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Are there objective moral truths (things that are morally right or
wrong independently of what anybody thinks about them)? To answer
this question more and more scholars have recently begun to appeal
to evidence from scientific disciplines such as psychology,
neuroscience, biology, and anthropology. This book investigates
this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically
focused, partly clarificatory, and partly metatheoretical way. It
argues for two main theses. First, it is possible for the empirical
sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate.
And second, most appeals to science that have so far been proposed
are insufficiently empirically substantiated. The book's main
chapters address four prominent science-based arguments for or
against the existence of objective moral truths: the presumptive
argument, the argument from moral disagreement, the sentimentalist
argument, and the evolutionary debunking argument. For each of
these arguments Thomas Poelzler first identifies the sense in which
its underlying empirical hypothesis would have to be true in order
for the argument to work. Then he shows that the available
scientific evidence fails to support this hypothesis. Finally, he
also makes suggestions as to how to test the hypothesis more
validly in future scientific research. Moral Reality and the
Empirical Sciences is an important contribution to the moral
realism/anti-realism debate that will appeal both to philosophers
and scientists interested in moral psychology and metaethics.
Philosophers have long debated whether morality is objective. But
how do lay people think about this matter? A Philosophical
Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism discusses the philosophical
aspects of this question in an accessible, integrated and coherent
way. The first part argues that many empirical studies have been
unsuccessful in fully or exclusively measuring beliefs about moral
objectivity. Still, there are a few lessons that can be drawn from
them. Most importantly, lay people are not objectivists. They
believe that moral statements only express desires or that their
truth is relative to individuals or cultures. The book's second
part considers ways in which these empirical findings may help
assess philosophical theories about moral objectivity. Overall,
findings about people's moral objectivity beliefs suggest that
morality is not objective. The truth of the matter may even lie
beyond the traditional objectivism/non-objectivism dichotomy. This
book develops a unique perspective on a thriving new area of
research. It is a valuable resource for upper level undergraduates,
postgraduates and researchers in moral psychology, theoretical
psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics and philosophy of
the mind.
Philosophers have long debated whether morality is objective. But
how do lay people think about this matter? A Philosophical
Perspective on Folk Moral Objectivism discusses the philosophical
aspects of this question in an accessible, integrated and coherent
way. The first part argues that many empirical studies have been
unsuccessful in fully or exclusively measuring beliefs about moral
objectivity. Still, there are a few lessons that can be drawn from
them. Most importantly, lay people are not objectivists. They
believe that moral statements only express desires or that their
truth is relative to individuals or cultures. The book's second
part considers ways in which these empirical findings may help
assess philosophical theories about moral objectivity. Overall,
findings about people's moral objectivity beliefs suggest that
morality is not objective. The truth of the matter may even lie
beyond the traditional objectivism/non-objectivism dichotomy. This
book develops a unique perspective on a thriving new area of
research. It is a valuable resource for upper level undergraduates,
postgraduates and researchers in moral psychology, theoretical
psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics and philosophy of
the mind.
Are there objective moral truths (things that are morally right or
wrong independently of what anybody thinks about them)? To answer
this question more and more scholars have recently begun to appeal
to evidence from scientific disciplines such as psychology,
neuroscience, biology, and anthropology. This book investigates
this novel scientific approach in a comprehensive, empirically
focused, partly clarificatory, and partly metatheoretical way. It
argues for two main theses. First, it is possible for the empirical
sciences to contribute to the moral realism/anti-realism debate.
And second, most appeals to science that have so far been proposed
are insufficiently empirically substantiated. The book's main
chapters address four prominent science-based arguments for or
against the existence of objective moral truths: the presumptive
argument, the argument from moral disagreement, the sentimentalist
argument, and the evolutionary debunking argument. For each of
these arguments Thomas Poelzler first identifies the sense in which
its underlying empirical hypothesis would have to be true in order
for the argument to work. Then he shows that the available
scientific evidence fails to support this hypothesis. Finally, he
also makes suggestions as to how to test the hypothesis more
validly in future scientific research. Moral Reality and the
Empirical Sciences is an important contribution to the moral
realism/anti-realism debate that will appeal both to philosophers
and scientists interested in moral psychology and metaethics.
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