Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, by relatively small deployments of American forces, and by a very limited destruction of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield.

Iran appears to be pursuing an assertive foreign policy that confronts the United States on a variety of points: the Middle East peace process, the stability of moderate Muslim states, terrorism (such as the death threat to Rushdie), security in the Persian Gulf, and nuclear proliferation. However, Iran's intentions and capabilities are by no means clear. One the intentions side, some observers expect that a desire for good economic relations with the West and a waning of revolutionary fervor will lead to moderation in action if not in words; others see a broad consensus inside Iran for assertiveness, uniting Persian nationalism with Islamic fundamentalism. On the capabilities side, Iran is short on cash and faces growing internal political dissension, which some say means it will not be able to devote much to foreign adventures and the military build-up, while other say internal problems give Iran reason to acquire a military with which to pressure its rich neighbors. To discuss these issues the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University convened a workshop on "Iran's Strategic Intentions." The workshop brought together leading experts on Iranian security policy: speakers with access to Iranian officials and with the language skills to follow Iranian developments. Some of the points taken from the discussion, which by no means represent the view of all the authors or discussion participants, were: Iran is absorbed with domestic problems. Foreign affairs is a secondary concern for Iran's leaders and its people. Foreign policies are in large part a by-product of domestic politics. The government lacks legitimacy. The post-Khomeini leadership is not accepted by many believers as the voice of religious authority. Religious figures in the provinces, especially those with large Sunni or non-Persian populations, increasingly reject the representatives sent from Tehran. The hold of the central government over the provinces in weakening. The economic situation is bad, and the popular mood is worse. Public and elite opinion both believe that the continued existence of the Islamic Republic is in doubt. Iran's military strategy does not emphasize external defense. Iran sees itself as friendless in a hostile world, but it does not see itself as facing a serious danger from its neighbors. Iraq is not seen as a credible threat for the foreseeable future, for political and military reasons. Turmoil in the southern parts of the former Soviet Union is not seen as posing a conventional military problem for Iran. Iran's principal external aims for its military are to discourage US involvement I the Gulf and to spread its influence in its neighborhood. The Revolutionary Guards and the security forces, which are increasingly coordinated with the military, may be called on regularly to suppress domestic unrest. Iran will pursue military capabilities at the low end and high end, not in the middle. Development of nuclear weapons makes excellent sense, to assert the revolutions success and its claim of equality to the great powers. Iran lacks the resources to engage in an extensive buildup of its conventional military. The leadership realizes that high-technology weapons are essential for success on the modern battlefield; revolutionary fervor is not sufficient. Support subversion and terrorism fits Iran's budget, its ideology, and its predilections. Nor does Iran believe it will have to pay a high price for this sort of low-intensity conflict.

This report calls into question the viability of the longstanding logic of naval force building. It provides a description of the opportunities that rapid advances in technology and organizational effectiveness offer the U.S. Navy as it looks to a demanding future. Most important, it provides an alternative feel architecture design that incorporates the three broad elements of the Department of Defense's transformation strategy.

The National Defense University recently hosted a major symposium to address the challenges to U.S. national security and international stability posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and missiles as a means of delivery. The need to examine such issues is clear. Perhaps no problem facing civilian and military decision makers today is as urgent and important as the effort to control the proliferation of such weapons. Put simply, WMD proliferation represents one of the most complex and fundamental threats to security today. Attended by many of the premier experts in the field, the NDU Symposium explored a broad spectrum of issues ranging from the incentives and disincentives for proliferation to non- and counterproliferation policies and programs. The panelists discussed such critical issues as how effectively present controls to prevent proliferation are working and how to protect against proliferation when it occurs. Most impressively, the participants ventured to identify alternative perspectives and approaches that may contribute to meeting the common challenges. All this unfolds in the pages that follow. It is a search for wisdom, for, as Cicero said twenty centuries ago, "Weapons are of little use on the field of battle if there is no wise counsel at home." Ervin J. Rokke Lieutenant General, USAF President, National Defense University

The Department of Defense has been successfully exploiting rapidly developing advances in information technology for military gain. On tomorrow's multidimensional battlefield - or "battlespace" - the increased density, acuity, and connectivity of sensors and many other information devices may allow U. S. Armed Forces to see almost everything worth seeing in real or near-real time. Such enhanced vision of the battlespace is no doubt a significant military advantage, but a question remains: How to we achieve dominant battlefield knowledge, namely the ability to understand what we see and act on it decisively? The papers collected here address the most critical aspects of that problem - to wit: If the United States develops the means to acquire dominant battlespace knowledge (DBK), how might that affect the way it goes to war, the circumstances under which force can and will be used, the purposes for its employment, and the resulting alterations of the global geomilitary environment? Of particular interest is how the authors view the influence of DBK in light of the shift from global and regional stability issues that marks the post-Cold War world. While no definitive answer has yet emerged, it is clear that the implications of so profound a change in military technology are critical to the structure and function of the U.S. Armed Forces. In working toward a definitive answer, the authors of this volume make an important contribution to a debate whose resolution will shape the decades to come. Ervin J. Rokke Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University

In 2003, the U.S. Army began a process to transform from a division-based to a modular force structure. Congress requested a study of the process and outcomes of the initiative to assess the impact on the Army's capabilities in a range of operations.