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NATO has been a "nuclear" alliance since its inception. Nuclear
weapons have served the dual purpose of being part of NATO military
planning as well as being central to the Alliance's deterrence
strategy. For over 4 decades, NATO allies sought to find
conventional and nuclear forces, doctrines, and agreed strategies
that linked the defense of Europe to that of the United States.
Still, in light of the evolving security situation, the Alliance
must now consider the role and future of tactical or non-strategic
nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Two clear conclusions emerge from this
analysis. First, in the more than 2 decades since the end of the
Cold War, the problem itself-that is, the question of what to do
with weapons designed in a previous century for the possibility of
a World War III against a military alliance that no longer
exists-is understudied, both inside and outside of government.
Tactical weapons, although less awesome than their strategic
siblings, carry significant security and political risks, and they
have not received the attention that is commensurate to their
importance. Second, it is clear that whatever the future of these
arms, the status quo is unacceptable. It is past the time for NATO
to make more resolute decisions, find a coherent strategy, and
formulate more definite plans about its nuclear status.
Consequently, decisions about the role of nuclear weapons within
the Alliance and the associated supporting analysis are fundamental
to the future identity of NATO. At the Lisbon Summit in Portugal in
November 2010, the Alliance agreed to conduct the Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review (DDPR). This effort is designed to answer
these difficult questions prior to the upcoming NATO Summit in May
2012. The United States and its closest allies must define future
threats and, in doing so, clarify NATO's identity, purpose, and
corresponding force requirements. So far, NATO remains a "nuclear
alliance," but it is increasingly hard to define what that means.
he role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are
subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international
security, primarily because it is so often disconcerting to
remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an
American journalist wryly noted that the future of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was "a subject that drives the
dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart"- a dismissive quip
which would have remained true right up until the moment World War
III broke out. The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared
to the momentous issues that the East and West have tackled since
the end of the Cold War, the scattering of hundreds (or in the
Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe
seems to be almost an afterthought, a detail left behind that
should be easy to tidy up. Such complacency is unwise. Tactical
nuclear weapons (or NSNWs, "non-strategic nuclear weapons") still
exist because NATO and Russia have not fully resolved their fears
about how a nuclear war might arise, or how it might be fought.
They represent, as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, "the
longest deadlock" in the history of arms control. Washington and
Moscow, despite the challenges to the "reset" of their relations,
point to reductions in strategic arms as a great achievement, but
strategic agreements also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear
weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the
2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are lower than
at any point in history, but they are based on leaving each side a
reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each.
Inflicting this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a
step no sane national leader would take. But it is here that
tactical weapons were meant to play their dangerous role, for they
would be the arms that provided the indispensable bridge from peace
to nuclear war. Thus, the structures of Cold War nuclear doctrines
on both sides remain in place, only on a smaller scale.
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