Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl explosion, disaster struck once again after a tsunami overwhelmed the considerable safety measures at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. However, Fukushima had in place a solid containment structure to reduce the spread of radiation in the event of a worst-case scenario; Chernobyl did not. These two incidents highlight the importance of such safety measures, which were critically lacking in an entire class of Soviet-designed reactors. This book examines why five countries operating these dangerous reactors first signed international agreements to close them within a few years, then instead delayed for almost two decades. It looks at how political decision makers weighed the enormous short-term costs of closing those reactors against the long-term benefits of compliance, and how the political instability that dominated post-Communist transitions impacted their choices. The book questions the efficacy of Western governments' efforts to convince their Eastern counterparts of the dangers they faced, and establishes a causal relationship between political stability and compliance behavior. This model will also enable more effective assistance policies in similar situations of political change where decision makers face considerable short-term costs to gain greater future rewards. This book provides a valuable resource for postgraduate students, academics and policy makers in the fields of nuclear safety, international agreements, and democratization.

Twenty-five years after the Chernobyl explosion, disaster struck once more after a tsunami overwhelmed the considerable safety measures at the Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. However, Fukushima had put in place a solid containment structure to reduce the spread of radiation in the event of a worst-case scenario; Chernobyl did not. These two incidents highlight the importance of such safety measures, which were critically lacking in an entire class of Soviet-designed reactors. This book examines why five countries operating these dangerous reactors first signed international agreements to close them within a few years, but instead delayed for almost two decades. It looks at how political decision makers weighed the enormous short-term costs of closing those reactors against the long-term benefits of compliance, and how the political instability that dominated post-Communist transitions impacted their choices. The book questions the efficacy of Western governments' efforts to convince their Eastern counterparts of the dangers they faced, and establishes the causal relationship between political stability and compliance behaviour.This model will also enable more effective assistance policies in similar situations of political change where decision makers face considerable short-term costs to gain greater future rewards. This book provides a valuable resource for postgraduate students, academics and policy makers in the fields of nuclear safety, international agreements and democratization.

The deadly May 31, 2010 Gaza flotilla incident has been misunderstood. This book explores the incident in more detail than mainstream media coverage has allowed-explaining the background, key players, and the incident itself-enriched by the authors having had unique access to senior Israeli officials in the immediate aftermath of the event. The incident is a microcosm of the struggle between terrorism and democratic societies, and raises a number of legal, ethical, and strategic political issues in the contemporary Middle East. Chapters address the political and military scenario preceding the incident, key state and non-state actors involved, military and ethical dimensions of the operation, and the aftermath in the media and politics. The book provides thoughtful and readable analysis that is useful to policy makers and to the general public, and draws some important conclusions for the continuing conflict between democratic states and terrorists and their sponsors.