Most histories of the northern sector of the Russian front concentrate on the siege of Leningrad, and focus little attention on the heavy fighting during the Wehrmacht's withdrawl into the Baltic countries. Retreat from Leningrad begins where those books end, with the massive January 1944 Soviet offensive which was designed not only to break the siege completely but also to destroy Army Group North. Enjoying huge superiorites in men and material, the Red Army attempted to crush two German armies which lacked more than a handful of tanks, contained a high percentage of unreliable foreign volunteers, and were hampered by Adolph Hitler's inflexable "no retreat" strategy. This untold story is recovered here in great detail, primarily as told by the German officers who served as commanders and chiefs of staff for Army Group North and its constituent armies. Their accounts were drafted soon after the war ended at the request of the United States Army, but have languished in poorly translated manuscripts until Professor Steven H. Newton re-translated, corrected, and annotated them, as well as providing subsatanial amounts of new material direct from the army group's operational records. The result is the most comprehensive and detailed operational study of sustained combat in the northern sector of the Russian front ever published in English. Dr Steven H. Newton is Associate Professor of History and Political Science at Delaware State University. Trained as a military historian, he received his Ph.D. fromn The College of William and Mary. His specalities include the German Army, Eastern from combat in World War II, and the American Civil War. Retreat from Lenigrad is his third book; he is also the author of German Battle Tactics on the Russian Front, 1941-1945(also available from Schiffer Publishing). Dr Newton is an active lecturer on Military topics, who has appeared in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York. He also serves as a platoon sergeant in Army National Guard's "Stonewall Brigade"(1st Brigade, 29th Infantry Division[Light]).

Most often viewed as a prelude to Robert E. Lee's Civil War victories of 1862, Joseph E. Johnston's campaign in Virginia early that year has been considered uninspired at best, catastrophic at worst. Steven Newton now offers a revisionist account of Johnston's operations between the York and James Rivers to show how his performance in the "Peninsular War" contributed to a crucial strategic victory for the Confederacy.

Newton acknowledges the limitations usually attributed to Johnston by other historians but suggests that assessments of the general's performance in Virginia have been colored by later controversies. He argues that contemporary sources portray Johnston as conducting his operations competently and within the strategic framework laid down in Richmond, even when he personally disagreed with those decisions. By holding his outnumbered army together and delaying the advance of Union forces, the general bought critical time for the Confederacy to recruit, organize, and arm the expanded army that would drive the Federals away from Richmond soon after Johnston himself was wounded at Seven Pines.

Focusing on the period between mid-February and late May 1862, Newton examines in detail the high-level conferences in Richmond to set strategy and the relationship of the Peninsula campaign to operations in the Shenandoah Valley and the western Confederacy. What emerges is a portrait of a general who was much more complex in thought and action than even his advocates have argued. By examining what Johnston actually accomplished rather than speculating on what he might have done, Newton shows that his overall conduct of the campaign holds up well under scrutiny.

Marked by painstaking research and analysis, Newton's reconsideration of Johnston is a key account of Confederate operations in the pivotal eastern Virginia theater in 1862. It provides an important new look at an episode in the war that until now has received little attention and helps rescue an unduly maligned leader from the shadow of Lee.