionally on the battlefield. Therefore, adversaries will use propaganda and deception, especially altered images, in an attempt to level the battlefield or to win a war against the United States without even having to fight militarily. Propaganda and Information Warfare in the 21st Century will be of great interest to students of information war, propaganda, public diplomacy and security studies in general.

Anthony "Mouse" Maas is caught in the Baby Boomer Crunch with three free-spending daughters and financially strapped parents. A hard-working commodity broker in Los Angeles, Mouse is in a slump and his firm, for which he has made so much money, is about to fire him. Then his mother dies. At her funeral he meets his high school sweetheart, Sharon Calloway. She reawakens in him an old dream to become an artist. Desperate for money to pay off his debts, support his family, and have a chance to pursue his dream and, maybe, run away with Sharon, Mouse devises a scheme to bilk his ungrateful bosses of enough money to solve all his problems.

What would you risk to achieve your dream? Would you risk your career? Your life? Your child's life? While researching Alzheimer's disease, Los Angeles neurosurgeon Julie Stein discovers the key to her long-frustrated dream of becoming a novelist: a combination of drugs that allows her to write as well as Shakespeare. Unfortunately, the drugs' side effects may kill her. The high school football team is about to cut Julie's son, Pete, who dreams of playing linebacker in the NFL. Knowing the costs, he secretly starts taking anabolic steroids. Julie soon faces an awful choice: abandon her dream or risk both their lives?

Since February, 1962, a series of articles has appeared in Naval Aviation News under the title "Evolution of Aircraft Carriers." They measure up as an authentic, earnest attempt to chronicle a history of carriers since the mobile airfield idea was initially conceived. Here, under these covers, are the entire contents of those articles. This does not comprise a complete history of carriers - that history is still being written in seas around the world. This collection, based on information gathered from many office sources, provides an interesting account of how and why the carrier developed as it did. It is the story behind the perhaps better known tale of carrier operations. It is the story of change - change dictated by operational necessity and by technological progress. It is also the story of how naval constructors took full advantage of technological progress, and the lessons learned of operational experience to solve the Navy's unique problem of taking aviation to sea. As a result of their efforts and the constant improvement of tactics necessary to weld seas and air power together, the aircraft carrier stands today at the forefront of Naval power, ready and able to defend the nation and to project national interests to all parts of the world.

Does history provide lessons for foreign policy makers today? Macdonald combines cognitive psychology theories about analogical reasoning, international relations theories about military intervention, and original archival research to analyze the role of historical information in foreign policy decision making. He looks at the role of historical analogies in Anglo-American decision making during foreign policy crises involving the possible use of force in regional contingencies during a crucial period in the 1950s when the West faced an emerging Soviet threat. This study analyzes the influence of situational and individual variables in a comparison of more than ten leaders from two nations facing four different crises. Rolling the Iron Dice describes the often significant effect of historical analogies on perceptions of the adversary and of allies, time constraints, policy options and risks, as well as the justification of policy in four crises: the 1950 Korean invasion; the 1951-53 Iranian oil nationalization incident; the 1956 Suez crisis; and the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. Contrary to both the slippery slope and the escalation models of military intervention, Macdonald argues that leaders decide extremely early in a crisis, often on the basis of an historical analogy, but also based on perceptions of the rationality of an adversary, whether to use military force. Their decision does not change unless the adversary capitulates to every demand.